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JULY 10, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
Fortress Wilna. Strong Soviet attacks supported by artillery 
and mortar fire were beaten back during the night. However, the 
Soviets had managed to infiltrate the German lines and establish 
several strong points in the city equipped with light machine guns, 
mortars and anti-tank rifles.536 Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf west of the 
city was under attack from the east, south and southwest by 
approximately 40 Soviet tanks (see Figure 145). Rykonty was 
entered during the night by Soviet armor. Maj. General 
Heidkaempfer informed Lt. General Krebs of the threatening 
situation faced by Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf at 0545 hrs. The very 
serious situation west of Wilna was complicated by Soviet armored 
attacks since Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf had no anti-tank weapons to 
stop the armored thrust in the direction of Kauen (see Figure 145). 
Nevertheless, Kampfgruppe T olsdorf was ordered by Field Marshal 
Model to hold the Landwarow bend (see Figure 145). Therefore, the 
3rd Panzer Army requested the use of the Luftwaffe "Panzerjaeger" 
air support.537 Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern smashed a 
Soviet infantry battalion east of Meyszagola, but the Soviets 
continued to reinforce this area constantly (see Figure 143). 
"Fortress Wilna" requested supply drops especially of 
ammunition. A Stuka attack at 1230 hrs was reported effective 
and another Stuka attack was requested. The Commandant of 
"Fortress Wilna" reported that the Soviets inside the city were 
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strong and that they had infiltrated the eastern part of the city by 
coming through a hole on the rail line in the south (see Figure 145). 
Presently, the Soviets were attacking from the north across the 
bridge on the right (see Figure 145). The Commandant requested 
that strong pressure be applied on the Soviets from the outside. 
Wilna was reported at 1535 hrs under heavy attack from 
practically every side (see Figure 145).538 The Commandant 
informed the High Command that the terrain in the east must be 
evacuated tonight. The garrison under command of General Stahel 
had fought on all sides and even had to beat back an attack in hand 
to hand combat within the German artillery position. Despite 
heroic defensive efforts not all breakthroughs could be avoided so 
that as a result of German losses the defenders were pressed back 
into a tighter ring in the inner city (see Figure 145) .539 "Fortress 
Wilna" reported heavy casualties during the day's fighting and two 
holes in the defensive line. One hole was at the mouth of the 
Wileika river and a 2 km wide hole in the south on both sides of the 
railway underpass. These penetrations allowed the Soviets to 
infiltrate the thin defense line and transfer the battle into the 
inner city.540 The plugging of these holes was not possible because 
of continued combat losses. Therefore, the defense line was pulled 
back under the cover of darkness. The Soviets had transferred 
strong forces south and north of Wilna further to the west while 
attacks had been launched against the city all day (see Figure 144). 
IX Army Corps. The 212th and 252nd Infantry Divisions 
occupied the new position after Grenadier Regiment 279 cleared it 
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of Soviet troops. The north wing of the Corps had already been 
outflanked by the Soviets and Buitunai (3.5 km southeast of 
Kuktiskes) was occupied (see Figure 146). The 3rd Panzer Army 
requested Army Group North to expedite the disengagement of the 
225th Infantry Division. The division was ordered directly to send 
all its motorized elements and truck mounted infantry to Wilkomir. 
Tauragnai was under attack in the morning from the east and the 
west (see Figure 146). The Soviets had gotten behind the left wing 
of the IX Corps at Buitunai and were attacking south which meant 
that the left wing would have to be pulled back since Army Group 
North had failed to close the gap by attacking south. 
Three battalions from the 225th Infantry Division were 
attacking in the hills of Alauso lake and were supposed to 
breakthrough to Utena. The 3rd Panzer Army hoped to employ the 
225th Infantry Division on the south wing of the Corps once it had 
fought through to Utena. However, later in the day it became 
apparent that the 225th Infantry Division was bogged down at 
Utena and could not link up with the left wing of the IX Corps. 
Army Group North decided to retain the division to close the hole 
between 3rd Panzer Army and Army Group North on the left wing of 
the IX Corps. The 225th Infantry Division had reached to within 7 
km northeast of Utena when the promised use of the Tiger Tank 
Battalion was withdrawn. Army Group North informed Army Group 
Center that approximately 7 Soviet divisions and armored 
formations of unknown strength were attacking and had partly 
outflanked the outermost right wing of Army Group North south of 
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Duenaburg. Therefore, the continuation of the attack to restore 
contact with the north wing of the 3rd Panzer Army was no longer 
possible.541 The Soviets advanced without hindrance to the north 
and northwest between Kuktiskes and Tauragnai (see Figure 146). 
The 212th Infantry Division was broken through in several 
positions and was pulled back to a new defensive line on the line of 
lakes: tip of Orinos lake - lsnarusee - southwest of Kraujaliai lake 
- southeast of Paseksciai (see Figure 146). Contact with the 252nd 
Infantry Division at this position was to be secured. 
Meanwhile, the 3rd Panzer Army was preparing to stop the 
Soviet advance east of Kauen. Field Marshal Model was assembling 
Kampfgruppe Kauen consisting of the new XXVI Army Corps, the 
first elements of the 6th Panzer Division, one parachute battalion, 
69th Infantry Division, and 93rd Infantry Division.542 The 63rd 
Infantry Division was also unloading in Jonava. 
4th Army 
Kampfgruppe Weidling. The Soviets were advancing on the 
rail line and road Lida-Grodno against Kampfgruppe Weidling (see 
Figure 144). The Soviets achieved numerous breakthroughs and 
forced the defensive line back to Orla -Lebioda - Pielasa (see 
Figure 144). 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Corps was attacked on both flanks 
and threatened by Soviet forces west of Wilna attacking south into 
the Solcza sector and arriving in the rear of the 4th Army. The 
Corps withdrew to the line Radun-Eischischken. 
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9th Army 
Kampfgruppe von Vormann was restored to Army level status. 
Kampfgruppe von Vormann became the resurrected 9th Army (see 
Figure 147).543 The command authority over the units was 
transferred from the 2nd Army to the restored 9th Army.544 
The Szczara front was broken through north of Byten and 
north of Slonim (see Figure 144). The 9th Army formations were 
forced to withdraw to the Hrwyda river. The 28th Jaeger Division 
was recovering behind the front line and was currently not combat 
effective. The division was building a second defensive line at the 
Zelwianka river and on both sides of Zelwa (see Figure 144). The 
12th Panzer Division was on the left wing of the 9th Army. 
JULY 11 , 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
Fortress Wilna. The garrison of Wilna succeeded in 
shortening the front during the night and closing the 1 km hole on 
the south edge of the city.545 German troops fought throughout the 
night to clean up Soviet resistance inside the city. The situation 
had become critical in Wilna with the increasing casualties and 
shortage of water. Hitler issued a "Fuehrer Befehl" at 1528 hrs: 
Fight your way out over the Wilja river to the left wing 
of Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf at the mouth of the Waka 
river.546 
General Stahel requested aerial reconnaissance to determine 
the route with the least enemy resistance. Radio communications 
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to "Fortress Wilna" were heavily jammed during the entire day and 
completely ceased at 2130 hrs.547 There were no further reports 
for the day from "Fortress Wilna." Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf pushed 
the Soviets back at Woly in a counterattack. However, Soviet armor 
during the course of the day succeeded in cutting off the 
Kampfgruppe's supply road to the northwest by taking Vievis. 
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf was as a result likewise encircled since 
partisans were located on its western front. SS Parachute 
Battalion 500 with the first elements of the Panther Battalion of 
the Gross Deutschland Division organized a blocking position on 
both sides of the road to Kowno (see Figure 148). 
IX Army Corps. The Soviets thrust deeply into the flank west 
of Dubingiai to the north which threatened the rear of the IX Corps 
(see Figure 149). Kuktiskes on the outermost left wing was lost 
after bitter fighting in the town. The north wing of the Corps was 
threatened by the unhindered advance of Soviet Divisions on both 
sides of the Utena-Wilkomir road (see Figure 149).548 The IX Corps 
Command Post moved during the evening to Sventupe (2 km 
northeast of Vidiskiai) (see Figure 149). The strength of the IX 
Corps divisions with the exception of the 212th Infantry Division 
had fallen significantly: 
252nd Infantry Division: approximately 900 men 
Corps Detachment D: 550 men 
391 st Security Division: 1200 men.549 
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The left wing and center of the IX Corps were to be pulled back that 
night to the following line: the lakes east of Moletai - northern tip 
of Virinto lake - Kanjukai - Rubikai lake (see Figure 149). 
Colonel General Reinhardt addressed three vital questions to 
Field Marshal Model: 
1 . The relief of Wilna. 
2. The hole to Army Group North after the II Army 
Corps retreats up to 25 km northeast of Utena. 
3. The preparation of a position from Kauen to the 
north, where no natural obstacle can be found up to the 
Memel river north of Kauen.550 
The answers to these questions were vital to 3rd Panzer Army's 
defensive preparations. 
Field Marshal Model responded that the mission of the 3rd 
Panzer Army was to prevent a widening of the hole between the 3rd 
Panzer Army and Army Group North. Field Marshal Model ordered 
the following: 
1 . The Nieman front south of Kauen is to be blocked. 
2. The battle at Kauen and to the northeast is to be 
conducted so Kauen, Janow and Wilkomir can be held. 
Mobile elements of engaged units are to intercept 
enemy armored spearheads rapidly and establish 
defensive lines. 
3. Contact with Army Group North is to be restored. 
The IX Army Corps is to maintain firm contact with the 
west within the Army's front. The II Corps will t?e 
requested to close the hole at Utena with the 22Sth and 
87th Infantry Divisions. The border between 3rd Panzer 




Kampfgruppe Lt. General Floerke was attacked by the Soviets 
northeast of Wawiorka and broke through 1 O km to the southwest. 
Kampfgruppe Weidling was forced to pull back its north wing to the 
line Wawiorka-Sobakinze (see Figure 150). The 5th and 7th Panzer 
Divisions were withdrawn under the cover of the 170th Infantry 
Division to the northwest (see Figure 150). The 5th Panzer Division 
and a reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment from the 7th Panzer 
Division attacked the Soviets entering the line Daugai-Valkininkai 
(see Figure 150). 
9th Army 
The resurrection of the 9th Army from "Kampfgruppe von 
Vormann" resulted in a new assignment. The 9th Army was 
directed to conduct the construction of a rear defensive position 
along the line Brest-Grodno.552 It was hoped by Army Group Center 
that the Soviet advance could finally be stopped on this line. The 
Soviets had broken through again on the 9th Army front east of the 
Polish border (see Figure 151 ). 
453 
JULY 12, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
Fortress Wilna. Radio communications from "Fortress Wilna" 
had ceased at 2130 hrs on July 11th and were later resumed at 
0345 hrs by General Stahel. General Stahel reported that his 
Kampfgruppe would begin the breakout to the west along the north 
bank of the Wilja river tonight beginning approximately at 2230 
hrs.ss3 Losses were reported as lighter than in previous days. 
Stronger Soviet forces were reported crossing the Wilja river at 
Lesniki moving in a northwestern direction. The Soviets had also 
constructed a floating bridge east of the north bridge in Wilna with 
the intention of advancing north. General Stahel requested by radio 
that Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf assign a detachment with heavy 
weapons to hold the town at the junction of the Waka river with the 
Wilja river. 
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported that the Soviets succeeded in 
forcing their way across a bridge north of Rykonty and penetrated 
the wooded terrain northwest of Rykonty. Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf 
was ordered at 0822 hrs to hold the southern front and the area 
around Woly under all circumstances. Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf and 
Kampfgruppe Stahel were to join together.ss4 The area on the Wilja 
river bank in the area of Woly was to be held for the breakout of the 
Wilna garrison.sss Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf requested Luftwaffe air 
support at 1530 hrs for the woods south of Landwarow and the hills 
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northeast of Pietuchowo. Air support was requested at 2100 hrs 
for the hills east of Woly and the woods south of the town. 
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf announced by radio at 2015 hrs that 
relief was on the way. The 6th Panzer Division was ordered to 
attack in the direction of Landwarow at 0600 hrs the next 
morning.556 The 6th Panzer Division was to be reinforced by a 
Panzer battalion from the Panzer Division "GrossDeutschland," SS 
Parachute Battalion 500 and 1112 companies from Parachute 
Regiment 16.557 This attack was to assist the breakout of 
Kampfgruppe T olsdorf and the garrison of Wilna to an area east of 
Kauen. Luftwaffe support was secured to support this attack. 
The 3rd Panzer Army had transferred its Command Post to 
Babtai, 21 km northwest of Kauen (see Figure 151 ). The further 
withdrawal of the 225th Infantry Division during the course of the 
day widened the hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 16th 
Army through which a Soviet tank brigade entered. However, the 
16th Army was organizing Kampfgruppe Kleffell consisting of the 
225th Infantry Division, 61 st Infantry Division and SS Panzer 
Reconnaissance Battalion 11 for the purpose of attacking to restore 
contact to the north wing of the 3rd Panzer Army.558 Olita was 
taken by Soviet attack during the day (see Figure 152). 
Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern attacked from 
Sirvintos to the east and destroyed 26 Soviet anti-tank guns, 2 
tanks and 2 assault guns in Griedraiciai leaving the town in flames. 
But the Brigade was cut off from its supply elements by Soviet 
attacks in the rear and was forced to fight its way back to 
Sirvintos where Kampfgruppe Schmidt was located (see Figure 
152). 
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Lt. General Krebs informed Major General Heidkaempfer that 
even though the second half of the 6th Panzer Division had not 
arrived other units would be coming. Therefore, the 3rd Panzer 
Army had two missions: 
1 . The present area was to be held. 
2. The hole to Army Group North was to be bridged by 
offensive action after the arrival of further units.559 
4th Army 
Kampfgruppe Weidling was pushed back to the line Szecuzyn-
Ostryna by Soviet cavalry forces (see Figure 153). Further Soviet 
penetrations on the north wing of the Kampfgruppe forced another 
withdrawal to the line Niemen-Kotra sector (see Figure 153). 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The 5th Panzer Division attacked to the 
north and delayed the Soviet advance from Wilna (see Figure 152). 
Defensive battles raged with the focal point west of the rail line 
Wilna-Grodno (see Figure 152). Thirty Soviet tanks broke into 
Varena, but were repulsed in a counter stroke (see Figure 152). The 
5th and 7th Panzer Divisions were employed on both sides of the 
Dugai lake against the flank of the Soviet armor that had entered 
Olita (see Figure 152). 
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2nd Army 
The withdrawal movement of the XX Corps progressed as 
planned. Soviet attacks on Pinsk were beaten back on the north 
wing of the XXlll Army Corps. A deep breakthrough was achieved on 
the 129th Infantry Division's sector (see Figure 153). The 
penetration reached the Jasiolda river north of Sielek and 
Smolanica whereby a wide hole was ripped to Kampfgruppe 
Harteneck (see Figure 153). The Soviet attack on the front of 
Kampfgruppe Harteneck and the L V Army Corps achieved several 
penetrations up to a depth of 5 km. 
JULY 13, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
Fortress Wilna. There were no reports since 2230 hrs 
yesterday concerning the breakout of the garrison from Wilna. 
Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported combat activity coming from the 
direction of Wilna during the early morning hours. Colonel General 
Reinhardt drove to the 6th Panzer Division in the morning and 
ordered an attack at 0745 hrs toward Landwarow using the present 
units and the artillery from Panzer Division "GrossDeutschland."560 
Finally, Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf reported at 0955 hrs that the uneasy 
wait was over. The radio message read: 
Stahel reached me with about 400 men initially. Stahel 
reports: Breakthrough with 3000 men 
succeeded ... Enemy very quiet.561 
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The most difficult phase of treeing the garrison of Wilna 
appeared to be successful, but Kampfgruppe Tolsdort still remained 
encircled (see Figure 154). The Soviets continued to attack 
Kampfgruppe Tolsdort from the west. The location of the relieving 
force at 1020 hrs was uncertain. The spearhead of the group 
consisted of the Panther Battalion of the Panzer Division 
"Grossdeutschland" and the Kampfgruppe of the 6th Panzer 
Division.562 Koschedoren was reported cleared of Soviets at 0840 
hrs and the Panther Battalion of Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" 
had passed Vievis at 1205 hrs. The Panther battalion "GD" radioed 
the 6th Panzer Division that contact had been made with 
Kamptgruppe Tolsdort at 1300 hrs (see Figure 155).563 The route of 
retreat for the group would be in the rear northeast of Ziezmuriai 
which was under Soviet fire. Kampfgruppe Tolsdort reported that 
approximately 3000 men as of 2030 hrs of Kampfgruppe Stahel had 
arrived (see Figure 155).564 They had crossed the Wilja river twice 
and were mostly lacking clothes. The 6th Panzer Division secured 
the line at Vievis and Ziezmariai for the transportation to the rear 
of the combat veterans of Wilna. According to Soviet sources the 
Battle of Wilna which ended on July 13th resulted in 8000 Germans 
killed and 5000 taken prisoner.565 
4th Army 
Kampfgruppe Weidling was outflanked on the north and the 
Soviets tried to take Grodno by a surprise attack which was 
defeated by rapidly concentrated forces (see Figure 156). Soviet 
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armor that had broken into the city was destroyed. Weak police 
forces were holding the city against strong Soviet attacks from the 
north and northeast. The 5th Panzer Division was ordered to Grodno 
to mop up Soviet resistance.566 
The XXXIX Panzer Corps completed its withdrawal to the 
expanded bridgehead at Merken. Nevertheless, Soviet penetrations 
made it necessary to withdraw from the contracting bridgehead. 
Weak Soviet units succeeded in reaching the west bank of the 
Niemen river at Olita (see Figure 156). 
2nd Army 
The last units of the XX and XXlll Army Corps on the right 
wing of the 2nd Army had crossed over the Jasiolda river. The 
Soviets attacked the right wing of Kampfgruppe Harteneck and 
broke through the front of the 129th Infantry Division at several 
positions and forced the division back (see Figure 156). 
Kampfgruppe Harte neck and the L V Army Corps were withdrawn 
during the-night of July 13-14th to the line Kuklicze - east of 
Wolkowysk - to along the Ros river. The 12th Panzer Division on 
the left wing of the L V Army Corps smashed an encircling attack by 
two Soviet rifle divisions.567 
JULY 14-31, 1944 
The Soviet advance began to slow down as they advanced 
further to the west. German resistance stiffened as German forces 
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fell back toward East Prussia and Poland. German reinforcements 
were poured into Army Group Center to stabilize the front which 
had been ripped wide open. There was only one more major loss by 
Army Group Center which involved Corps Detachment E in the 
encirclement of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk." Brest-Litovsk was a 




The defense of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" was conducted by the 
203rd Security Division and Corps Detachment E (see Table XXXVll) 
(see Figure 158).568 Corps Detachment E consisted of three weak 
divisional groups: 86th, 137th and 251 st Infantry Divisions.569 Lt. 
General Felzman, Commander of Corps Detachment E was appointed 
Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" on July 21, 1944.570 
This "Fortress" like all the other "Fortresses" on the Eastern 
Front suffered the same fate. Soviet forces broke through 
northwest and southwest of the city cutting it off and encircling 
its garrison. Field Marshal Model recognized that holding "Fortress 
Brest-Litovsk" was pointless when it could not be given adequate 
supplies and sufficient troops.571 The fate of "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" would not be decided by the outer or inner defensive rings, 
but by events north of the city and behind the city west of the Bug 
river. 
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July 25, 1944 
2nd Army 
Soviet armor forces advancing south of Siedlice were beaten 
back during the morning by the attack of assault guns. Strong 
Soviet forces from the area of Lukow advancing in a northern 
direction arrived south of the Siedice-Miedzyrzec road (see Figure 
159). 
The VI II Army Corps was thrown back to the line Miedzyrzec-
Biala Podlaska. Soviet forces broke through the 168th Infantry 
Divisions sector but elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade succeeded 
in a counterattack in restoring communications between Biala 
Podlaska and the west front of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" (see Figure 
159). The withdrawal of the 541 st Infantry Division from the Bug 
river line was pursued by the Soviets to the northeast. 
The Soviets attacked the north wing of the 5th SS Panzer 
Division "Wiking" in the XXll I Army Corps sector from the northeast 
and southwest and forced the Division from Kleszczele to the south 
(see Figure 159).572 The 4th Panzer Division was unable to parry 
the Soviet attack by an armored thrust along the rail line to 
Kleszczele because of a Soviet attack from the east (see Figure 
159). 
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JULY 26, 1944 
2nd Army 
The 2nd Army was engaged by the concentrated attacks of 7 
Soviet Armies and 5 Mobile Corps.573 Soviet attacks were repulsed 
from the west, south and southeast by the garrison of Siedlce 
which had been reinforced by elements of the 3rd SS Panzer 
Division "Totenkopf." (see Figure 160). The Soviets, however, 
crossed over the road east of the city and took Mordy (see Figure 
160). The front from west of Miedzyrec to Brest and the continuous 
southern front of the 2nd Army had been broken through by Soviet 
armor supported attacks in numerous places (see Figure 160). 
Miedzyrzec and Biala Podlaska were lost (see Figure 160).574 The 
3rd Cavalry Brigade counterattacked and destroyed 2 Soviet 
battalions northeast of Biala Podlaska and threw the advancing 
Soviets back over the road to the south.575 The Soviet attacks 
during the evening with infantry and armor achieved a deep 
breakthrough 20 km east of Biala Podlaska to the north and pushed 
forward on the Terespol-Janow Podlaski road (see Figure 160). 
Soviet cavalry from the wooded terrain north of Mielnik pressed to 
the southeast in the direction of Wysokie Litewski. The Soviet 
advance continued despite the best efforts of the German 1st 
Flieger Division which attempted to interdict from the air the 
Soviet advance in the area of Siedlce - Lukow and the area of 
Bialystok (see Table XXXVlll). 
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The Soviets attacked the XXlll Army Corps north of Brest with 
armor support and achieved a partial breakthrough up to the rail 
line Brest-Bielsk Podlaski (see Figure 174). The 5th SS Panzer 
Division "Wiking" had fended off Soviet attacks from the west, 
north and east in the area south of Kleszczele (see Figure 160). 
Fortress Brest-Litovsk. Soviet attacks on the outer defenses 
of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" broke through and the Soviets entered 
the inner defense ring of the city which lead to an extremely 
threatening situation (see Figure 174).576 The breakthrough into 
the inner defense ring combined with the progressive encirclement 
from the west placed the "Fortress" in an untenable position. There 
was only enough ammunition for 10 days at maximum and food 
supplies for 14 days.577 There were also 700 wounded which could 
not be evacuated and Junker 52 transport aircraft were 
requested.578 The Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" strived 
to acheive contact with the left wing of the 223rd Infantry 
Division Kampfgruppe by rapidly pulling out troops from the eastern 
front of Brest-Litovsk and transferring them to the west in the 
general line Dobryn Wik. - west of of Wolka - Dobryniska - west of 
Dobrynka (see Figure 161 ). However, the disengagement of troops 
from the east front of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" weakened the outer 
defense ring sufficiently that the Soviets achieved several 
penetrations in the defense line. 
"Fortress Brest-Litovsk" was only connected to the west by 
radio. The Soviets pressed their attacks in several sectors with 
units up to battalion strength. The Germans managed to liquidate 
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the penetrations at Kostomoloty, Zakije and Jamno. Nevertheless, 
the Soviets succeeded by advancing from the west and south 
against "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" achieving deep breakthroughs in 
the fortress defense line at Wolka Dobrynska.579 The 2nd Army 
granted permission for withdrawal to the inner defense ring of the 
fortress. 580 
German commanders had become sensitive to the disasters 
that had resulted from the encirclement of Hitler's so called 
fortresses. Colonel General Weiss, Commander of the 2nd Army 
expressed his concerns about the encirclement of Brest-Litovsk at 
121 O hrs to Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center. He 
informed Krebs that the situation was getting worse. The enemy 
had broken into Miedzyrzec from the south (see Figure 160). The 
enemy at Biala Podlaska could not be stopped after the loss of the . 
12th Hungarian Division and the cavalry (see Figure 160). Col. 
General Weiss stated: 
The crisis on the south flank of the Army has 
intensified. Brest cannot remain standing under these 
circumstances. It could come any minute when a 
situation that is not supposed to happen will appear 
terribly similar to the situation of Bobruisk ... Today it 
is necessary to pull back the garrison of Brest to the 
inner ring. I will order this action. Brest must be 
evacuated en masse as early as possible tonight. It is 
important that the first elements of the movement are 
rapid. It is important to deliver forces to the 
threatened positions. 581 
Lt. General Krebs responded that he did not believe that the 
issue could be settled today.582 Col. General Weiss responded: 
We have not lost our nerves and also the essential 
experience gained in previous battles. Therefore, you 
can believe us, that it is essential. A relief of the XXlll 
Corps by the 541st Division is not possible. The 2nd 
Army is presently being attacked by 8 armies.583 
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Colonel General Weiss informed Lt. General Krebs at 1230 hrs 
that the Soviets were in Biala Podlaska and were advancing from 
there towards the west.584 The Soviets were also forcing their 
way into Miedzyrzec from the south (see Figure 160). Colonel 
General Weiss stated that a "major decision was urgent. "585 He 
requested freedom of movement to the line Siedlce-Orla. Lt. 
General Krebs responded that Field Marshal Model had planned for a 
withdrawal to the line Miedzyrzec-Kleszcze but that would soon be 
difficult. Col. General Weiss informed Krebs that the forces in 
"Fortress Brest-Litovsk" were being pulled back to the inner 
defense ring (see Figure 161 ). He further stated that the forces in 
Brest needed to be evacuated tonight so that the troops could be 
freed for further use.586 Lt. General Krebs responded that he did 
not believe Brest could be evacuated tonight.587 
Lt. General Krebs responded at 1250 hrs that with the 
occupation of the inner defense ring Field Marshal Model had 
approved the release of two battalions from "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" to clear the road to Biala Podlaska.588 
465 
JULY 27, 1944 
2nd Army 
Colonel Lassen, General Staff Operations Officer for the 2nd 
Army informed Colonel General Weiss that Corps Detachment E 
would be cutoff tonight. Col. General Weiss responded that the 
moment had not yet arrived for complete freedom of movement. 
Finally, Lt. General Krebs informed the 2nd Army at 0025 hrs that 
Field Marshal Model had approved the objectives of the 2nd Army 
including the withdrawal of Corps Detachment E from Brest-
Litovsk.589 Colonel Lassen informed Lt. General Krebs at 0850 hrs 
that the Brest units would be pulled back to the following line: 
northwest of Biala - east of Janow Podlaski - along the Pulwa to 
the rail line. The order had been transmitted to the XX Army Corps. 
Lt. General Felzmann, Commandant of "Fortress Brest-
Litovsk" sent a radio message describing the breakout. Two Soviet 
attacks each consisting of 1000 troops from the southwest were 
repulsed. Then the garrison of Brest after 45 minutes of artillery 
preparation and the demolition of the airport commenced the 
breakout through the west ring of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" at 1805 
hrs through T erespol over the Bug river against 3 Soviet 
Divisions.59o The breakout had begun just prior to the complete and 
total isolation of the city had been completed by the Soviets (see 
Figure 162). The Commandant of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" 
organized the breakout to the west based upon two assault 
groups.591 The assault groups encountered stiff resistance despite 
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45 minutes of artillery preparation. The assault group on the right 
reached Krzyczew while the left group got bogged down in the 
Krzna sector of Beresowka. The main difficulty encountered in the 
fighting withdrawal of Kampfgruppe Felzmann was not frontal 
resistance but Soviet fire from both flanks along the route of 
retreat which inflicted heavy losses in men and material.592 Lt. 
General Felzmann reported that the last German soldier evacuated 
Brest shortly after midnight.593 
JULY 28, 1944 
2nd Army 
The garrison of Brest-Litovsk which had made its breakout 
was according to the last radio message engaged in heavy battle 
with the lead elements located at Kolosz and Zaczopki (see Figure 
163). The southern assault group reported strong Soviet pressure 
from the south along the entire route of march.594 
The XX Army Corps formed a Kampfgruppe from the 102nd 
Infantry Division and the 223rd Divisional Group which was 
assembled for an attack on July 28, 1944 at 1300 hrs at Wierzchlas 
(see Figure 163).595 The attack was to proceed through Biony-
Zaczopki. This attack was successful and broke through the Soviet 
defense line and permitted the relief of Kampfgruppe Felzmann (see 
Figure 164).596 The first group to reach German lines was the 
448th Regimental group in a column with more than 600 wounded 
men.597 The remnants of the 137th Infantry Divisional Group and 
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the 167th Regimental Group also broke through with severe losses 
of men and equipment. 
JULY 29, 1944 
2nd Army 
The garrison of "Fortress Brest-Litovsk" reached German 
lines, but had suffered severe losses in men and equipment.598 
Elements of Corps Detachment E managed to reach the German 
defense line along the west edge of Niemojki to the west edge of 
Hadynow (see Figure 164).599 Elements of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
secured the retreat route of Kampfgruppe Felzmann to the west 
where elements of Corps Detachment E were placed back into the 
front (see Figure 165). 
According to Soviet sources the German losses from the three 
divisions attempting to escape amounted to 15,000 killed and 2000 
taken prisoner between July 29-30, 1944.600 The 86th, 137th and 
251 st Infantry Divisional Groups were for the most part destroyed 
in the battle and subsequent retreat from "Fortress Brest-Litovsk." 
The 86th Infantry Divisional group was destroyed but some 
remnants were absorbed into the 251st Infantry Division which had 
also been smashed but was later reformed as the 251 st 
Volksgrenadier Division.601 The 137th Infantry Divisional Group 
appears to have been disbanded.602 
THE CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN LOSSES 
TO THE EASTERN FRONT 
The causes of the collapse of Army Group Center were a 
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result of Soviet strengths and German Weaknesses. The Soviets had 
changed their tactics and the Germans as a result of their 
weaknesses could not counter the new Soviet tactics successfully. 
The Soviet and German factors combined produce an explanation for 
the collapse of Army Group Center in the summer of 1944. There 
were six significant Soviet factors that contributed to the success 
of the Red Army in Belorussia: 
1 . The Soviets possessed numerical superiority in every 
category of combat strength: troops, tanks, trucks, artillery, 
aircraft and supplies. 
2. The Soviets employed massive concentrations of artillery 
for the initial breakthrough on the Belorussian Front. The mass and 
numbers of artillery employed for the initial artillery barrage was 
unprecedented. 
3. Soviet offensive tactics were developed to exploit their 
numerical superiority for maximum effect. The Soviets 
concentrated their forces on narrow frontages with closely 
concentrated infantry and attached armored brigades employed in 
the first wave to make the initial breakthrough. Soviet tank and 
mechanized corps strength was preserved by holding them in 
reserve till the hole in the German lines was made by the initial 
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first wave of infantry. Then the tank and mechanized corps were 
deployed through the broken German line into the depth of 
battlefield toward distant objectives. 
4. Soviet air superiority based on the 5 air armies employed 
was used effectively against the German front lines, directly 
behind the front, and in all areas where the Soviets were mounting 
a major breakthrough. 
5. The vast quantity of ammunition supplies gave the Soviets 
the capability to use firepower from artillery, mortars and fighter 
aircraft continuously for days without pause. Artillery barrages 
could be maintained for days. The Soviets were not restricted like 
their German counterparts by the supply of ammunition. 
6. The extensive motorization within the tank and 
mechanized corps (see Figures 166 & 167) permitted the 
formations to drive great distances into the depth of the German 
front. They could carry more fuel and infantry to accompany the 
tanks because of the vast quantities of American trucks supplied to 
the Soviets through lend-lease. The Soviets empowered by such a 
high level of mobility were able to advance behind German lines 
without regard to their rear or flanks especially since Soviet 
numerical superiorty in the air permitted units operating in depth a 
sense of security. The Soviet deep armored penetrations permitted 
the Soviets to achieve certain decisive advantages: occupation of 
strategic terrain features, interruption of all German rearward 
communications, preventing supply operations to frontline troops, 
setting the stage for encirclement, and producing detrimental 
psychological effects on German troops.603 
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7. The Soviet use of the "double pincer" maneuver such as in 
the case of the German 4th Army. The "outside pincer" was formed 
by tank armies driving towards distant objectives and the "inner 
pincer" by infantry armies with attached tank brigades which 
pressed the German 4th Army into a tighter cauldron in a process of 
encirclement which had already been completed by the breakthrough 
of the "outside pincer" into the rear area. This technique enabled 
the Soviets to successfully encircle entire German armies. 
Thus, Soviet strengths were major factors causing the 
collapse of Army Group Center, but only provide a partial 
explanation of the German defeat. The most serious weakness was 
found within the German Army High Command. 
German weakness combined with Soviet strengths provides 
more complete answers to the causes of the collapse of Army Group 
Center. Soviet strengths alone could not have caused the collapse 
of Army Group Center. Soviet strengths in the past had been 
countered by a resolute German defense such as in the failure of 
the Soviet winter offensive of 1943-1944 against Army Group 
Center. Therefore, the explanation is found in the mistakes of the 
German Army High Command. The German High Command made the 
following six grave errors: 
1. There was a failure to heed the military intelligence 
summaries of Army Group Center which reported obvious Soviet 
concentrations and impending signs of a major offensive against 
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Army Group Center. Colonel Gehlen and Foreign Armies East bear a 
major responsibility for the inaccurate intelligence assessment 
that predicted the major Soviet summer offensive against Army 
Group North Ukraine. Gehelen's inaccurate intelligence summaries 
lead the German High Command not to take the necessary measures 
in Army Group Center's sector to prevent a major collapse. Strong 
reserves were not brought up and early withdrawal of the 
overextended front to the Dnieper river covering position was not 
executed in time. The Army Group was forced to conduct a battle 
with an inadequately manned, overextended line without virtually 
any reserves. This alone produced a hopeless situation. 
2. Hitler, however, taxed the abilities of Army Group Center 
to defend itself even further. He forbid the construction of 
rearward positions believing that such positions would weaken the 
resolve of the German soldiers to fight. Instead they were exposed 
during the retreat in Belorussia to continuous Soviet air attacks 
and encirclement by Soviet armor in their rear areas. The failure 
to construct a Berezina river defense line was an enormous mistake 
on the part of Hitler. It would have provided a solid secondary main 
defense line in Belorussia. Unfortunately, for the German soldiers 
of Army Group Center the Berezina river proved to be instead an 
obstacle to their retreat from the Soviet offensive. The Berezina 
river proved to be the same problem to the German Army in 1944 as 
it had been to Napoleon in 1812. There were not enough bridges for 
a large army to cross the river quickly. (see Figure 168). 
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The most shocking fact during the retreat of the 4th Army to 
the Berezina river was that there were only two main permanent 
bridges between Borissow and Schatkowo (north of Bobruisk) (see 
Figure 168). The bridge at Beresino was a wood road bridge 560 
meters long and 3.5 meters wide and a wood road bridge 15 km 
north of Beresino was 560 meters long and 4.2 meters wide.604 
These were the only two large bridges on the Berezina river for 
hundreds of kilometers that were available for the retreat of the 
4th Army. The Soviet air force consequently could concentrate on 
these limited crossing points and the roads leading to them. These 
crossings and the roads were subjected to massive bombing and 
strafing creating even further chaos for the retreating Germans. 
The bridges were subjected to concentrated air attacks which 
damaged them and caused even further delays in crossing the 
Berezina river facilitating the Soviet encirclement of the German 
4th Army. Clearly the need for more bridges across the Berezina 
river was necessary for the retreat of the German Army as well as 
fortified positions along the river from which to establish a 
defense line. However, Hitler had forbid all of this rear area 
construction leaving no defensive line in depth for Army Group 
Center to fall back on. 
3. Hitler failed to permit his generals the freedom of 
command to execute a flexible defense. His insistence on a 
doctrine of "standing fast" and the medieval notion of fortresses 
which he ordered with his Fuehrer Befehl Nr. 11 interfered with the 
local commanders decision making authority to respond to the 
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changing circumstances on the battlefield. Bobruisk, Vitebsk, 
Orsha, Mogilev and Minsk along with others received the "Fortress" 
designation which meant that troops were locked into defending a 
fixed position instead of available to be used in a flexible manner. 
Generalmajor Peter von der Groeben who was a staff officer 
in Army Group Center stated: 
Even the smallest move depended on authorization from 
Hitler's Field Headquarters. This, in particular 
pertained to withdrawal of sectors, evacuation of 
cities, etc. Every separate move of this type, no matter 
how urgent it may have been, had to be fought for 
almost to the point of despair. Due to Hitler's daily 
schedule, decisions for requests were made only once 
daily, late at night, and consequently if an approval was 
given, this usually arrived too late. Authorization for 
withdrawals were granted only in the rarest cases. 
Misjudging actualities to an almost tragic extent, 
Hitler believed to have found the road to victory in his 
principle "hold at all costs"605 
4. The German weakness in the air proved a decisive factor in 
the collapse of Army Group Center. Previously, the German 
Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front had been able to supply encircled 
units or halt Soviet armored breakthroughs. However, German 
Luftflotte 6 (see Table XXXIX) proved unable to halt the 
breakthroughs of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 especially 
when the breakthroughs were occurring simultaneously. The lack of 
German fighter aircraft prevented Luftflotte 6 from interdicting 
the 5 Soviet air armies in the skies over Belorussia which meant 
that the Soviets had achieved effective air superiority. Luftflotte 
6 had only 40 combat ready fighters to oppose the massive 
numerical superiority of the Soviet Air Force.606 
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The Soviets were able as a result of their air supremacy to 
break the backbone of the German defense which was centered in 
their artillery. The German Army in Belorussia depended on 
artillery because of the low combat strengths of the German 
infantry and the shortage of tanks. Artillery positions had been 
sited on exposed foreward slopes or in open positions to reinforce 
anti-tank defenses. 
Paul Carell described the situation of the German Army in 
Belorussia under conditions of Soviet air supremacy: 
By means of well-prepared air strikes, the Russians 
succeeded in eliminating the previous reconnoitered or 
rapidly pinpointed gun positions of the German 
artillery. The backbone of the German defense was 
broken. The German infantry was helpless against any 
motorized or mechanized enemy. The same dilemma 
arose in the west. Soviet ground-support aircraft 
bombed the retreating columns of the German rearward 
services and reserve units at bridges and road 
bottlenecks. The effect was devastating. There was 
chaos on the roads. No switching of units was feasible. 
Faced with this sudden enemy superiority in the air, the 
German divisions were desperate and, in view of their 
defenselessness, frequently panicked. There was 
nothing the German could do. 
Nothing revealed more strikingly the turn in the 
military situation on the Eastern Front than the 
crushing air superiority of the Soviet air force. Thanks 
to Eisenhower, Stalin had conquered the Russian skies. 
Without a protective roof overhead no front on earth 
could be held in the long run. The Russians had learned 
this in 1941 and 1942. Now this law of modern warfare 
was being proved against the German armies--in both 
East and West.607 
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5. The German High Command failed to supply their troops 
with adequate supplies of hand-held anti-tank weapons. The 
Germans had developed the Panzerfaust, a hand-held recoiless anti-
tank grenade launcher which could be fired from 30 yards with a 
penetration of 200 mm of armor.6os The Panzerschreck or Ofenrohr 
was an 88 mm rocket launcher similar to the American Bazooka 
which had also been developed and had a range of 130 meters.609 
Both of these weapons were the most effective hand-held anti-tank 
weapons in the German arsenal and if the German infantry in 
Belorussia had been supplied with these weapons in quantity it 
would have increased their anti-tank capability dramatically. 
However, the German infantry was supplied instead with large 
quantities of anti-tank mines which required the infantry to deploy 
the mines before their defensive positions or actually place the 
mine on the tank or under the tank so that it would detonate. This 
of course required the German infantry to expose themselves to 
Soviet fire. Therefore, the lack of hand-held anti-tank weapons 
contributed significantly to the demise of the German Army in 
Belorussia. 
6. The last major weakness of the Germans was their 
hesitancy to move in reserves on time and in sufficient numbers. 
Hitler failed to permit the reinforcement of Army Group Center on a 
massive scale even after the attack against Army Group Center had 
been identified as the major Soviet summer offensive. 
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Reinforcements only trickled into Army Group Center while it was 
virtually disintegrating. Eventually, the German High Command had 
to pour in massive reinforcements to plug the hole left by the 
destruction of 28 German divisions in Army Group Center.610 The 
total number of replacement divisions to reconstruct the front 
amounted to 29 divisions and 7 brigades (see Table XXXX). If only 
half of these formations had been available as reserves in the rear 
area of Army Group Center the disaster for most of Army Group 
Center could have been averted and the debacle of the collapse of 
Army Group Center avoided. 
The collapse of Army Group Center constituted the most 
decisive defeat of the German Army in the summer of 1944 and it 
set the the stage for the weakening of other Army Groups on the 
Eastern Front because the divisions to shore up Army Group Center 
came mostly from Army Group North, Army Group North Ukraine and 
Army Group South Ukraine (see Table XXXX). The subsequent 
weakening of the other Eastern Front armies to reinforce Army 
Group Center facilitated the remaining Soviet offensives launched 
during the summer of 1944 against the other Army Groups. The 
collapse of Army Group Center resulted in the destruction of 28 
German divisions and the loss of 31 generals (see Table XXXXI). The 
defeat of the German Army in Belorussia was greater than the 
defeat at Stalingrad and constituted one of the greatest disasters 
in the history of the German Army.611 
TABLEXXXV 
ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE 
JUNE 22, 1944 
Army Group Center Formations 
Army Group Center 
And OKH Reserve 
14th Motorized Infantry 
Division 
20th Panzer Division 
60th Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" 
390th Field Training Division 
707th Infantry Division 
White Ruthenia Military 
District: 
52nd Security Division 
221 st Security Division 
391 st Security Division 
3rd Panzer Army 
Reserves: 
95th Infantry Division 
201 st Security Division 
IX Army Corps 
Corps Detachment D 
(combined 56th & 262nd 
Infantry Divisions) 
252nd Infantry Division 
LI II Army Corps 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division 
206th Infantry Division 
246th Infantry Division 
Commanders 
Field Marshal Busch 
Chief of Staff: Lt. Gen. Krebs 
Lt. Gen. Floerke 
Lt. Gen. Von Kessel 
Maj. Gen. Von Steinkeller 
Lt. Gen. Bergen 
Maj. Gen. Gihr 
Maj. Gen. Newiger 
Lt. Gen. Lendle 
Lt. Gen. Von Monteton 
Col. Gen. Reinhardt 
Maj. Gen. Michaelis 
Lt. Gen. Jacobi 
Gen. d. Arty. Wuthmann 
Maj. Gen. Pamberg 
Lt. Gen. Melzer 
Gen. d. Infantry Gollwitzer 
Lt. Gen. Pistorius 
Lt. Gen. Peschel 
Lt. Gen. Hitter 
Maj. Gen. Mueller-Buelow 
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TABLEXXXV 
ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE 
JUNE 22, 1944 
(continued) 
Auny Group Center Formations 
3rd Panzer Army 
VI Army Corps 
197th Infantry Division 
256th Infantry Division 




286th Security Division 
XXVll Army Corps 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
78th Assault Division 
260th Infantry Division 
XXXIX Panzer Corps 
12th Infantry Division 
31st Infantry Division 
110th Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
XI I Army Corps 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
57th Infantry Division 




Gen. d. Arty. Pfeiffer 
Col. Preu (acting) 
Lt. Gen. Wuestenhagen 
Lt. Gen. Graf Von Oriola 
Gen. d. Inf. Gollwitzer 
Gen. d. Inf. Tippelskirch 
Lt. Gen. Oschmann 
Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers 
Maj. Gen. Schuermann 
Lt. Gen. Traut 
Maj. Gen. Klammt 
Gen. d. Arty. Martinek 
Lt. Gen. Bamler 
Lt. Gen. Ochsner 
Lt. Gen. Von Kurowski 
Lt. Gen. Schuenemann 
Lt. Gen. Vincenz Mueller 
Lt. Gen. Zutavern 
Lt. Gen. Trowitz 
Lt. Gen. Drescher 
Lt. Gen. Traut 
Maj. Gen. Erdsmannsdorf 
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TABLE XX.XV 
ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE 
JUNE 22, 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group Center Formations 
9th Army 
XXXV Army Corps 
6th Infantry Division 
45th Infantry Division 
134th Infantry Division 
296th Infantry Division 
383rd Infantry Division 
XXXXI Panzer Corps 
35th Infantry Division 
36th Infantry Division 
129th Infantry Division 
L V Army Corps 
102nd Infantry Division 




1st Hungarian Cavalry Division 
4th Cavalry Brigade 
5th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
23rd Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
XXlll Army Corps 
7th Infantry Division 
17th Infantry Brigade 
203rd Security Division 
Commanders 
Gen. d. Inf. Jordan 
Lt. Gen. Von Luetzow 
Lt. Gen. Heyne 
Maj. Gen. Engel 
Lt. Gen Philipp 
Lt. Gen. Kullmer 
Lt. Gen. Hoffmeister 
Gen. d. Arty. Weidling 
Lt. Gen. Richert 
Maj. Gen. Conrady 
Maj. Gen. Larisch 
Gen. d. Inf. Herrlein 
Lt. Gen. Von Bercken 
Lt. Gen. John 
Maj. Gen. Hamann 
Col. Gen. Weiss 
Gen. d. Pion. Tiemann 
Lt. Gen. Von Rappard 
Lt. Gen. Pilz 
479 
TABLEXXXV 
ARMY GROUP CENTER ORDER OF BATTLE 
JUNE 22, 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group Center Formations Comm~rs 
2nd Army 
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XX Army Corps 
Corps Detachment E 
(Combined 137th & 251st 
Infantry Divisions) 
Gen. d. Arty. Freiherr Von Roman 
Lt. Gen. Felzmann 
3rd Cavalry Brigade 
VII I Army Corps 
5th Jaeger Division 
211th Infantry Division 
12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
Gen. d. Inf. Hoehne 
Lt. Gen. Thum 
Lt. Gen. Eckhardt 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
1 O (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502, 509-523; 
Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction Of 
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 
Publisher's, 1987), pp. 29-31; Hinze, Der Zusammenbruch 
Der Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Osten 1944, pp. 286-288; 
Kriegstagebuch (KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte, 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende. 
4.6.44. NAMP T-311, Roll 228; Werner Haupt, .Qi§_ 
Schlachten Der Heeresgruppe Mitte 1941-1944 (Friedburg: 
Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1983), p. 266. 
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TABLEXXXVI 
OVERVIEW OF THE COMBAT READINESS, STRENGTH AND RESERVES 
OF THE 4TH ARMY ON JUNE 20, 1944 
Total CQmbat Read~ 
Combat Assault Panzer Heavy SP 
Strength Sector Km per Artillery Guns II IV VI Guns 
!..!~!IS Qer Qiv. in Km SQldier !,,ighUHea~ 
XXVll Army 27 24 45 
Corps 
78th Sturm 5712 32 178 46 55 31 18 
Division 
25th Panzer 2686 17 158 27 32 45 10 
Grenadier 
Division 
260th 2554 32 80 46 1 3 
Infantry 
Division 
XXXIX 58 43 
Panzer Corps 
110th 2590 27 96 33 9 6 
Infantry 
Division 
337th 3775 22 172 46 35 1 0 
Infantry 
Division 
12th 3604 32 113 36 1 1 1 0 
Infantry 
Division 





18th Panzer 2787 24 116 36 1 6 
Grenadier 
Division 
267th 2498 26 96 35 1 1 9 
Infantry 
Division 





OVERVIEW OF THE COMBAT READINESS, STRENGTH ANO RESERVES 
OF THE 4TH ARMY ON JUNE 20, 1944 
(continued) 
Total C~mibat Read~ 
Combat Assault Panzer Heavy SP 
Strength Sector Km per Artillery Guns II IV VI Guns 
















Ti:21a!LA~rage 30SJQ 259 119 ~§2 2Q5 2~§ 24 11 29 l 1 § 
Source: Lt. Colonel Von Wienskowski, Die Entwicklung der Lage bei 
der 4. Armee waehrend der russischen Sommeroffensive 
1944 und die Vorgaenge bei den abgesprengten Verbaenden 
22.6. bis 5.7.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication 
T-312, Roll 1365, p. 4. 
TABLE XXXVll 
BATILE STRENGTH OF CORPS DETACHMENT E 
ON JULY 25, 1944 
UNITS 
203rd Security Division 
137th Infantry Division 
251st Infantry Divisional Group 
86th Infantry Divisional Group 
Miscellaneous Artillery Units 









Source: Anneeoberkommando 2, Gliederung der Kampfverbaende am 
25.7.1944. Korps Abteilung E National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-312, Roll 1318. 
TABLE XXXVlll 
COMBAT REPORT OF THE 1 ST FLIEGER-OIVISION 




11 Close Support Air Attacks 
6 Close Support Air Attacks 
5 Anti-Tank Air Attacks 
Fighter Patrols ·and Air Cover 
for the JU 87 
Reconnaissance of 
2nd Army Front 
TOTAL AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION: 
235 Attack Aircraft 
23 Anti-Tank Aircraft 
73 Fighter Aircraft 
25 Reconnaissance Aircraft 
356 
145 FW 190 
90 JU 87 "Stukas" 
23 JU 87 "Anti-Tank Stukas" 
44 FW 190 
29 ME 109 
14 ME 109 
11FW189 
356 Aircraft 
OPERATIONAL AREA: Siedlce - Lukow and area of Bialystok 
SOVIET LOSSES INFLICTED BY 1ST FLIEGER-DIVISION: 
6 tanks destroyed 
1 tank probably destroyed 
5 tanks and 1 armored personnel carrier damaged 
67 trucks destroyed 
6 trucks and 1 half-track carrier destroyed by incendiary fire 
5 trucks damaged 
·3 towed vehicles destroyed 
1 automobile destroyed 
4 artillery guns destroyed 
1 anti-tank gun destroyed 
3 anti-tank guns damaged 
3 anti-tank and 1 mortar platoon effectively strafed 
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TABLE XXXVlll 
COMBAT REPORT OF THE 1 ST FLIEGER-DIVISION 
FOR JULY 26, 1944 
(continued) 
1 Flak gun was silenced. 
2 Flak guns were put out of action 
2 Soviet aircraft (1 Lagg-5 & 1 JAK-9) were sbot down 
1 JAK-9 effectively strafed 
A direct hit on a position containing 4 Flak guns 
Numerous infantry positions and vehicles and towns were 
attacked with resulting fires and explosions 
GERMAN LOSSES: 1 ME 109 failed to return 
Source: A.H. Ou., 26.7.44, Einsatzmeldung der 1. Flieger-Division 
vom 26. 7 .44 National Archives Microfilm Publication T -
312, Roll 1318. 
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TABLEXXXIX 
OPERATIONAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FL YING FORMATIONS 
OF LUFTFLOTIENKOMMANDO 6, JUNE 28, 1944 
Formations 
Luftflottenkommando 6 HQ 
2. Staffel 
IV Flieger Korps HQ 
Kampfgeschwader 1 HQ 
11./Kampfgeschwader 1 
Kampfgeschwader 4 HQ. (Ju 88) 
11./Kampfgeschwader 4 
111./Kampfgeschwader 4 
Kampfgeschwader 27 HQ 
I ./Kampfgeschwader 27 
111./Kampfgeschwader 27 
Kampfgeschwader 53 HQ 
I ./Kampfgeschwader 53 
11./Kampfgeschwader 53 
111./Kampfgeschwader 53 




Transport Staffel IV Flieger Korps 

























Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 15 (AOK 2 & 9) Baranowitsche 
1 . / 4 (Bf 109) Baranowitsche 
11 ./11 (FW 189) Baranowitsche 
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TABLEXXXIX 
OPERATIONAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FL YING FORMATIONS 









Schlachtgeschwader 1 HQ. (FW 190) 
111./Schlachtgeschwader 1 (FW 190) 
11./Schlachtgeschwader 77 (FW 190) 
1 O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader 3 
1 O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader 77 
Jagdgeschwader 53 HQ 
l./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) 
111./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) 




4 Flieger Division Command Post 
Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 1 O (AOK 4) 
2./Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Bf 109) 
3./Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Bf 109) 
3./14 (FW189) 
Nahaufklaerungsgruppe 4 (Pz.AOK 3) 




























OPERATIONAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FL YING FORMATIONS 
OF LUFTFLOTTENKOMMANDO 6, JUNE 28, 1944 
(continued) 
Formations 
Schlachtgeschwader 1 O HQ. (FW 190) 
l./Schlachtgeschwader 1 O (FW 190) 
111./Schlachtgeschwader 10 (FW 190) 
I ./Schlachtgeschwader 1 
1 O.(Pz.)/Schlachtgeschwader I 
Jagdgeschwader 51 HQ 
Stabsst./Jagdgeschwader 51 (FW 190) 
111./Jagdgeschwader 51 (FW 190) 
IV./Jagdgeschwader 51 (Bf 109) 
111./Jagdgeschwader 52 (FW 190) 
4 ./Nachtschlachtgeschwader 2 
Fliegerfuehrer 1 Command Post 
Nachtschlachtgruppe 2 HQ 
3./Nachtschlachtgruppe 2 
Stab/Eins.Gr.2.Flg.Sch.Div 
2. and 3. Staffel 

































OPERATIONAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FL YING FORMATIONS 





Jagdfliegerfuehrer 6 Command Post 









F ernaufklaeru ngsgruppe 2 
1. (F)/100 (Ju 88) 
4. (F)/11 (Ju 188) 
4. (F)/14 (Ju 188) 
Eins.Kdo.l.(F)/122 (Me 410) 
Nachtaufklaerungsstaffel 2 (Do 217) 
Verb.Staffel Lfl.Kdo.6 
Transport Staffel Lfl.Kdo.6 
Stab I ./Transportgeschwader 3 
























Source: Luftflottenkommando 6, Einsatzmaessige Gliederung der 
fig. Verbaende des Lfl.Kdo.6. Stand 28.6.44. 00.00 Uhr 
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 228. 
TABLEXXXX 




1st Fallschirm Panzer Division 
"Hermann Goering" 
3rd SS Panzer Division 
"Totenkopf" 
4th Panzer Division 
5th Panzer Division 
5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" 
6th Panzer Division 
7th Panzer Division 
12th Panzer Division 
14th Panzer Division 
19th Panzer Division 
Panzer Division "Gross 
Deutschland" 
TOTAL PANZER DIVISIONS: 
INFANTRY DIVISIONS: 
1st Infantry Division 
17th Infantry Division 
28th Jaeger Division 
50th Infantry Division 
69th Infantry Division 
73rd Infantry Division 
131 st Infantry Division 
170th Infantry Division 
196th Infantry Division 
212th Infantry Division 
367th Infantry Division 
541 st Volksgrenadier Division 
542nd Volksgrenadier Division 
54 7th Volksgrenadier Division 
548th Volksgrenadier Division 
Sour~ 
Southwest Theater, Italy 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group North Ukraine 
OKH Reserve 
OKH Reserve 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group North 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine 
1 O Panzer Divisions 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group North 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group North Ukraine 
Army Group North 
AOK Norway 
Army Group North 












551 st Volksgrenadier Division 
558th Volksgrenadier Division 
561 st Volksgrenadier Division 
562nd Volksgrenadier Division 
TOTAL INFANTRY DIVISIONS: 
BRIGADES: 
Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von 
Werthern 
Lehr Brigade 
Panzer Brigade 1 02 
Panzer Brigade 103 
Panzer Brigade 1 04 
Grenadier Brigade 1131 
Grenadier Brigade 1132 
TOTAL BRIGADES: 
TOTAL REINFORCEMENTS TO 



















1 O Panzer Divisions 




Source: Kurt Mehner, Geheim Tages Bericht der Deutschen 
Wehrmacht Vol. 10, pp. 502-508, Vol. 11, pp. 337-338; 
Kriegstagebuch (KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte, 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Kriegsgliederungen National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -311, Roll 228. 
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TABLEXXXXI 
THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 
Formations 
Destroyed 
ARMY GROUP CENTER 
AND OKH RESERVES: 






3RD PANZER ARMY: 
95th Infantry 
Division 
LI II Army Corps 
4th Luftwaffe Field 
Division 





























Killed Or Captured 
Maj. Gen. Von 
Steinkeller Prisoner 
Lt. Gen. Gihr Prisoner 
Maj. Gen. Michaelis 
Prisoner 
Gen. d. Inf. 
Gollwitzer Prisoner 
Lt. Gen. Pistorius 
Killed 
Lt. Gen. Peschel 
Killed 












THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 
(continued) 
Formations Reorganized Or Commanders 
Destro~~d Disband~d Unit~ Killed Or Ca1:2tured 
4THARMY: 
XXVll Army Corps Reorganized Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers 
Prisoner 
25th Panzer Reorganized 
Grenadier Division 
78th "Sturm" Reorganized Lt. Gen. Traut 
Division Prisoner 
260th Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. Klammt 
Division Prisoner 
Gen. d. Arty. 
Martinek, Commander 
of XXXIX Panzer 
Corps Killed 
12th Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Bamler 
Division Prisoner 
31st Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Ochser 
Division Prisoner 
110th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. Von 
Division Kurowski Prisoner 
337th Infantry Reorganized Lt. Gen. Schuenemann 
Division Prisoner 
XI I Army Corps Disbanded Lt. Gen. Vincenz 
Mueller Prisoner 
18th Panzer Reorganized Lt. Gen. Zutavern 
Grenadier Division Suicide 
57th Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. Trowitz 
Division Prisoner 

































Killed Or Captured 









Lt. Gen. Von Luetzow 
Prisoner 
Lt. Gen. Heyne 
Prisoner 
Maj. Gen. Engel 
Prisoner 
Lt. Gen. Philipp 
Suicide 
Lt. Gen. Hoffmeister 
Prisoner 
Maj. Gen. Conrady 
Prisoner 













TOTAL CORPS DESTROYED: 
TOTAL DIVISIONS DESTROYED: 
TOTAL COMMANDERS KILLED OR CAPTURED: 
Commanders 





Source: Caren, pp. 508-509, Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen 
Tagesberichte Der Deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung Im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 10, pp. 502, 509-523; 
Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 11, pp. 337-338; Kriegstagebuch 
(KTB) Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fuehrungsabteilung, 
Kriegsgliederung NAMP T-311, Roll 228; Rolf Hinze, QM_ 
Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresgruppe 
Mitte, p. 426; Teske, p. 216; OKW/Org. Abt. und 
Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung der in diesem 
Kriege gefallenen. toetlich. verungluecten. verstorbenen. 
vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale 
Flensburg 5 June 1945 NAMP T-77, Roll 785; Generalstab 
des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber die 
grossen Verbaende des Heeres. der Waffen-SS und der 
Fallschirm-truppen. Stand 30.7.44 NAMP T-78, Roll 413; 
Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht 
ueber Aufgeloeste Division 1944 NAM P T -78, Roll 41 O; 
Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 Vol. 3, 
p. 241; Mitcham, pp. 41-471; OKH Allgemeines Heeresamt, 
Abwicklungsstab, H 41/7-H 41/12 NAMP T-78, Roll 139. 
German Army files H 4117-H 41 /12 contain the reports of 
units destroyed in the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 
against Army Group Center. 
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Figure 63. The Six Staggered Offensives Of The Red 
Army During "Operation Bagration." Source: AOK 4, 
Beibringung Von Unterlagen ueber die Vorgaenge bei den 
Abgesprengten Verbaenden im Sommer 1944 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 244. 
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Figure 64. Army Group Center Under Attack, June 22, 
1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 65. 3rd Panzer Army Order Of Battle, June 1944. 
Source: Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Mitte 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende 
4.6.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, 
Roll 228. 
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Figure 66. 3rd Panzer Army - Situation On June 22, 
1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3 Panzer Armee-
Lage am 22. Juni 44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 219. 
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Figure 68. 4th Army Order Of Battle, June 1944. 
Source: Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Mitte 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende 
4.6.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, 
Roll 228. 
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Figure 69. 9th Army Order Of Battle, June 1944. 
Source: Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Mitte 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende 
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Figure 70. 2nd Army Order Of Battle, June 1944. 
Source: Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Mitte 
Fuehrungsabteilung, Gliederung der Grossen Verbaende 
4.6.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, 
Roll 228. 
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Figure 71. Army Group Center, June 23, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 72. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
June 23, 1944 At 1000 hrs. Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, .ba9§. 
der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 23.6.44. 1000 Uhr National 
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Figure 74. 3rd Panzer Army - Situation On June 23, 
1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3 Panzer Armee-
Lage am 23. Juni 44. National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 75. Army Group Center, June 24, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 76. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
June 24, 1944 At 1000 hrs. Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, La9§ 
der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 24.6.44. 1000 Uhr National 
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Figure 77. The Hole Between Liii And VI Army Corps, 
June 24, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lage bei 3. 
Panzer Armee. 24.6.44., National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 219. 
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Figure 79. The Soviet Breakthrough On The Left Flank 
Of The 4th Army, June 24, 1944. Source: Major D. 
Saulin, "The Battle of Orsha," Krasnaia Zvezda (Red 
Star) 11 October 1944 as translated in Military Review 
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Figure 80. The Hole Between The 337th And 12th 
Infantry Divisions, June 24, 1944. Source: 
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lage bei 4. Armee. 24 Juni 44., 
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Figure 81. The Soviet Breakthroughs On The 9th Army 
Front, June 24, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, S.:. 
Armee - Lage am 24.Juni 44. National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -311, Roll 219. 
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Figure 83. The Encirclement Of The Lill Army Corps, 
June 25, 1944. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 3. Panzer 
Armee - Lage am 25.Juni 44. National Archives 
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Figure 84. The Hassen and Bear Defensive Lines. 
Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1. Anlagen zum KTB Nr . 
.2..4. National Archives Microfilm Publication T ~312, Roll 
252. 
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Figure 85. Army Group Center, June 25, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 86. Bridgehead Orsha, Dnieper Covering Position, 
Hessen and Bear Lines. Source: A.O.K 4, la. Kartenband 
1, Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 24 National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 87. Soviet Advance On Bobruisk, June 24-25, 
1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 9, Der Grossangriff 
auf die 9. Armee. der Einsatz der Reserven und der 
Durchbruch Suedl. d. Beresina. 24. u. 25.6.44. National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 339. 
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Figure 88. The 9th Army Situation On June 25, 1944. 
Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 9. Armee - Lage am 25.Juni 
44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 
219. 
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Figure 89. Bobruisk Bridgehead And 9th Army Defensive 
Lines. Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1. Anlagen zum 
KTB Nr. 24 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-
312, Roll 252. 
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Figure 90. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
June 26, 1944. Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. 
Armee. Stand: 26.6.44.morgens National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-313, Roll 318. 
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Figure 92. Soviet Encirclement Of Vitebsk. Source: 
Colonel S. Shishkin, "The Vitebsk Operation," Krasnaia 
Zvezda (Red Star) 25 October 1944 as translated in 






Figure 93. Liii Army Corps And 206th Infantry Division 
On June 26, 1944. Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe 
Mitte, Fester Platz Witebsk 21.6.44. National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 218. 
Figure 94. Army Group Center, June 26, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 95. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division's Sector 
On June 22, 1944. Source: Abwicklungsstab 
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Bericht ueber den Anteil der 25. Pz. 
Gre. Div. an den Kaempfen der Heeresgr. Mitte ab 20. 6. 
1944. 12.9.1944 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78, Roll 139. 
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Figure 97. Soviet Control Of Titowka Road Junction. 
Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester 
Platz Bobruisk 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 218. 
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Figure 98. Soviet Operations Against The 9th Army, 
June 24-27, 1944. Source: Colonel P. Boldyrev, "The 
Bobruisk Operation," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) 28 
September 1944 as translated in Military Review Vol. 
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Figure 100. Army Group Center, June 27, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-




g~~Ae···n···3·. :·;:·P.. •· ·~)1 · ., .. ,.... ·-r. ·~ ... ~·~~: ... r •• ;_'f·~-'-:'i'-'·'~...:".1'> .. ,-i, ..~.i:j' ... , r-<-~--~,,...r)"-..:.1 ~v· •• I z· cmee· .,\ '.: 1'\ -J ,,, .. -.,:\' j ~\ T,Jf, ' ••>.""lf":,1,.4.;,.,0 :rt: ..... ,, , ..i"'- "'''-'"'"' """-··~\·,· ''\1 ,L4,., •• , •. ,, r .. , •• •' {•..:J.~1-• IOJ •· -..!•t"~v .. , ~- ~::.~~ .5--.;.::_._. .... 
1 
.~ , .. -~ ·~,\-C,. '· ... ~: J,-:·::;, .... ~.,~. , .ft::·"~·~-~·· ~nCl"2.7:·6c~J1.:· · ·· 1 . ...- ~ 0-.,:-~2..·t~, ..i~-~··%_,.,.)/:::..',•r·t··· •.... ~~;..,\ :;r.. 
_ · · · · .¥4-.mor.g_~nS":..,,r.:..'.,:.:;.~·~{'. .. )•~ .. ~~·"*n·'-'.:-·.; :!-.::··:1r\'f.~':y. 
C."' -i,•":f....:,}/'1'/. ... ._ •• .-·rl. ·-. --:::~--;.-(_ ·,1.;.:.,,.J ·; 2$'2." v,.',1.c.yC/'f'·-i·,'t.J: '' -:-;-~h~~·.,,· . 
~rei:~w .. ··~- .. ~;,,;:::..tt~·.:::.~r·~,Y,i.: .. J~_.:_( >--·-< .L .... -~·-~c.··· .... , :.\! .-::;:, .. ;;::::! .• h·"'~i ,- • ,,.,: .. C'•~ .::;.."J_...~·~-~· ~·· 1 /~:" ''-.. :·•' ~:· "...' ., ; -..; f - ,, ~ .,,~~.~" .' • --:.,•. ~~ '. f._ •" 1,, U•f.',. J a..1., ii' , \ ~1 ;,~ ,.._.~f}~-J ..y',~ • , ,,., • .,..:,};!]' •' }. \" / .... ,,~...:::. .. • I,..; ' ' :•,••I~ ~ n• / ! ::~'.-' l/' ~ ',1' U • \,:: J' lll.4.f, · ,., .,..~~. ''(! . ,.. .• "',. , , .. , r -t!J.!!.; :_.,·· ,.,, •// •;, ,'~" ,'o , \:"I ,.,.~ ..... ,I ~~!r''\'/f ,._ ......... '\_••: :~~~ -...,;;<....... r.··• ~J~:;,;4-''., ;-: .. ,1J.i:., •!• ;.,.'"' ·::< •. ::,. 
1 
•I,'- "••'""• •', .·(..., .•,. ~ 1 ,1lj'1-ol-r,,( '••• , - .••• '" • ., ..... ~~K·'~ ,...:,."~ ~ ~::';;:;-.,-!;-,;,-•,\,3, •{~-<,.,,,,,.,.,,. E :. ,,. :','•':.,. ~(',~ <• r " h:. ~~·.4f:": 1 .;(: ... l ~~·-·--..-~:.:J,,., --;jl{"~~· ...... ·.i:.;.. .. ":"'r··· , ... : ...: ..... ~ .~J;~, (\' - ., ... ~· . . • 'i .... ~.:r· 
1
,. . .:.:·:···. '.M~ .. ,.~:• ~ ":···-r...,;.~.·-· ·.• ,,(t · · ·:·~.-.~ ~ :1• ,: •• ;; r. •. ,· :r:r '·'~ · ... ~ -! '.. 
'+<" -:_;_',;,"': (' r-'.; ••' .!,..!: 11·• "\ .. ,,.!~:; .. ;}, • .. •. "./, • .;,"1"•' !<.· ..-_ .. '>:,' 
0 
tr.Nit" .r '; • .. !\, " .... I£ 
• •·· '' ' • ,, . I· • ' ' . - • ' • , r---" -~•-'••J,., 'ti•·,~'"''••,, i .... .J...,J. ( ,J1, .. ')i 1 ,{t .. , 0· 1, I '·',/( 
t-·~J; ._:_ . .1.~,,..1 .. ·"'-JZ' .~ .,. ,..., ·· .... .:.,.-,,_.n. fit11.J!'J':¥' • ···--- ~-·i.:· . ~·- :·· ........ ~ .. ;; ,,..:. . ,,,, .. _~ .~.:. ·;"~' ·i·.'~:";:"' .;..::: ... to;r-r• -;• . .ti.; f,_t " ...... _ . '·- "· ( ,.,t.. .• '-'}\;f·~· i lf"'''"~\''t.""11" ro·l.-11 ;~ ,I r·r ,l,.., ,,~· ·' /,1'· 1 ,-' 'ft:::_'}-'-· "F~:,,;· ~'o..J ••'t.: 
r 
•·r ,, ,,... < ... ,. ·/ .......... , • - '·, > i&. · i · •·• ..• , 
·'' I' 'I,· :~·,i.,.. '. 'I ' ' _. •• ~"•" "''\.·I · •" [ ... ;:.•~·;,' ~ "f.'' '" ' ·"'•cl J' "" (·~ , .. , ... .,(r ... - ~,, . ._..,_,_ .• ./ :· r. ~·',"'" ·, .• ,..~ '-· !.- :., ... ·I ·~ ~-'"' 1.;~\.I •.• -~ . ·.~"'r>' ;;,.,,,. ... ,._. ,.·. ~ •·-<!·( lt ·•'-, :• •... 'ID.,) ._"'51:2 .. -·1· , ..... , ,;1 1 "11-· ~ 1 .. _,,,::,.·.-- ~~·!:J·"'·.---·~·:"",--,. ,_..,.-,."', .•. ~ .. .,.;r·~ ·'i. ... -.;.: 1,. ·~',·~ •... ;~I' .... ·:~ 
• ,::~ .... ---· ·r-·:·: .... i.12!.:··~ ~.: .. ·,·· ,' ... .!. •. 1 ... ;. i.- .·1~·.-:-t.-I z ·· - •=rr. ..... \_C . .':··.):l'·o-t1._·,.~·<( .~'_~: •;·~ ·"--'.\ .-'.11'-.•~ ~··"·/ ~.~, • , : ~ ... t·/· 
·.,,.'. ... !-.; .•.'·~, ~ r·"' ·.·,, ... '..:.: ·7:·; ... : :.<.• _.,, j•', .; ..... :;···~·I JP,··""' ... .'.:; .... • ·' \r ·- ('. 
,1·,.· .. 1, .. ·.· ··-···~··!\.....\:· ~ ··:.c,: :. '··1'': .. • ·"f'/i"'''" ·~·~ ~"". "" '11 •. / 
0" 1 ~---· · ---·· • ... , •• I "- ., .. ,.... ... '•· .... . ..... r .......... '•I 1'1:...----' · •' · • •-:r" I'"' ,· • v ... ; ... - ·., :'"; ·,,: • I·~,..:•. 1 ;c. ! \ • ··J::·".. , J,r-jl.L, t t:n.;~Jo. · ' r•I ~·, ~·. ·" 
,• /, a .. '• I , • 
1 
.; ' • • S•"•" •i• , 1+ 
1, ' I • I 'J" • ..., - • l ( • ' , ;-9 ' ~- .... ~ .. -~ ' ... - - :", .> .. • - • > .... ••• ... """:-"i' '1 • -~-"" [.{> ... ,_ ··' ·:. •• - . . . . .. ' -. .., ' ' ' ' . ' ... ... 
~
·!;: ·--:•'\••;•;,·: ,•i,!'">gf~.-~ •. \ B'~·.:"'·'·,;~ ... rv.•?'I. ·"-. I ····~··· .. ; • •"' • t"\ "'of. J 1. ·-·--)• • 1~{. l(':r ' I , • .. ... ,., ,_,, ••• ' • ~ ""!_ .... I I lf :.. ·r,: ' . jl •• """".J r~I.} ,, .,. .., ' j' . ., , 7'~··-• ~ '""'°' o I'.• "'\, ... VT... . ·'1'o 
,..:., _ • •• ·;·-··· ./"' 1 .. ,1., -:-r;,1'1. •• 'l'Jz..,..1· .. -1·,~ :.>er,·. :I .. : .. · ·•, ,•:. . 
'' "-'__; ·~ I' I j I . ·1 \ ) .... ' · .. } ' .. ' - I • •. '" ,•i • 
·11 .. -. .• '-··. • .• .•• , _ -1-, , ; ~H'f,, . • .. · .. ;--.: ..:.~· · ., "' ~ 1'· '. .. . ' ;/,' . ~,. .' ..... 'J : ~· -.. • ,.<f • •f ~ .. · ' .... ·." ~- 1 • .. ,, :Jv ~lf~3. \\•1'. 
• • •• I_. . . '-r ._ .. , • , • , ... ':..•I' - ~,. .. ·' l' J'•. "'-· ~J,1, •• •-lo·.. II-
.. I'_;·,:: /. ·~ .. -~:'.', ... :.:~·."'>',,.~.· ·, ·' .... , ... •, '.··:~.'..':,,t'.'. . .: ... , ~;-~:1 ("-, )'· . . '(," ...... , .... - ''{(.,· . 1.... --\··~\ .1,l , .. : 
"1 ~- ·:,.._-~,,. . .. • Li\:·}.:.·.... , ,: ~·. ,.,, I l ~ · .. , .. ~' , f. ... ;~::~ :::'. \ ··. l .. 
• , · . -,- .• , ... , J ,. • · .. " I • ~ •1 ./ ' ' · Y ~· ./ .~\- :. ··~ .. ~· .. ~-·. ~: ·/'['~· ,- .. ~/~~ ,, .... ·:.: .. :'·~;: .... ~'. •. _:.. ~ .···,,yf1. .·~,. '-;· .. 
:'·. ·' , •·. ~' I .. ,' . I') .... • ·, . 1 ....... •,,,; : ... ·; ''• .. : .... ·Gr ~.' • 
• , /·'·'· ~•-'•'"•)/•'· ... ; .... • ,..,.,:. lS.J)f' - ..• ..., ............. -yf1 ._., ..i'c~'//,__ 
-: ~. i,• 1~/ ... "/" • .. ~:/•.;,..;:,'~ •' r ,.j, \" . ·/, .. /~:,~:. ••'\ ··~ ... .,"'.~r ";'., ::,~•: .. ~.~~ ; •. < J. ·-~ I "''"' .... , .•.•• r. • . v -; -:" . ' . ..( . I; J,,,, . -l / • , . ' . ~ ' . ~ - (.'. • . I. ~ - . ' \• .:~t-~: .,,·_r~ .·. :~"· . .. ::::.-:.; .. : .. :·! _>~'"(·· .. ·~: ... :.. . -r.-~~ .... ( ... '?~ .... ., ... , .. (~' .. ,, .-, ..... 
'.!':" f.: : ~- ;_~--:~-~,,~·.J :':J_' ::· .:-~_-;; '' '.~: ~ '..~ ;;:::o:~ . : .!i~::::rt . .-.... ~ 
, \1. I • ~'.,' 
Figure 101. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
June 27, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. 
Armee. Stand: 27.6.44.morgens National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -313, Roll 318. 
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Figure 102. Soviet Breakthrough Into Rear Of 4th Army, 
June 27, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei 
Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 105. The Impending Encirclement Of The 4th 
Army, June 27, 1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 4, 
Die Entwicklung des russischen Grossangriffs gegen die 
Heeresgruppe Mitte Im Sommer 1944. Karte 1 National 




-·- -.. ...... : ... ., 





·1~ . '\'°' H•• 
'·. 
'- 'J'\' "'" 
Figure 106. The Soviet Encirclement Of Bobruisk, June 
27, 1944. Source: 
Einschliessung Von 
Archives Microfilm 
Armeeoberkommando 9, Die 
Bobruisk 26. u. 27.6.44. National 
Publication T-312, Roll 339. 
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Figure 107. The 9th Army Situation On June 27, 1944. 
Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, 9. Armee • Lage am 27.Juni 
44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-311, Roll 
219. 
Figure 108. The Eastern Acess Into Bobruisk: The Road 
And Railway Bridges Across The Berezina River. 
Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester 
Platz Bobruisk 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T -311 , Roll 218. 
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Figure 109. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. June 28, 1944. Source: 
Armee. Stand: 28.6.44.morgens National 






,,. ~) SIUl.ID \( 
. '"'--··· I 
. ,":' 
f 
.. fi! ' 












Figure 110. Army Group Center, June 28, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 111. The Principal Roads Used In The Retreat Of 
Army Group Center. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, ..Jai 
den Rueckzugskaempfen benutzte $trassen National 
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Figure 114. The Breakout From Bobruisk. Source: 
Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester Platz 
Bobruisk 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 218. 
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Figure 115. Army Group Center, June 30, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 117. Fortress Ssluzk. Source: Oberkommando 
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester Platz Ssluzk 21.6.44. 
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Figure 119. 9th Army Order Of Battle, June 30, 1944. 
Source: Lt. Weller, Gefechtsbericht der 9. Armee ueber 
die Schlacht in Weissruthenien 24.6.-10.7.1944 
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 
339. 
€SS 
'6LS 110):1 'SL-l. UO!l'eO!IQOd 
Wl!!OJO!Vi S9Al~OJV 1euoneN 98-vtl. ue6eMJaWB>tJSZU'ed 
'(uan~) lSO 1 a11alSl1a1s6unJae1>t!OelUOJ:t 











~ :;i ,, o.· 
::J 










'· ~. ....... 
l.n \Q . ....... 













·e~£ 11oti '£~£-1 uoireonqnd 
Wj!!OJO!~ S0J\!40J'tf ll3UO!ll3N sua6JOW'vv'L' ~ :pUBlS 
•aaWJ'tf ·zd '£ Jap a6e1 '£ ·>ro·v·zd :aoJnos ·vv6 ~ '~ Atnr 




-.. i . ·.· .. ~ .. _ ..:._ 
.. ~-. . . ... :· .· .,_, 
-I ... 
' , . .. .. .. -;' .. ~ ... · 
-"'-· ·1 
.. •.' . .. , .... -· 
" ··-•1.··-·•' I ... 
·;... J '•n · .... .=, ... ·a • · 
"'··· ...... , 
' ',.:•• • ..._ ... , .•. :, ~r:-1•1 .;_,,. •• ... , 
.. ~ -... · ,;····'·" 
......•... 
....... . ....... ::. 
--~~-~7~.~·:~·· · ·-. Qq. ' ..... ':' .• -. _ .. , 
--------
· ... · ., ..... ., 
:: .... ·'' . ' . -· . ........ ,, 
.. · . 
' .. ft I ,. ;:"' ' 
., ........ 
. -· ..... _-. ... 
-·· '!' . ' I·•-,. ............. : . ., 
.. ··-· 
....... · .. · .. ·-:·····"'· ......... _. 
···'.',':I --•• :• ........ ·""" . ....... , ~ '., ,,.,., ti .... , ••• 
. ... ''· ........ 
. \ 
.. 
I / :~· . ' .. •. 
\;· .. .• "l 
"'' 






. '>- ... , 
Figure 122. Army Group Center, July 1, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 123. 
July 1, 1944. 
Soviet Eastern Advance Toward Minsk On 
Source: A.0.K. 4, la. Kartenband 1. 
Anlagen zum KTB Nr. 24 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T -312, Roll 252. 




Figure 124. Army Group Center, July 2, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 125. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
July 2-4, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. 
Armee. Stand: 2.-4.7.44.morgens National Archives 
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Figure 126. The Position Of Army Group Center On July 
2, 1944 At 1200 Hrs. Source: Heeresgruppe Mitte, Lasm 
H.Gr.Mitte am 2.7.44. 1200 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 234. 
Figure 127. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
July 5, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. 
Microfilm Stand: 5.7.44.morgens 
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Figure 128. Army Group Center, July 3, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 130. Army Group Center, July 5, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 131. Fortress Baranowicze. Source: 
Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester Platz 
Baranowicze 21.6.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-311, Roll 218. 
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Figure 133. The 4th Panzer Division, 12th Panzer 
Division And The 28th Jaeger Division On July 5, 1944. 
Source: Armeeoberkommando 9, Per Kampf um die 
Landenge von Baranowicze 4. u. 5.7.44. National 
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Figure 134. The Red Army's Offensive Thrusts, June 22-
July 5, 1944. Source: Oberkommando Heeresgruppe 
Mitte, Stossrichtungen d. R.A.-22.6.-5. 7.44. National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T -311, Roll 219. 
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Figure 135. The Situation Of The 3rd Panzer Army On 
July 6, 1944 In The Evening. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lag§ 
der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 6.7.44.Abends National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-313, Roll 318. 
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Figure 136. Army Group Center, July 6, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-










... 14 I 
I •. I 
• •. ,. • ·~ I'.:.. 








~ ..... ,~,. '1 • "\. 
,. 
:::·~ -\: .~.:--'~ ·~i.,/~-·: 




. . ' ._;,,...,,. ' ./;. ' !. l 
m.·· · '"· 
'"...;~ 
te .. •.-;""'~ 
! ~·-....... 
:t-. "! ·~·2· 
_/"''-'j• {P.'".""°· . . . . . . . i ": 
\\ .. '..... .\ ..... il· '- :·'. 
.. 4. - - ... • • ,,,,, .. 
-·: .. •4i , - ~"-··· ! .. " ,· '\ .:---...J.~ 
•. "'" .. •• - 1.,0,, .. -
~) 
' , ..... .. . - f. . 
~
' ..... · ,,. . 
,, '. . ,.·"f ,· • ---- ·, 
i _J. . .. ' ~ 
~ .: ... •'~.,. .. :. 
; ·.~,:-·: ~~ ,· f.'•· ••. 






l" .-. ,,. 
~. \ 
Figure 138. 3rd Panzer Army's IX Army Corps On July 7, 
1944 In The Evening. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. 
Armee. Stand: 7.7.44.Abs. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313, Roll 318. 
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Figure 142. Army Group Center, July 8, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 143. Fortress Wilna, Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf And 
Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von Werthern, July 9, 1944. 
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 
9.7.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-313, 
Roll 318. 
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Figure 144. Army Group Center, July 9-10, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 
21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication 
T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 145. Fortress Wilna And Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf, 
July 10, 1944. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. 
Armee. Stand: 10.7.44. National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 147. Gruppe Von Vormann, Order Of Battle, July 
10, 1944. Source: Lt. Weller, Gefechtsbericht der 9. 
Armee ueber die Schlacht in Weissruthenien 24.6.-
10.7.1944 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-
312, Roll 339. 
rt'. 
(,fl •I.: .. •' • I 
·.1.11 a...-•>"· 
I ' 
'J· . •.• . 
Figure 148. SS Parachute Battalion 500 And Panther 
Battalion Of The Panzer Division "Gross Deutsch land." 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 
21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication 
T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 149. IX Army Corps, July 11, 1944. Source: 
Pz.A.O.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 
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Figure 152. Panzer Grenadier Brigade Von Werthern's 
Attack On Griedraiciai And The Soviet Advance To Olita, 
July 12, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei 
Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 153. Army Group Center, July 12, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Figure 154. Kampfgruppe Tolsdorf, July 13, 1944. 
Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Lage der 3. Pz. Armee. Stand: 
13.7.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-313, 
Roll 318. 
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Figure 156. Army Group Center, July 13, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 157. Fortress Brest-Litovsk. Source: 
Oberkommando Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fester Platz Brest 




Figure 158. The Garrison Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk. 
Source: Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagenkarte Brest-
Litowsk Stand 26.7.44. 9 Uhr. National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 1318. 
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Figure 159. Soviet Attacks Southwest And Northwest 
Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk, July 25, 1944. Source: OKH, 
Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-10.8.44., 
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 160. Soviet Attacks Southwest, Northwest And 
East Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk, July 26, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
10.8.44., National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 161. The Situation Of Fortress Brest-Litovsk On 
The Morning Of July 26, 1944. Source: 
Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten A.O.K. 2 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 1325. 
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Figure 162. The Encirclement Of Fortress Brest-
Litovsk On July 27, 1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 
2, Lagekarten A.O.K. 2 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-312, Roll 1325. 
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Figure 163. The Breakout Of The Garrison Of Fortress 
Brest-Litovsk On July 28, 1944. Source: 
Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten. A.O.K. 2 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, Roll 1325. 
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Figure 164. The Relief And Arrival Of Kampfgruppe 
Felzmann At The German Western Defense line, July 28, 
1944. Source: Armeeoberkommando 2, Lagekarten 
A.O.K. 2 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-312, 
Roll 1325. 
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Figure 165. The 2nd Army, July 29-30, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Mitte Von 21.6.-
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Panzer-Korps. Stand Maerz 1944 National Archives 
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Figure 167. Soviet Mechanized Corps. Source: 
Oberkommando H.Gr. Mitte, Beispiel fuer 
Kriegsgliederung eines Mech Korps. Stand Maerz 1944 
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Figure 168. Rail And Road Bridges In Belorussia. 
Source: Luftgaukommando XXVll, LSOK Uebersichtskarte 
Eisenbahn u. Strassenbruecken im Bereich Luftflotte 6 
Stand 12.2 .1944 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T -311, Roll 225. 
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CHAPTERX 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE 
AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE XIII ARMY CORPS, 
JULY 13-23, 1944 
Marshal Ivan Koniev launched the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive 
against Army Group North Ukraine on July 13, 1944.1 The Soviets 
had concentrated sufficent forces on the 1st Ukrainian Front to 
achieve their objectives of reoccupying the Ukraine and in taking 
southern Poland. The First Ukrainian Front consisted of 7 infantry 
armies, 3 tank armies, 2 cavalry-mechanized groups, and 2 air 
armies (see Table XXXXll).2 This force gave Marshal Koniev a total 
of 80 divisions, 1 O tank and mechanized corps, 4 independent tank 
brigades, and the 1st Czechoslovak Corps.3 The strength of the 1st 
Ukrainain Front amounted to 843,000 men, 2,200 tanks and self-
propelled guns, 14,000 artillery guns and mortars, and 2,806 
aircraft.4 This gave the Soviets a margin of superiority of 
approximately 1.4:1 in combat troops, 2.2:1 in artillery and 
mortars, 2.2:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.4:1 in combat 
aircraft (see Table XXXXlll). 
Army Group North Ukraine under the command of Colonel Josef 
Harpe contained the 4th Panzer Army, 1st Panzer Army, and the 1st 
Hungarian Army (see Table XXXXIV) Army Group North Ukraine 
634 
possessed 36 Infantry Divisions, 5 panzer divisions, two Panzer 
Grenadier divisions, and 2 infantry brigades (see Table XXXXIV).S 
These forces amounted to 600,000 combat troops, 6,300 artillery 
guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and 700 aircraft.6 
Army Group North Ukraine, therefore, despite the transfer of 3 
panzer divisions to Army Group Center remained very strong.7 
Marshal Koniev's plan to break up Army Group North Ukraine 
was based on the concept of two main blows and one secondary 
blow. Stalin had argued for one main blow from the center of the 
front toward Lvov.s However, Marshal Koniev was persistent and 
received permission for his own plan, but if it failed Stalin would 
hold him personally responsible.9 Koniev's plan called for one main 
blow on the right flank on the axis toward Rava Ruska and the other 
main blow centered on Lvov with a secondary attack in the south on 
the left flank toward Stanislav.10 The following Soviet formations 
were deployed for the attack toward Rava Ruska on July 13, 1944: 
3rd Guards Army; 13th Army; 1st Guards Tank Army; Baranov's 
Cavalry-Mechanized Group consisting of the 1st Guards Cavalry 
Corps and the 25th Tank Corps.11 
The attack in the center toward Lvov on July 14, 1944 
employed the following Soviet formations: 16th Army; 38th Army; 
3rd Guards Tank Army; 4th Guards Tank Army; S.V. Sokolov's 
Cavalry-Mechanized Group consisting of the 6th Guards Cavalry 
Corps and the 31st Tank Corps.12 
The secondary attack toward Stanislav on July 21 , 1944 
employed fewer Soviet formations: 1st Guards Army and 18th 
Army.13 
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The Germans had established strong defensive positions in 
depth. There were 3 defensive belts. The infantry was deployed in 
the first two defensive lines and the armor was held in reserve 
approximately 1 O miles from the forward positions.14 
Nevertheless, a general lack of reserves weakened the German 
defense in depth. The Soviets had become masters of breakthrough 
operations employing concentration of forces against narrow 
attack sectors to achieve breakthroughs in depth. Thus, the 
Germans were faced again with a battle to avoid encirclement. 
The Germans had studied the new Soviet style of offensive 
operations and reached some conclusions about countermeasures to 
be employed to counteract Soviet operational measures. The 4th 
Panzer Army Headquarters noted some characteristics of the Soviet 
attack based on the experiences of Army Group Center. The Soviet 
attack groups consisted on an average of 12-15 rifle divisions and 
1-2 tank corps.15 Four major Soviet characteristics were noted: 
(1) Considerable improvement in the employment of artillery; (2) 
New concentrated employment of ground attack aircraft; (3) New 
method of armor employment; (4) Operational extension.16 
The Germans observed that the Soviets had concentrated their 
artilllery on the point of their planned breakthrough with the 
objectives of eliminating German artillery as the main firepower 
and backbone of the defense, engaging the reserves, and covering 
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the flanks of the attack. 11 The artillery commanders had also 
responded flexibly and rapidly to the development of the situation. 
The German countermeasures adopted were: (1) frequent artillery 
changes of location before the beginning of the offensive; (2) 
Employ numerous dummy positions; (3) camouflage; (4) When the 
attack is finally recognized change all earlier positions.1 s 
The Soviets had employed the Anglo-American model of air 
attack in groups of often more than 100 aircraft working together 
with Soviet artillery.19 The objectives were the the elimination of 
German artillery during the day, pinning down of reserves, and the 
preventing of their movement. German countermeasures were 
proposed: (1) employment of twilight and darkness for combat and 
movement; (2) Use of all weapons for anti-aircraft defense 
including rifles; (3) Good camouflage and cover in the front lines as 
well as for the reserves, assembly areas, fire positions, and 
command posts; (4) slit trenches were needed on both sides of the 
roads and tracks, at command posts, and assembly areas; (5) Radios 
were to be in separate locations from the command posts; (6) 
Frequent changes of command post were necessary; (7) Fire 
positions were to be layed out so they could not be knocked out by a 
carpet bombing attack; (8) Light Flak artillery was to be redeployed 
from already destroyed and unimportant objects to important 
positions; (9) Combat vehicles in the rear areas were to maintain 
large intervals; (10) Tracked vehicles were to disperse; (11) Main 
roads were to be bypassed; and (12) Roads were to be cleared of 
damaged vehicles.20 
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The Soviet attack in the beginning was characterized by small 
numbers of tanks. However, after the breakthrough had been 
achieved on the battlefield Soviet armor was employed en masse 
with far ranging objectives. German countermeasures 
recommended were: (1) Organization of an armor defense in depth 
in the main battle line; (2) Mobile armor defense in the depth of the 
battlefield; (3) Passive armor defense (obstacles, mines, trenches, 
etc.) in depth with concentrations on the roads and not in the 
terrain.21 
The Soviet operational expansion with far ranging objectives 
in depth posed a challenge to the German defense. Soviet forces 
previously were used on a limited short range scale. Currently, 
Soviet forces instead had objectives deep in the German rear area 
and pursued these objectives without regard to threats on the 
flanks. Combined operations of the operational groups in the depth 
of the battlefield was paramount. This action denied the German 
Command sufficient time to rebuild the front. The only German 
countermeasures available remained foresight and planning ahead 
for the employment of German reserves.22 
The effect of the Soviet artillery in the major offensive 
against Army Group Center was noted in the report 
Grosskampfgliederung 4.7.1944 by the 4th Panzer Army.23 The 
extremely heavy barrage fire during the beginning of the Soviet 
offensive against Army Group Center was directed against the 
forward trenches inflicting high losses of personnel and material 
which was decisive in the defense of the main battle line. 
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Therefore, in order to preserve defensive capabilities new 
countermeasures were developed based on the experiences of Army 
Group Center. The structure of the battle area was to be organized 
with lines in depth. The defense was to be transferred to the lines 
in depth shortly before a major Soviet attack. The attack was then 
to be smashed in the depths of the defense and the old main battle 
line retaken. If the beginning of a major attack was not recognized 
in time and barrage fire had already begun then the defense was to 
be conducted from the old main battle line. 
The enlarged battle area was to consist of a main battle line 
which was located behind the most forward trench or the second 
trench. Behind the enlarged battle area the main line of a new 
battlefield was to be established. The previous main battle line 
was to be held with the first trench containing only a light security 
line manned with combat ouposts. Soviet forces that got into the 
first trench prior to the actual attack were to be thrown out by a 
counterattack. The purposes of the enlarged battlefield concept 
could only be realized if the approaches to the obstacles before the 
main battle line remained under German control so the Soviets 
could be deceived as to the real intentions of the Germans prior to 
the major attack. The enlarged battlefield area was to be prepared 
so that all command posts, the majority of observation posts and 
heavy weapons possessed communications to the rear and could be 
transferred behind the new main battle line. When an alert was 
sounded the infantry were to occupy the enlarged battlefield 
positions before dawn. The most forward trench of the previous 
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main battle line was to remain manned by only a weak security line. 
These combat outposts were assigned the mission to repulse the 
Soviet reconnaisance troops. Complete observation of the 
battlefield was to be maintained from under cover before and 
during Soviet barrage fire and when there was an unequivocal sign 
that the Soviet infantry and armored formations were attacking 
then these troops could withndraw to the new main battle line.24 
The new tactics adopted by the German Army may have 
increased its tenacity and ability to resist the new Soviet 
offensive measures. However, the overwhelming superiority 
exerted by the ·Soviets along the designated narrow attack sectors 
on the battlefield continued to achieve outstanding results in 
breaking open the German defenses. 
JULY 13, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
The Soviets attacked during the morning hours on a wide front 
and broke through the main battle line and took Horochow and 
Cechow (6 km south of Horochow).25 Battalions from the 16th and 
17th Panzer Divisions were used in a counterattack to liquidate 
this breakthrough (see Figure 169). The Soviets advanced into the 
woods west of the main battle line on the northern sector of the 
291 st Infantry Division and were brought to a halt before the 
German artillery position (see Figure 169). The 214th Infantry 
Division was busy clearing out the Soviet penetration into the 
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combat outpost positions (see Figure 169). The Soviet 
breakthrough north of Dolsk was met by a counterattack from the 
LVI Panzer Corps. However, the counterattack ran into heavy Soviet 
artillery barrage fire and was halted.26 
JULY 14, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXll Army Corps And XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets 
attempted to expand their breakthrough areas in both corps sectors 
to the southwest and west. The Soviets broke through on the left 
sector of the 340th Infantry Division in several places.27 The 17th 
Panzer Division was locked into battle all day east of the 
Druzkopol-Horochow road and repulsed the Soviets in a successful 
counterattack.28 The 291 st Infantry Division established a 
blocking position west of Horochow. The 16th Panzer Division 
forced the Soviet spearheads back in the region 8 km southeast of 
Zawidow in a counterattack. The 40-50 Soviet tanks which had 
broken through were mostly destroyed. Thirty Soviet tanks were 
confirmed as destroyed and contact to the right wing of the 88th 
Infantry Division was restored (see Figure 169).29 Strong Soviet 
attacks were mostly repulsed on the right and left wing of the 88th 
Infantry Division and the entire sector of the 72nd Infantry 
Division. However, the bridgehead at Lokacze was evacuated and 
the left wing of the 72nd Infantry Division's forward security on 
the main battle line was pushed back to the Turja sector (see 
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Figure 169).30 The Soviets established a bridgehead over the Turja 
river in the center of the 214th Infantry Division's sector. 
1st Panzer Army 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviet major offensive began at 
0345 hrs with an extremely massive artillery barrage on the 
German lines from 0400-0930 hrs.31 The attack hit the 357th 
Infantry Division's sector and the south wing and center of the 
349th Infantry Division.32 The Soviet attack pushed the entire 
front of the 337th Infantry Division back to the artillery covering 
position. The Soviet breakthrough of 3 km behind the main battle 
line during the afternoon was sealed off. But the Soviets renewed 
their attack in the afternoon against the 357th Infantry Division 
and after heavy artillery preparation with strong tactical air 
support failed to achieve further success. The attack was launched 
again in the evening against the left wing of the division with 
approximately 90 tanks in the direction of Zborow. The 349th 
Infantry Division after liquidating a deep breakthrough had its right 
wing pushed back 6 km west of the previous main battle line. 
Ill Panzer Corps. The Ill Panzer Corps counterattacked with 
the 1st Panzer Division and the 8th Panzer Division.33 The 1st 
Panzer Division was employed at 1100 hrs south of Zloczow. 
Panzer Grenadier Regiment 113 and the reinforced Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment 1 formed Kampfgruppe Neumeister under the command 
Colonel Neumeister and advanced along the Tarnopol-Lemberg road 
to the area northwest of Zborow. 34 The Soviets had achieved on the 
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southern edge of their breakthrough a penetration 1-3 km west of 
the old main battle line. The Soviets had taken the town of Mszana, 
but Kampfgruppe Neumeister stormed the town and retook it and 
forced the Soviets back out of the German lines. 35 The 8th Panzer 
Division counterattacking from the northwest was delayed by 
strong Soviet tactical air attacks. 
JULY 15, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 340th Infantry Division was forced 
back to the south bank of the Sudolowka river despite tenacious 
resistance and Soljanow was lost (see Figure 170).36 The 16th and 
17th Panzer Divisions held the newly established main battle line 
from the west edge of Druzkopol to the north against heavy Soviet 
pressure. However, local penetrations could not be prevented. 
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets also attacked the southern 
wing of the Corps with armored support and broke through the front 
of the 88th Infantry Division in several places. The Soviets 
penetrated 12 km behind the main battle line. However, a 
concentrated counterattack by 20 German tanks pushed the Soviets 
back, but the 88th Infantry Division's southern wing still remained 
4 km behind the main battle line (see Figure 170).37 All other 
attacks in the corps sector were repulsed except for the battle 
underway in a breakthrough area on the boundary between the 72nd 
and 214th Infantry Divisions (see Figure 171 ). 
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1 st Panzer Army 
XXXXVll I Panzer Corps. Fierce Soviet attacks were launched 
against Jezierna and to the north of the town, but were repulsed 
and the penetration liquidated with the knocking out of 6 Soviet 
tanks.38 
Ill Panzer Corps. The counterattack by the Ill Panzer Corps 
gained ground in the south and stopped on the line Jezierna to 15 
km east of Zloczow.39 The 1st Panzer Division succeeded during 
the counterattack in taking Otegjow and halting the Soviet attack. 40 
The 8th Panzer Division to the north got bogged down using the 
main rail line in its advance and was subjected to continuous 
Soviet air attacks which caused heavy tosses (see Figure 170).41 
The situation became even worse when the Soviets broke through on 
the left wing of the Ill Panzer Corps and forced the right wing of 
the 349th Infantry Division back which permitted the Soviets to 
advance further to the west. 42 
JULY 16, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks from the northeast and 
north resulted in the toss of Radziechow (see Figure 172).43 The 
340th Infantry Division was thrown back to the west in the region 
6 km southeast of Radziechow. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division 
rapidly occupied the elevated terrain 6 km northeast of Chotojow 
and Witkow Nowy to cover the assembly of the 340th Infantry 
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Division (see Figure 172).44 The Soviets advanced with infantry 
and armor forces through the hole between the 340th Infantry 
Division and the 17th Panzer Division and occupied Pawlow ( 4 km 
north of Cholojow) during the evening. The Soviets now posed a 
threat to the Bug River bridges. The bridges at Rudasielecka (6 km 
northeast of Kamionka Strumilowa) and Dobrotwor (13 km north of 
Kamionka Strumilowa) were blocked. The Soviet forces supported 
by armor attacked the front of the 17th Panzer Division, 291 st 
Infantry Division, and the 16th Panzer Division throughout the day. 
The Germans were pushed back to the line 6 km west of Druzkopol -
6 km northwest· of Druzkopol - 5 km southeast of Zawidow (see 
Figure 172).45 
XXXXXll Army Corps. The 88th Infantry Division's front was 
ripped apart on the right by approximately 100 Soviet tanks 
advancing in a western and northwestern direction.46 A 
counterattack was launched with a heavy tank battalion from the 
area of Poryck (see Figure 172). The 72nd and 214th Infantry 
Divisions repulsed most of the breakthroughs in their respective 
sectors. 
1 st Panzer Army 
XXIV Panzer Corps. The 1 OOth Jaeger Division liquidated a 
local breakthrough at Kupczynce (see Figure 173). 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Ill Panzer Corps was placed under 
the command of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. A successful defense 
was conducted throughout the day by the north wing of the 96th 
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Infantry Division, 1st Panzer Division, 357th Infantry Division and 
8th Panzer Division (see Figure 173).47 The 8th Panzer Division 
launched an attack to the north, but was halted by tenacious Soviet 
resistance. A blocking position was established by the 8th Panzer 
Division on its left wing west of Zloczow. Nevertheless, the 
Soviets made a hole in the front between the left wing of the 8th 
Panzer Division and the right wing of the 349th Infantry Division at 
Kottow and were able to attack Zloczow with armor and infantry 
(see Figure 172).48 Soviet forces north of Zloczow had crossed the 
Zloczow-Sasow road to the west and were advancing against a 
village 6 km northwest of Zloczow. 
XIII Army Corps. The 349th Infantry Division which had its 
right wing pushed back to Kottow was now placed under the 
command of the XIII Army Corps.49 The XIII Army Corps received 
the order to withdraw to the Prinz Eugen position as a result of the 
deteriorating situation along its flanks.so 
Corps Detachment C received the following orders: 
The Division was to disengage during the night of July 
16-17, 1944 beginning at 00.00 hrs to the Prinz Eugen 
position. The junction point on the right to the 14th SS 
Volunteer Division "Galizien" was at the tip of the 
woods 1.5 km southwest of Wolochy and on the left to 
the 361 st Infantry Division on the rail line 1.5 km 
northeast of the white church at Zablotce. The 
Divisional Group 217 would be deployed on the right and 
the Divisional Group 183 on the left. The Divisional 
Group 339 minus the 691 st Grenadier Regiment was 
held in the corps reserve and was assembled in Konty. 
Fusilier Battalion Corps Detachment C was transferred 
to the disposal of Corps Detachment C in the area 
southwest of Podhorce. Combat elements of all units 
were to remain as rearguards till July 17th at 1000 hrs 
in the old positions and when the first Soviet pressure 
was encountered they were to conduct a fighting 
withdrawal to the new line. Artillery Regiment 219 
was to provide artillery support for the rearguards 
with individual batteries. The 1st Engineer battalion of 
Engineer Regiment 219 was to destroy the bridges at 
Ponikwa, Boratyn, Suchodoly and Holoskowics once the 
last units had passed them. The command post for 
Corps Detachment C on July 17th was to be in the 
woods east of Brachowka.51 
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According to the army records the Soviets had lost 123 tanks 
since the offensive began in the area northwest of Tarnopol.52 
JULY 1 7, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division held 
the Bug River bridgehead northeast of Kamionka Strumilowa against 
heavy assaults by Soviet mounted infantry attacking from the 
northeast and north (see Figure 174).53 The Soviet attacks were 
repulsed and 25 Soviet tanks were destroyed. Soviet armor and 
infantry forces attacked the right flank of the 17th Panzer 
Division. The attack was repulsed southeast of Tartakow and 10 
Soviet tanks were knocked out. However, approximately 20 Soviet 
tanks broke through to Krystynopol and crossed the Bug river north 
of the town (see Figure 17 4). 54 Soviet attacks against the east 
front of the 17th Panzer Division were weak and repulsed with only 
local losses of terrain. 
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XXXXll Army Corps. The 88th Infantry Division's line was 
attacked by the Soviets with 40 tanks at Poryck (see Figure 174). 
The 214th Infantry Division was also under attack east of 
Wlodzimierz and local penetrations were achieved by Soviet armor 
(see Figure 174). 
VIII Army Corps. The 12th Hungarian Reserve Division was 
broken through in several locations which required a counterattack 
by a battalion from the 211 th Infantry Division and 168th Infantry 
Division to shore up the 12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry Division's 
line (see Figure 175). 
1st Panzer Division 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets pursued the German 
withdrawal movement into the Prinz Eugen position south of 
Zborow slowly. A massive Soviet attack north of Zborow forced a 
local withdrawal from the main battle line. Both the 1st and 8th 
Panzer Divisions launched a counterattack and reached the region 9 
km southeast of Kottow by midday despite unfavorable weather and 
tenacious Soviet resistance.55 However, Soviet defensive fire from 
tanks, artillery and anti-tank guns from the northeast and east as 
well as a regimental attack on the right flank brought the attack to 
a halt and the Panzer Divisions regrouped.56 A renewed attack by 
the 8th Panzer Division gained 3 km to the north. But Soviet 
infantry, armor and artillery formations moved through the hole 
between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and XIII Army Corps and reached 
the line Busk-Gliniany.57 
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XIII Army Corps. The 340th Infantry Division was pushed back 
by the Soviets to the south on the line Hutaszklana-Ohladow-
Babinie {9 km northwest of Toporow).58 The withdrawal of Corps 
Detachment C to the Prinz Eugen position was completed without 
Soviet pressure. 
The threatening situation that had developed from the 
southeastern direction in the area of Busk caused the XIII Army 
Corps in the early morning hours of July 17th to assemble the 
Divisional Group 339 in the area of Olesko which was brought 
forward by motor transport to hold open the highway toward 
Busk.59 The increasing threat to the rear of the XIII Army Corps at 
Busk caused the corps to establish a defensive line at Wierzblany -
east of Czuczmany - Humniska with the Engineer Battalion 219 and 
a heavy anti-tank platoon from the Panzerjaeger Battalion 219. 
Soviet armor was already 1 km east of Busk. Divisional Group 339 
received the order to reconnoiter through Bialy-Kamien. Corps 
Detachment C was ordered around midday by the XIII Army Corps to 
transfer the Fusilier Battalion to secure the highway in the area of 
Jasionowce against the Soviets advancing in the direction of 
Majdan Pieniakkie and this position was occupied at 1400 hrs. The 
SS Field Replacement Battalion 14 stationed near Busk was caught 
between the Soviet spearheads advancing toward Busk and was 
mauled.so The remnants managed to retreat to the west. 
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JULY 18, 1944 
The Soviet forces advancing through the existing holes in the 
German line at Zloczow and between the 4th Panzer and 1st Panzer 
Armies advanced deeper into the breakthrough areas. The Soviets 
reached the region west of Busk with strong armored forces and 
made contact with the Soviet forces from the north that had broken 
through on both sides of Kamionka Strumilowa and completed the 
encirclement of the XIII Army Corps (see Figure 176).61 
4th Panzer Army 
The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division repulsed Soviet attacks 
supported by armor against Kamionka Strumilowa from the north, 
east and southeast throughout the day (See Figure 176). 62 The 
Germans withdrew north of Kamionka Strumilowa to Mosty-Wielkie 
and held this town against numerous attacks from the north (see 
Figure 176). 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. Soviet armor was crossing the Bug 
river at Krystynopol and north of the town. German forces knocked 
out at least 25 Soviet tanks halting the advance and Krystynopol 
was retaken by German forces (see Figure 176).63 
XXXXll Army Corps. Poryck was lost and the Germans were 
'thrown back to the woods west of the town (see Figure 176).64 The 
new main battle line followed the west bank of the Bug river and 
along the course of the rail line. 
L VI Panzer Corps. The Soviets launched their anticipated 
attack after very heavy artillery preparation combined with 
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tactical air support. The 342nd and 26th Infantry Divisions were 
broken through on a wide front despite tenacious resistance (see 
Figure 176).65 The Soviets advanced on both sides of the rail line 
Kowel-Luboml and southwest of Maciejow 1 O km to the west (see 
Figure 176). The Soviets then assembled for a renewed attack 
south of the rail line against the secondary defense line of the 
253rd Infantry Division.66 The units of the 342nd and 26th Infantry 
Divisions continued to conduct defensive battles in the depth of the 
defensive postions (see Figure 176). 
1st Panzer Army 
XXXXYlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets attacked Glinna with 
armor and achieved a 3 km wide and approximately 1 km deep 
bridgehead over the Strypa river which was sealed off temporarily, 
but during the evening the Soviets broke through again in a 
southwestern direction (see Figure 176). 67 Several Soviet attacks 
supported by armor were repulsed north of Zborow. 
The German counterattack to the north to close the hole 
between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the XIII Army Corps gained 
little ground against Soviet artillery barrage fire and had to be 
halted. Army reports indicated that 18 Soviet tanks had been 
knocked out. 
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Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets pushed the German line back to 
the west. The 101 st Jaeger Division was brought up and employed 
in the line Gliniany to the northwest. 
XIII Army Corps. Busk was lost to a heavy Soviet armored 
attack and 50-60 Soviet tanks had already advanced 1 O km west of 
Busk (see Figure 176).68 The German line held against repeated 
attacks from the south against Bialy Kamien, but Sasow was lost to 
a Soviet armored attack from the south (see Figure 176).69 The 
349th Infantry Division attacked from the area northeast of 
Zloczow and forced its way into the woods south of Kottow. 
Meanwhile, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough on the eastern 
front of the XIII Army Corps on the Sasow-Brody road. The German 
withdrawal movement in the north was followed by a Soviet 
advance toward Toporow which continued past the town to the west 
1 O km north of Busk. 10 
The previous orders of Divisional Group 339 were changed 
during the night of July 17-18, 1944 and it was ordered to advance 
toward Ruda Koltowska beginning at 0200 hrs. There it was to 
combine with the 349th Infantry Division along with 6 assault guns 
for an attack to the south to take Obertasow.71 The junction with 
the 8th Panzer Division attacking to the north was to be 
accomplished in the area of Obertasow.72 Divisional group 339 
advanced out of the area of Chmielowa at 1400 hrs toward 
Obertasow and reached the hills north of Obertasow during the 
afternoon without the support of artillery from the 349th Infantry 
Division. The attack by the 8th Panzer Division, however, failed to 
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breakthrough and the pocket remained close. 73 Strong Soviet forces 
advancing mostly on the Lemberg-Brody highway and on both sides 
of the Holoskowice-Wysoko road were partially repulsed in hand to 
hand combat with extremely high casualties. The northern and 
southern Soviet pincers met just north of Busk and completed the 
encirclement of the XIII Army Corps (see Figure 176). Meanwhile, 
the 340th Infantry Division attempted to breakthrough to 
Kamionka-Strumilowa which was still in German hands. 
The XIII Army Corps decided on the afternoon of July 18th to 
make a thrust to the south in the hills of the Lemberg-Zloczow road 
to breakout of the Soviet encirclement and establish a connection 
with the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps.74 The XIII Army Corps gave the 
following orders to Corps Detachment C: 
Corps Detachment C was to disengage from the front 
during the night of July 18-19th and assemble on July 
19th in the woods on both sides of the road to Bialy 
Kamien. Corps Detachment C's sector was to be 
assumed by the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" 
and the 361 st Infantry Division by a simultaneous 
withdrawal to the line Zahorce-Czyski-Czechy-hills 
northeast of Gaje Konteckie. 1s 
Corps Detachment C responded with orders for the deployment 
of its units for the breakout: 
Divisional Group 217 will withdraw during the night of 
July 18-19th with Grenadier Regiment 311 to the line 
Zahorce-Czyski-Czechy and wait to be relieved by the 
14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien". All remaining 
units of the Divisional Group were to asemble in the 
area of Gawareczyzna. 
Divisional Group 183 will be relieved by units of the 
361 st Infantry Division and assemble in the woods 
south of Ozydow; The Fusilier Battalion will assemble 
in the area of Gorna. 
Ski-Jagd Kommando with the T-34 armor platoon will 
go to the new division command post at the forester's 
house 1 km northwest of Gorna. 
Artillery Regiment 219 is to move into position in the 
area north of Bialy-Kamien so that it can provide 
effective artillery support for the planned attack over 
the Bug river. 
Supply troops will transfer to the woods south of 
Ozydow.76 
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The breakout of the XII I Army Corps to reach the 1st and 8th 
Panzer Divisions in the southwest would have to cover 24-32 km of 
heavily wooded and swampy terrain, and the Bug river would also 
have to be forded. 77 
JULY 19, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
Gruppe Major General v.d. Meden was pushed back by the 
Soviets to the line Przemyslow (north of Belz) - Wojslawice (6 km 
west of Olwowek) where it was on the defense against attacks on 
the right wing (see Figure 177).78 Belz was occupied by the 
Soviets after losing 17 tanks.79 
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets achieved a breakthrough on 
the right wing against the 88th and 72nd Infantry Divisions. The 
Soviets continued their advance to the west from their 
breakthrough area engaging the German forces. 
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L VI Panzer Corps. The Soviets pushed the defensive front 
back to the Bug river on a wide front and pursued the withdrawal of 
the corps closely (see Figure 177).80 
VIII Army Corps. Soviet attacks supported by armor were 
repulsed at Holowno and Zgorany. The 168th Infantry Division held 
the line north of Mokrany against Soviet company strength attacks. 
1st Panzer Army 
XXXXVlll .Panzer Corps. The Soviets penetrated the thin 
defensive line southwest of Glinna and were then pushed back in a 
counterattack. Soviet infantry breached the main battle line 
southwest of Zborow.81 The 96th and 357th Infantry Divisions 
were attacked by Soviet forces supported by armor throughout the 
day. The Soviets achieved only local gains north of Gologory 
loosing 4 tanks. 
II I Panzer Corps. The 101 st Jaeger Division repulsed a Soviet 
attack supported by armor east of Dziedzilow (see Figure 178) 82 
The 68th Infantry Division staged a local withdrawal 4 km 
southwest of Zoltance after conducting a defense against Soviet 
attacks supported by armor. 
XIII Army Corps. The relief of Divisional group 183 went 
according to plan. Divisional Group 183 reached the woods south of 
Ozydow by noon. The German Army official report on the 
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destruction of the XIII Army Corps criticized the fighting ability of 
the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" severely stating: 
The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" had already 
shown with their first actions only an exceptionally 
inferior ability to standfast. The Galicians proved in no 
way to be the fanatical defenders of their homeland 
against Bolshevism, as one had supposed, so that their 
first-rate equipment and armament had hardly any 
impact and was finally only in the hands of a 
completely undisciplined, disordered mass on which the 
small number of German command personnel despite 
their utmost efforts had hardly any control over.83 
Furthermore, the numerous supply vehicles of the 14th SS 
Volunteer Division "Galizien" alerted the Soviets to the direction of 
the breakout of the XIII Army Corps by their movement in the 
direction of Bialy Kamien in the daylight.84 The Soviet responded 
by obstructing all the roads and paths so that decisive troop 
movements were seriously delayed. 
The XII I Army Corps faced the danger of having the current 
pocket in which they were located being split in half with the loss 
of Podhorce and Chwatow. The XIII Army Corps assigned the 
Grenadier Regiment 311 and the Fusilier Battalion of Corps 
Detachment C to clear up the situation. However, before the 
assigned units could be deployed both Podhorce and Chwatow were 
retaken by the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" with the 
support of assault guns.85 Apparently, the Galician SS were not as 
much of a disordered mob as the German Army claimed. 
General Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army Corps and his 
Chief of Staff, Colonel von Hammerstein on the morning of July 
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19th at the Corps Command Post issued the orders for a breakout of 
the XIII Army Corps to reach the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps in a three 
day operation.as The main burden of the attack was assigned to 
Corps Detachment C which the most combat worthy formation.87 
Corps Detachment C was to advance on July 20th at dawn on both 
sides of Bialy Kamien over the Bug river and after crossing the 
Zloczowka sector occupy and hold the tand between Skwarzawa and 
Chilozyce with a strong defense line to the southeast.SB The 
Fusilier battalion 361 and Assault Gun Brigade 249 were placed 
under the command of Corps Detachment C for the breakout. 
Engineer Battalion 219 was also brought up for the assault. 
The 349th Infantry Division was ordered to protect the east 
flank of Corps Detachment C and also take hill 334 and the hills 
southwest of it. The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien''i 361 st 
Infantry Division and 454th Security Division were to provide the 
rear cover for the withdrawal and breakout. 89 
On July 21, 1944, the XIII Army Corps plan called for making 
solid contact with the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps by Corps Detachment 
C between Lackie and Jasionowce and at Zloczow with the 349th 
Infantry Division.90 This would open the cauldron for the escape of 
the XIII Army Corps. 
On July 22, 1944, the plan provided for the rear echelon, 
supply troops and wounded to be sent out of the cauldron through 
the openings made by Corps Detachment C and the 349th Infantry 
Division. The remaining order of withdrawal from the pocket was 
to be the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien", 361st Infantry 
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Division followed by the 454th Security Division.91 This order of 
withdrawal was to be followed as long as Corps Detachment C and 
the 349th Infantry Division with the support of opposite units from 
the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps could hold open the cauldron. Corps 
Detachment C was assigned to assemble later in the area of 
Wisniowozik-Gologory. 
Corps Detachment C's adjutant received the orders for the 
attack on July 20th at noon. Divisional Group 183 and Fusilier 
Battalion 361 on the right of Corps Detachment C were to advance 
from the area of Bialy Kamien and take Belzce and Poczapy along 
with the hills south of the town and hold them.92 Divisional Group 
217 was to advance from the area of Czeremosnia over hill 366.1 
and Zulice to reach Chilozyoe on the left flank of Corps Detachment 
C. Assault Gun Brigade 249, Corps Detachment C's armored platoon 
and the motorized 1st Engineer Battalion of Regiment 219 were to 
asemble in Bialy Kamien. They were to cross the Bug river and 
occupy the hills south of the river with infantry. This armored 
group was then to advance on both sides of the highway to Poczapy 
and seize the crossings and block the Zloczow-Busk road.93 
The Soviet pressure on the XIII Army Corps continued 
throughout the day as it withdrew to the south. The corps assumed 
a new defense line of Olesko-Sokolowka. The 340th Infantry 
Division and 454th Security Division were closely pursued by the 
Soviets and separated by the Soviets from the rest of the XIII Army 
Corps (see Figure 178).94 Both divisions fought their way through 
to the west at Kamionka Strumilowa (see Figure 178).95 
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XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The 20th Panzer Grenadier Division was 
engaged the entire day in defensive battles against Soviet armor 
from the northeast and north (see Figure 178). The 168th Infantry 
Division's line southeast of Turyzka held against a Soviet attack 
supported by armor.96 The 16th Panzer Division was at Kulikow (9 
km southeast of Zolkiew). 
JULY 20, 1944 
4th Panzer Division 
A hole in the front emerged between the 1st and 4th Panzer 
Armies through which the Soviets advanced to the west and took 
Rawa Ruska and Uhnow and then proceeded further to the west and 
southwest (see Figure 179).97 Soviet armor engaged German units 
at Lubycza Krolewska and attacked Tomaszow during the evening 
(see Figure 179).98 
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets attacked this corps on a wide 
front with overwhelming infantry and armor achieving several 
breakthroughs and pushing the entire front back 3 km (see Figure 
179).99 The corps was forced to withdraw to the line Laszcow-
Krylow-to 4 km northwest of Horodlo. 
L VI Panzer Corps. The Soviets pursued the withdrawal of the 
corps to the west bank of the Bug river and attacked the newly 
occupied defense line on the Bug river (see Figure 179). The 
Soviets despite firm German resistance forced a crossing over the 
Bug river on both sides of the Kowel-Lublin rail line (see Figure 
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179).100 Once the Soviets had established their bridgehead they 
attacked the remnants of the German 253rd and 26th Infantry 
Divisions. The Soviet advance was halted here after the Germans 
employed every available man in the battle. 
VIII Army Corps. The 5th Jaeger Division was engaged in 
heavy combat at Zberez, but could not prevent the Soviets from 
crossing the Bug river.101 The corps withdrew its eastern front 
during the night to the Zlota-Lipa sector. 
1 st Panzer Army 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. The Soviets broke through the sector 
held by the 254th Infantry Division and were met with a 
counterattack by the 1st Panzer Division. The 8th Panzer Division 
attacked to the north through wooded terrain south of Zloczow (se~ 
Figure 180). 
XIII Army Corps. The beginning of the breakout attack of the 
XIII Army Corps had been set for 0330 hrs.102 However, the supply 
vehicles of the 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" clogged the 
road and combined with rainy weather delayed the deployment of 
certain units into their attack positions. Grenadier Regiment 311 
and the Fusilier Battalion from Corps Detachment C had not reached 
their start positions by 0330 hrs. Divisional Group 183 reported at 
0435 hrs movement difficulties and requested that the beginning of 
the attack be postponed. The quartermaster of Corps Detachment C 
took charge of traffic at 0500 hrs in an attempt to restore some 
order. 
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Nevertheless, the attack of Corps Detachment C commenced 
at 0500 hrs.103 Divisional Group 183 with Grenadier Regiment 351 
on the right and Grenadier Regiment 330 on the left overcame 
Soviet resistance and were north of Hill 24 7 at 0545 hrs. The 
northwest edge of Belzec was reached at 0725 hrs. 104 Divisional 
Group 217 minus Grenadier Regiment 311 along with the Fusilier 
Battalion of Corps Detachment C ran into stiff Soviet resistance at 
Hill 366.1 and the attack was brought to a standstill as of 0900 
hrs.1os The armored task force consisting of Assault Gun Brigade 
249 and the captured Soviet T -34 tanks of Corps Detachment C 
were delayed in advancing from their attack positions till 0800 hrs 
as a result of strong Soviet anti-tank fire from Hill 366.1.1os It 
was needed to advance against Poczapy since Grenadier Regiment 
351 of Divisional Group 183 had already advance through Belzec to 
the southeast and was encountering strong Soviet resistance from 
the direction of Poczapy. 
The armored task force reached the bridge at Poczapy at 1200 
hrs. after engaging in a heavy battle with Soviet armor and self-
propelled guns in which 20 were destroyed. The 3rd Engineer 
Company of Engineer Battalion 219 and elements of Grenadier 
Regiment 330 had to take Poczapy in a bitter house to house battle 
and the town was finally secured at 1500 hrs.101 Grenadier 
Regiment 351 had occupied Hill 251 3 km southwest of Poczapy and 
Divisional Group 217 arrived in the area of Zulice. Divisional Group 
339 under the command of the 349th Infantry Division took Hill 334 
at dawn and was fighting for Hill 234 at noon. 
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The attack objectives had almost all been reached. Three 
batteries of Artillery Regiment 219 of Corps Detachment C were 
pulled back over the Bug river during the morning hours. They were 
deployed into a position east of the road to Poczapy to provide a 
screen to the southeast. 
The favorable conditions set the stage for a further advance. 
Divisional Group 183 received the order to advance and take Kniaze 
at 1300 hrs and establish a screen to the west and southwest. 
Divisional Group 217 received orders at 1200 hrs to take Chilozyoe 
with Grenadier Regiment 389 as well as Hill 274.4 and occupy the 
area northeast of it and establish a defense to the east and 
southeast. Corps Detachment C moved its command post at 1255 
hrs to the woods 1.5 km southeast of Bialy-Kamien.1os 
The course of the battle began to change during the afternoon 
when increased Soviet air attacks brought the advance to a halt. 
Roads, artillery positions and the battlefield were subjected to 
continuous attack by Soviet bombers and attack aircraft which 
dropped bombs and strafed continuously.109 Heavy losses in men 
and material developed especially among the rear echelon troops. 
The German Luftwaffe did not even appear over the battlefield. The 
1st Battalion of Artillery Regiment 217 shot down one Soviet 
aircraft with rifles. Three armored flak guns from Jaeger 
Battalion 219 shot down three Soviet aircraft. 
Nevertheless, Divisional Group 217 entered Chilczyce at 1309 
hrs and with a unit of the armored task force and the motorized 1st 
Company of Engineer Battalion 219 and took the town and the hills 
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to the southwest by 1600 hrs. Divisional Group 183 encountered 
major difficulties at Kniaze as a result of terrain and the Soviet 
defense. The Division Command Post was transferred to the woods 
north of Kniaze at 2200 hrs. 
A serious threat to the entire breakout emerged during the 
afternoon on the eastern flank. The 349th Infantry Division 
managed to occupy Hills 289 and 274.4 but the defensive screen to 
the east and southeast was too weak and the Soviets captured Hill 
334 which then changed hands several times before it was finally 
lost to the Soviets during the evening. Corps Detachment C 
dispatched the Fusilier Battalion to the heavy fighting around 
Zulice. However, the Fusilier Battalion was stopped by a Soviet air 
attack on the west edge of Zulice. Later in the afternoon Zulice had 
to be abandoned.110 A Soviet battalion advancing through Zulice to 
the north attempted to take Hill 268, but was brought under direct 
fire by the 8th Battalion of Artillery Regiment 219 and shot to 
pieces. The Germans, however, counterattacked throughout the 
night and managed to retake a portion of Zulice as far as the church 
by 0700 hrs the next morning.111 
The breakout of the XIII Army Corps had been opposed by 
strong Soviet forces north and northwest of Zloczow. The breakout 
attempt had destroyed at least 32 Soviet tanks and numerous 
artillery guns, but had not yet succeeded .112 The entire front of the 
XIII Army Corps was compressed into an even tighter ring of 
encirclement with about 85,000 men encircled north and west of 
Zloczow (see Figure 180).113 
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Ill Panzer Corps. The defensive line on the Zloczow-Lemberg 
road was pushed back to the west by Soviet armor. The 1st Panzer 
Division withdrew toward the west in the direction of Pomercany 
and Wicyn.114 The retreating elements of the 1st Panzer Division 
were subjected to repeated heavy bombing by the Soviet Air 
Force. 115 The 1st Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Battalion 
reported at noon that the Soviets had occupied Przemyslany, 
Zaszkow and Zukow (see Figure 179).116 Meanwhile, the 8th Panzer 
Division was attacking to the north to relieve the encircled XII I 
Army Corps in the area north and west of Zloczow (see Figure 
179).117 The 101 st Jaeger Division and 68th Infantry Division 
repulsed weak attacks against the northern front of the corps 
knocking out 5 Soviet tanks (see Figure 180).118 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps repulsed repeated attacks 
against Kulikow, but could not prevent the Soviet advance on the 
road south of the town to the west. 119 The integration of the 20th 
Panzer Grenadier Division and elements of the 340th Infantry 
Division were completed today. The 168th Infantry Division and 
16th Panzer Division suffered heavy losses. 
JULY 21, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
Colonel Hoffman's unit holding Tomaszow was attacked by 
strong Soviet infantry and armor and pushed out of the town to the 
hills south of Tarnawatka (see Figure 181 ).120 
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XXXXll Army Corps. Soviet attacks against the right wing of 
Corps Group Major General v.d. Meden were repulsed. However, the 
Soviets broke into Krylow and made several penetrations to the 
north of the town (see Figure 181 ).121 German counterattacks 
blocked the penetrations north of the town inflicting severe losses 
on the Soviets. 
LVI Panzer Corps. The Soviets achieved penetrations on a 
wide front which could barely be sealed off (see Figure 181 ). The 
26th Infantry Division which had reached a state of exhaustion by 
continuous fighting over the last few days could not prevent the 
Soviet advance·to Sawin (see Figure 181).122 
VIII Army Corps. The Soviets on the south wing of the corps 
advanced out of their bridgehead Zabuze-Zberez to the west and 
crossed over the Chotm-Wlcdawa road. The 5th Jaeger Division was 
engaged in battle on its right wing at Osowa and Soviet pressure 
forced it to withdraw to the Bug river .123 The Soviets pushed back 
the 211th Infantry Divisions's sector at Piszcza to the southwest 
and were advancing on Wlodawa. The 12th Hungarian Reserve 
Division on the left wing of the corps was retreating with the 
Soviets in close pursuit. The Soviets reached the Bug river 
occupying the east bank at Slawatycze and proceeded to cross the 
river 6 km northeast of the town.124 
1st Panzer Army 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and XIII Army Corps. The combined 
attack on both sides of the cauldron from the south and north 
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restored contact between the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the XIII 
Army Corps (see Figure 181 ).12s Soviet attacks continued against 
the eastern front of the XIII Army Corps. A breakthrough was 
achieved against the 96th Infantry Division north of Pomorzany 
requiring a local withdrawal of the main battle line. 
XIII Army Corps. The XIII Army Corps gave Corps Detachment 
C and the 349th Infantry Division the following order: 
8th Panzer Division has reached Wereniaki. Advance at 
night through Zloczow further to the north. 1st Panzer 
Division advancing from the area of Gologory early in 
the morning to the north. The spearhead of Corps 
Detachment C and the 349th Infantry Division are to 
continue their flank attack at night. Attack objectives 
for Corps Detachment C the area Lackie-Jasionowce; 
349th Infantry Division, Zloczow.126 
The beginning of the night attack for Corps Detachment C was 
set for 0100 hrs.121 Divisional Group 183 was to attack Lackie and 
Divisional Group 217 was to attack Jasionowce. Both divisional 
groups were to seek contact with the formations of the XXXXVlll 
Panzer Corps. The new command post for Corps Detachment C was 
to move to the woods north of Kniaze at 0300 hrs, but was delayed 
by terrible road congestion. The traffic on the roads was rendered 
near impossible by the numerous supply vehicles plugging up the 
roads. Artillery Regiment 219 managed to cross the Zloczowka 
stream by traveling along byways during the early morning hours. 
Corps Detachment C Headquarters arrived in Poczapy at 0500 
hrs.12a Major Pacher, Commander of Grenadier Regiment 330 
secured the town with the assistance of a few assault guns. Major 
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Pachar reported that Divisional Group 183 in the battle for Kniaze 
during the night had been thrown back to the north by a Soviet 
counterattack.129 The command post of Divisional Group 183 was 
now located on Hill 257 southwest of Poczapy. Radio 
communications had apparently been lost to Divisional Group 217. 
Grenadier Regiment 311 and 389 assembled for the attack 
during the night southwest of Chilczyce. The attack was delayed 
till 0400 hrs and was reinforced by various units from other 
divisions and two assault guns. The main assault was launched 
directly east of Jasionowcze and the town was taken from the 
south .130 The attack progressed and the hills were taken and the 
attack objectives accomplished. However, the 8th Panzer Division 
was not located. Both regimental commanders decided to seek 
contact further to the south. The terrain was unsuitable for 
vehicles and they had to be abandoned. The 1st Panzer Division was 
finally reached after numerous battles around midday at Zukow.131 
The entire fate of the XIII Army Corps hung in the balance based 
upon the changing situation of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. 
The 1st Panzer Division took command of Grenadier 
Regiments 311 and 389. Divisional Group 217, elements of Assault 
Gun Brigade 249 and the 1st Company of Engineer Battalion 219 
which had advanced through Boniszyn made contact with the 1st 
Panzer Division. Kampfgruppe Neumeister of the 1st Panzer 
Division had launched a relieve effort during the early morning 
hours and succeeded in opening a small hole on the western side of 
the cauldron. This opening permitted 400 men of the 14th SS 
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Volunteer Division "Galizien" and about 3000 troops from various 
other XIII Army Corps units to escape.132 The 1st and 8th Panzer 
Divisions restored contact with the XIII Army Corps west of 
Zloczow at 1400 hrs (see Figure 181). 133 German forces captured 
Prezemyslany in an attack from the south and east after a difficult 
battle. 
The battle for the survival of the XII I Army Corps was waged 
during the day to the south. Corps Detachment C moved its 
headquarters after arriving in Poczapy to the woods east of Belzec. 
Divisional Group 183 was employed again against Kniaze without 
success. Divisional Group 217 had also been locked into battle 
around the town most of the day. Major Von Bonin, Commander of 
Divisional Group 217, even became separated from his staff in the 
course of the battle. The 2nd and 3rd Companies of Engineer 
Battalion 219 were subjected to severe bombing attacks in 
Poczapy. The 2nd Engineer Company despite the bombing 
participated in the renewed attack of Divisional Group 183 against 
Kniaze and managed to breakout of the ring of encirclement and 
advanced to the south. These elements made contact with the 8th 
Panzer Division in the area of Gologorky.134 Grenadier Regiment 
330 after a repeated effort to take and occupy Kniaze withdrew 
with the onset of darkness to the east of the town. Elements of 
Corps Detachment C's Fusilier Battalion remained in heavy 
defensive battles at Zulice. Divisional Group 339 under the 
command of the 349th Infantry Division secured Hill 274.4 on the 
left flank of the XIII Army Corps. Corps Detachment C assumed 
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command of the 454th Security Division at noon. It was pulled out 
of the northern front and was assigned to relieve Fusilier Battalion 
361 in the area of Belzec-Skwarzawa. 
The XIII Army Corps on the afternoon of July 21, 1944 gave 
the following order to Corps Detachment C and its subordinate 
units: 
The division was to assemble with 3 assault groups 
after the onset of darkness: 
Right Flank: Fusilier Battalion 361 in the area of 
Skwarzawa is to advance over the rail line Zloczow-
Lemberg to Lackie and to the south to occupy the hill 
terrain. 
454th Security Division follows as right flank security 
for the corps. 
Center: Divisional Group 183 with Engineer Battalion 
219 and Ski-Jagd Kommando in the area of Kniaze--
Completely capture the town with a further advance in 
the direction directly east of Lackie and pass by on the 
southeast side of the town's high terrain--the middle 
assault group shall contain Corps Detachment C's 
Headquarters with Felders Battalion 219 and the 
division's combat school. 
Left Flank: Divisional Group 217 with Fusilier 
Battalion of Corps Detachment C was to move from the 
area southwest of Chilczyce to capture Boniszyn and 
the high terrain south of the town. Artillery Regiment 
219 was to provide close support. 
The 349th Infantry Division east of Corps Detachment C 
was to thrust toward Zloczow. 
The supply troops were to be transferred during the 
course of the day to the area of Belzec and would 
follow Corps Detachment C Headquarters to the 
assembly area. 
The assembly area of Corps Detachment C after 
breaking through the ring of encirclement was to be 
Wisniowszyk and Gologory for the 454th Security 
Division .135 
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This order was given by the XI 11 Army Corps based upon the 
belief that the Corps would make contact with the armored 
spearheads of the XXXXVll I Panzer Corps directly south of the 
Zloczow-Lemberg road.136 The Corps Detachment C Headquarters 
assembled at 2100 hrs near Hill 257 southwest of Poczapy. Lt. 
General Lange, Commander of Corps Detachment C and Major General 
Nettwig, Commander of the 454th Security Division had a 
conference at the command post of the 454th Security Division in 
Belzec during the atternoon.137 General of the Infantry Hauffe, 
Commander of the XIII Army Corps, also appeared with his staff af 
this meeting. 138 The plans were laid out for the breakout of the 
XI II Army Corps that night. 
The departure to the assembly areas occurred just before the 
onset of darkness. Reconnaissance had determined that Kniaze was 
again completely occupied by the Soviets. Therefore, Lt. General 
Lange assembled his group directly northwest of Boniszyn along 
with Major Pacher, Commander of Grenadier Regiment 330.139 
. Major Pacher informed Lt. General Lange that based upon his 
experience a repeated attack on Kniaze would not guarantee 
success. Boniszyn on the other hand was already occupied by 
German troops. Therefore, Lt. General Lange decided to attack to 
the south with Grenadier Regiment 330 through Boniszyn.140 
Boniszyn was reached by 0100 hrs. Grenadier Regiment 330, the 
division's combat school and the Felders Battalion of Corps 
Detachment C assembled on the railway embankment south of 
Boni syn. 
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The 349th Infantry Division along with most of the 
subordinate Divisional Group 339 and Grenadier Regiment 912 had 
also selected the route through Boniszyn and joined the assembly 
area to the east. The attack through Zloczow had, therefore, been 
abandoned since it would have been necessary to occupy the town 
for the vehicles to get through following in the rear.141 
The assembly area was not noticed by the Soviets until 0300 
hrs. The assault group of Corps Detachment C and the 349th 
Infantry Division with the subordinate Divisional Group 339 began 
to attack shortly after 0300 hrs.142 Lt. General Lange described the 
attack: 
The enemy which had remained completely silent 
suddenly opened up heavy fire from their well prepared 
positions in the hills. Armor, anti-tank guns, self-
propelled guns, anti-aircraft guns, mortars and machine 
gun fire attempted to pin down the attacking German 
troops. A battle commenced which was rivaled by only 
few examples in the history of war and was comparable 
with the assault of our grandfathers, fathers and 
brothers on the Spieherner hills and at Lange mark ... 143 
The officers and grenadiers lead by their two Generals, 
Lt. General Lasch and Lt. General Lange assaulted the 
Soviet positions with unheard of bravery and fearless 
defiance of death with ringing yells of "Hurra" and the 
force of pounding waves which broke through regardless 
of numerous casualties and like the raging elements 
themselves advanced to the highway. Several blocking 
tanks were destroyed in close combat and the 
increasing artillery fire from the west and east and 
later the northern direction into the flanks and rear of 
the attacking troops was not capable of damming up the 
force of the assault. Wave after wave surged through 
the enemy positions. The hills south and west of 
Jasionowce were taken at 0500 hrs. The town itself 
and also Zalesie were taken by German troops. The 
officers and men honored their two generals with a 
ringing "Sieg Heil" on the edge of the woods south of 
Zalesie. The anticipated contact with units of the 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps was not established.144 
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The left assault group of Corps Detachment C and the 349th 
Infantry Division punctured the encirclement ring at Jasionowce 
and directly west of the town which proved decisive.145 However, 
the middle and right assault groups failed to breakout of the Soviet 
encirclement. The middle assault group of Corps Detachment C 
contained the commanding general of the XIII Army Corps, General 
of the Infantry Hauffe, along with his staff, and units of the 361st 
Infantry Division.146 
The middle assault group's assembly area was 1 km east of 
Kniaze and deployment into the assembly area was completed by 
0100 hrs. Major Schliep, Commander of Engineer Battalion 219, 
received the order personally to attack at 0200 hrs directly from 
General Hauffe.147 The attack was supported by 4 assault guns, 3 
captured T -34 tanks and 6 armored personnel carriers. The 
armored assault group broke into Kniaze and advanced further into 
swampy terrain while the Soviets sealed off the breakthrough 
behind the assault group with armor and mounted infantry. 148 The 
units following the assault group could not breakthrough and the 
assembly area east of Kniaze and between Boniszyn was brought 
under artillery barrage fire. 
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Major Schliep advanced with the 3rd company of Engineer 
Battalion 219 during the attack along a railway embankment bridge 
built further to the east and managed to enter the breakthrough 
area of the left assault group and advanced to the southwest. 
However, the whereabouts of the the Headquarters of XIII Army 
Corps and its staff are uncertain after the failure of the middle 
assault group.149 
Essentially, the fate of the right assault group remains 
unkown. It appears to have been deflected from its route of attack 
in the same way as the attack on Kniaze. The 454th Security 
Division's Headquarters with Major General Nettwig was probably 
annihilated.150 There was no trace of the Major General and 
Fusilier Battalion 361. 
The Soviets responded rapidly and tightened the ring around 
the XIII Army Corps during the night of July 21-22, 1944. The 
Soviets closed the ring again at Jasionowce with strong armored 
forces during the early morning hours.151 The Soviets were even 
attacking Boniszyn in strength by noon. Poczapy in the north was 
lost.152 Vehicles and heavy weapons were no longer able to get 
through and the swamp south of Boniszyn could not be traversed. 
Various assorted units managed to pry open the Soviet ring a third 
time west of Jasionowce and others managed to successfully 
defend the woods west of Boniszyn till the end of July 23rd and 
then later broke out in small groups.1 s3 
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XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets 
advance with strong armored forces through the hole between the 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and the Ill Panzer Corps past Bobrka and 
reached the region of Dawidow with armored spearheads where the 
German line finally halted the Soviet advance (see Figure 181).154 
Weak Soviet attacks against the 101 st Jaeger Division and the 
168th Infantry Division were repulsed. Soviet units which had 
managed to infiltrate between the 168th Infantry Division and the 
16th Panzer Division southwest of Kulikow were in the process of 
being destroyed by a counterattack of the 68th Infantry Division 
from the northeast and the 16th Panzer Division from the south 
(see Figure 181).155 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps repulsed Soviet attacks 
supported by armor against Turynka. The Soviets advanced through 
the hole between the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies in the direction of 
Jaroslau on the San river (see Figure 181).156 Soviet armored 
spearheads were reported 5 km east of Jaroslau by aerial 
reconnaissance. 
JULY 22, 1944 
The Soviets advanced rapidly through the hole between the 
1st and 4th Panzer Armies as well as between the L VI Panzer Corps 
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and the VIII Army Corps to reach the San and Weichsel rivers. The 
most forward Soviet units reached the San river at Jaroslau and 
Lublin as well as the region 15 km northwest of Lublin (see Figure 
182) .157 The 1st Panzer Army was broken through again southeast 
of Lemberg (see Figure 183). 158 There were only a few units of the 
XIII Army Corps which had broken out of the Soviet encirclement 
while the majority of the XIII Army Corps remained within the 
Soviet encirclement (see Figure 183). 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXll Army Corps and LVI Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks 
against the XXXXll Army Corps were repulsed (see Figure 182). The 
right wing of the L VI Panzer Corps was pressed back to the 
Teratyn-Cholm road. Chaim was lost to the Soviets and they 
achieved a 50 km wide breakthrough advancing to Lublin (see Figure 
182).159 The Soviets forced their way into the eastern portion of 
Lublin and reached the region 15 km northwest of the city (see 
Figure 182).160 The 26th Infantry Division as a result was cutoff 
30 km northwest of Chaim and had to fight its way back to the 
southwest (see Figure 182). 
VIII Army Corps. Soviet armor and cavalry forces pushed the 
right wing of the corps back southwest of Wlodawa. The Soviets 
then advanced to the north and occupied Parczew. 
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1st Panzer Army 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps. Soviet attacks from the east and 
northeast achieved deep breakthroughs forcing the 8th Panzer 
Division back to the southwest and northwest of Zukow. 161 Contact 
with the XIII Army Corps was completely severed as a result (see 
Figure 183).162 1000 men from the XIII Army Corps were rescued 
before contact with the XIII Army Corps was lost (see Figure 
183).163 
XIII Army Corps. The XIII Army Corps ceased to exist as an 
effective combat formation on July 22, 1944.164 Assault groups 
broke through individually without heavy weapons and advanced 
toward their ordered assembly areas. The assault group of Corps 
Detachment C under the command of Lt. General Lange along with 
numerous dispersed units from other divisions split into two 
groups in the woods south of Zalesie 165 The command of the second 
group was assumed by Lt. Colonel l.G. von Prittwitz. The various 
small assault groups gained an awareness of the hard facts during 
the day that units of the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps could not be 
expected to meet them in the breakout. In fact, the assigned 
assembly areas were occupied by the Soviets during the evening. 
Therefore, the troops of the XIII Army Corps organized in various 
assault groups fought their way out of the Soviet encirclement to 
the southwest under unprecedented difficulties without support 
from outside of the cauldron. Lt. General Lange's assault group was 
almost entirely annihilated.166 
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A successful breach was made in the Soviet encirclement 
which allowed other units of the XIII Army Corps to escape. A 
corridor was opened between Kniaze and lasenivtsi.167 The narrow 
escape corridor was only 137 to 205 meters wide and was defended 
as long as possible to allow as many German troops to escape as 
possible.168 The 14th SS Volunteer Division "Galizien" defended 
Pochapy, Belzets and Skvariava with the assistance of assault guns 
from the 8th Panzer Division which had broken into the cauldron 
from the outside.169 General Lindemann, Commander of the 361 st 
Infantry Division apparently was responsible for the successful 
breakout of this portion of the XIII Army Corps. 110 Brigadefuehrer 
Freitag with his staff and 800 troops of the 14th SS Volunteer 
Division "Galizien" along with the 361 st Infantry Division escaped 
from the pocket.111 Unfortunately, General Lindemann failed to 
breakout with the elements of the 361 st Infantry Division and was 
captured along with General Nedtwig, Commander of the 454th 
Security Division.112 General Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army 
Corps, was killed during the course of the breakout on July 22, 
1944.173 
Ill Panzer Corps. The Germans launched attacks from the east 
and west to attempt to close the hole on the Ill Panzer Corps front. 
Meanwhile, the right wing of the Ill Panzer Corps had been 
penetrated and the Soviets had reached the east and southeast edge 
of Lemberg (see Figure 183). Bobrka was lost to the Soviets. 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The corps had closed the hole to the Ill 
Panzer Corps by an attack of the 16th Panzer Division to the 
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south.174 The Soviets advanced through the hole between the 1st 
and 4th Panzer Armies to the San river on both sides of Jaroslau 
(see Figure 182).175 Crossings over the San river were in progress. 
July 23, 1944 
4th Panzer Army 
XXXXll Army Corps. The Soviets during the early morning 
hours took Krasnobrod on the right wing of the corps and advanced 
further to the northwest and were attacking Rudka (18 km 
northwest of Krasnobrod) by evening.176 Soviet attacks north of 
Tomaszow were smashed. The 17th Panzer Division launched a 
rapid thrust to the north from Krasnystaw and advanced over the 
Cholm-Lublin rail line to Pawlow engaging Soviet armored and 
motorized columns advancing to the west. 
L VI Panzer Corps. The garrison of Lublin repulsed numerous 
Soviet attacks from the north and south knocking out 38 Soviet 
tanks (see Figure 184).177 The Soviets advanced from Lublin to the 
northwest to the Weichsel river and reached Kurow. 11s 
1st Panzer Army 
Soviet attacks supported by armor and tactical air power 
pushed the front of the the XXIV Panzer Corps and the right wing of 
the XXXXVlll Panzer Corps back along the entire front (see Figure 
184). The 8th Panzer Division picked up approximately 10,000 
troops from the XIII Army Corps equipped with only hand-held 
weapons since the heavy weapons had to be abandoned during the 
breakout from the cauldron.179 The 1st Panzer Division and the 
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75th Infantry Division's attack on Przemyslany gained little ground. 
XIII Army Corps. The mass of the units which had broken 
through during July 22-23, 1944 made contact with units of the 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps on the Zlota-Lipa river at Wiesniowczyk or 
on the Gnila-Lipa river at Wolkow.180 The troops coming out of the 
pocket were completely exhausted and were sent to Chodorow. 
Grenadier Regiment 311 of Corps Detachment C under the command 
of Knights Cross holder, Captain Loer was placed under the 
command of the 1st Panzer Division and arrived later on July 28th 
at the new assembly area in Synowodsko Wyzne. A total of 
approximately 5,000 troops of Corps Detachment C had survived the 
encirclement battle and had brought out their light infantry 
weapons, but heavy equipment, vehicles and horses had been lost.181 
The part of the supply troops of Corps Detachment C which were 
fortunate to have been outside the cauldron were almost totally 
intact. Corps Detachment C reported the loss of the following 
commanders: Lt. Colonel Simons, Commander of Divisional Group 
183 was missing; Major Kaupert, Commander of Artillery Regiment 
219 was missing; and Captain Zinge, Commander of Fusilier 
Battalion Corps Detachment C was missing.182 There were another 
78 officers and 4,059 non-commissioned officers and troops 
reported killed or missing.183 
Ill Panzer Corps and XXXXVI Panzer Corps. The hole between 
these two corps was closed (see Figure 184).184 
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XXXXVlll Panzer Corps and Ill Panzer Corps. The Soviets 
advancing through the hole between these two corps broke into 
Lemberg from the east, southeast and west and the German garrison 
was forced back to the defense of the city center (see Figure 
184). 185 Soviet reconnaissance forces attempted to establish a 
small bridgehead across the San river in the sector of Gruppe Lt. 
General Freiher von Edelsheim (see Figure 184). The Germans, 
however, managed to partially eliminate the bridgehead. Soviet 
units further to the east blocked the Lemberg-Przemysl road at 
Sadowa Wisznia. 
GERMAN LOSSES IN THE BATTLE OF BRODY, 
JULY 13-23, 1944 
The Germans lost five divisions in the encirclement of the 
XIII Army Corps at Brody (see Table XXXXV).186 Soviet sources 
claim that the German losses were 8 divisions destroyed, 38,000 
killed, and 17, 175 captured.187 The discrepancy between Soviet 
claims of 8 divisions destroyed and actual German losses results 
because the Soviets claim the actual divisional groups within Corps 
Detachment C as divisions destroyed. Corps Detachment C 
contained the 183rd, 217th and 339th Divisional Groups. The 
Soviets apparently also counted the 349th Infantry Division which 
was also encircled with the XII I Army Corps, but achieved a 
successful breakout with heavy losses. 
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Major General Lindemann, Commander 361 st Infantry Division 
and Major General Nedtwig, Commander 454th Security Division 
were captured.188 However, Soviet and German sources disagree 
about the fate of General d. Inf. Hauffe, Commander of the XIII Army 
Corps. Soviet sources reported him captured and German sources 
reported him killed.189 Soviet claims about German losses appear 
to be exaggerated since according to German sources the XIII Army 
Corps contained between 32,000 and 35,000 troops.190 German 
losses appear to be more like 20,000 troops in the Brody pocket 
since 5,000 men of Corps Detachment C escaped along with 3000 
troops of the 14th SS Grenadier Division "Galizien". Nevertheless, 
there was an overall loss of 25,000 to 30,000 troops in the Battle 
of Brody.191 The losses of Army Group North Ukraine were mostly 
replaced by transfers of divisions from Army Group South Ukraine 
(see Table XXXXVI) which weakened this Army Group for the next 
major Soviet offensive. Thus, the Battle of Brody constituted a 
significant defeat in the chain of defeats that resulted in the 
collapse of the German Army in the East in the summer of 1944. 
TABLE XXXXll 
SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE, 
JULY 13, 1944 
Soviet Formations 
1st Ukrainain Front: 
1st Guards Army 
3rd Guards Army 
5th Guards Army 
13th Combined Arms Army 
18th Combined Arms Army 
38th Combined Arms Army 
60th Combined Arms Army 
Mobile Formations: 
1st Guards Tank Army 
3rd Guards Tank Army 
4th Tank Army 
Baranov's Cavalry Mechanized Group: 
1st Guards Cavalry Corps 
25th Tank Corps 
S.V. Sokolov's Cavalry Mechanized Group: 
6th Guards Cavalry Corps 
31st Tank Corps 
Front Reserves: 
XL VI I Rifle Corps 
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the 
Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), p. 171. 
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TABLE XXXXll I 
SOVIET NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY 
Men and Equipment 1st Ukrainian Army Group 
Ratios Front North Ukraine 
Personnel (combat) 843,000 600,000 
1.4:1 
Guns and Mortars 13,825 6,300 
2.2:1 
Tanks and Assault Guns 1,979 900 
2.2:1 
Combat Aircraft 3,052 700 
4.4:1 
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the 
Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), p. 178. 
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TABLE XXXXIV 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE, 
ORDER OF BATTLE, 
JULY 15, 1944 
Axis Formations 
Army Group North Ukraine 
4th Panzer Army 
Reserves: 
168th Infantry Division 
213th Security Division 
253rd Infantry Division 
XXXXVI Panzer Corps 
16th Panzer Djvision 
17th Panzer Division 
291 st Infantry Division 
340th Infantry Division 
XXXXI I Army Corps 
72nd Infantry Division 
88th Infantry Division 
214th Infantry Division 
L VI Panzer Corps 
1st Ski Jaeger Division 
26th Infantry Division 
342nd Infantry Division 
VII I Army Corps 
5th Jaeger Division 
12th Hungarian Reserve Division 
211th Infantry Division 
Commanders 
Col. Gen. Harpe 
Col. Gen. Harpe 
Maj. Gen. Schmidt-Hammer 
Lt. Gen. Lendle 
Lt. Gen. Becker 
Gen. d. Inf. Schulz 
Maj. Gen. Back 
Maj. Gen. v.d. Meden 
Maj. Gen. Eckholt 
Maj. Gen. Ehrig 
Lt. Gen. Recknagel 
Col. Arning 
Maj. Gen. Graf v. Rittberg 
Maj. Gen. v. Kirchbach 
Gen. d. Inf. Hossbach 
Col. Berg 
Lt. Gen. de Boer 
Maj. Gen. Nickel 
Gen. d. Inf. Hoehne 
Lt. Gen. Thumm 
Lt. Gen. Eckhardt 
TABLE XXXXIV 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE, 
ORDER OF BATILE, 
JULY 15, 1944 
(continued) 
Axis Formations 
1st Panzer Army 
Reserves: 
14th SS Grenadier Division 
"Galizien" 
20th Panzer Grenadier Division 
LIX Army Corps 
1st Infantry Division 
20th Hungarian Division 
208th Infantry Division 
XXIV Panzer Corps 
75th Infantry Division 
1 OOth Jaeger Division 
254th Infantry Division 
371 st Infantry Division 
XXXXVlll Panzer Corps 
96th Infantry Division 
349th Infantry Division 
359th Infantry Division 
111 Panzer Corps 
1st Panzer Division 
8th Panzer Division 
Commanders 
Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Raus 
Brigadefuehrer Freitag 
Lt. Gen. Fries 
Lt. Gen. Roehricht 
Lt. Gen. v. Krosigk 
Lt. Gen. Piekenbrock 
Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Nehring 
Lt. Gen. Beukemann 
Lt. Gen. Utz 
Maj. Gen. Thielmann 
Lt. Gen. Niehoff 
Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Balck 
Lt. Gen. Wirtz 
Lt. Gen. Lasch 
Lt. Gen. Arndt 
Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Breith 
Maj. Gen. Marcks 
Maj. Gen. Friebe 
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TABLE XXXXIV 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE, 
ORDER OF BATTLE, 
JULY 15, 1944 
(continued) 
Axis Formations 
XI 11 Army Corps 
Corps Detachment C: 
183rd Infantry Divisional Group 
21 ?th Infantry Divisional Group 
339th Infantry Divisional Group 
361 st Infantry Division 
454th Security Division 
1st Hungarian Army 
Reserves: 
1st Hungarian Infantry Division 
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division 
1st Hungarian Moutain Brigade 
2nd Hungarian Moutain Brigade 
19th Hungarian Reserve Division 
18th SS Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Horst Wessel" 
VI Hungarian Corps 
27th Hungarian Light Division 
XI Army Corps 
18th Hungarian Reserve Division 
24th Hungarian Infantry Division 
25th Hungarian Infantry Division 
101 st Jaeger Division 
VII Hungarian Corps 
16th Hungarian Infantry Division 
68th Infantry Division 
Commanders 
Gen. d. Inf. Hauffe 
Maj. Gen. Lange 
Lt. Gen. Lindemann 
Maj. Gen. Nedtwig 
Gen d. Inf. Buenau 
Lt. Gen. Vogel 




ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE, 
ORDER OF BATTLE, 





PANZER GRENADIER DIVISIONS 
INFANTRY DIVISIONS 
INFANTRY BRIGADES 
5 Panzer Divisions 
2 Pz. Gren. Divisions 
36 Infantry Divisions 
2 Infantry Brigades 
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Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
10, p. 504. 
Formations 
XI 11 Army Corps 
14th SS Division 
"Galizien" 
TABLEXXXXV 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE 
LOSSES AT THE BATTLE OF BRODY 
Reorganized 
Disbanded Commanders 
Gen. d. Inf. Hauffe 
killed 
Reorganized 
340th Infantry Division Reorganized 
687 
361 st Infantry Division Reorganized Maj. Gen. Lindemann 
prisoner 
454th Security Division Disbanded Maj. Gen. Nedtwig 
prisoner 
Corps Detachment C Disbanded 
TOTAL DIVISIONS DESTROYED: 5 Divisions 
Source: Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht 
ueber Aufgeloeste Division 1944 NAMP T-78 Roll 41 O; 
OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung 
der in diesem Kriege gefallen. toetlich verunglueckten. 
verstorbenen. vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen 
Generale Flensburg 5 Juni 1945 NAMP T-77 Roll 785. 
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TABLE XXXXVI 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE REINFORCEMENTS 
FROM AUGUST 1-31, 1944 
Formations 
3rd Panzer Division 
23rd Panzer Division 
24th Panzer Division 
78th Volkssturm Division 
97th Jaeger Division 
1 54th Reserve Division 
304th Infantry Division 
Source 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine 
OKH Reserve 
Army Group South Ukraine 
OKH Reserve 
544th Volksgrenadier Division 
545th Volksgrenadier Division 
Army Group South Ukraine 
OKH Reserve 
OKH Reserve 
TOTAL REINFORCEMENTS: 9 Divisions: 
6 Infantry Divisions 
3 Panzer Divisions 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
10, pp. 504-507; Vol. 11, p. 337. 
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Figure 169. Army Group North Ukraine, July 13, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 170. Army Group North Ukraine Under Attack On 
The Flanks Of The XIII Army Corps, July 15, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf y. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 171. Army Group North Ukraine, July 15, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 172. Soviet Attacks On The Flanks Of The XIII 
Anny Corps, July 16, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse 
Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen 
Weichsel-Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 173. Army Group North Ukraine, July 16, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Bryeckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
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Figure 17 4. Soviet Attacks On The Flanks Of The XIII 
Army Corps, July 17, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse 
Durchbruch Bei Hgr. Nordukraine u. Kaempte am grossen 
Weichsel-Brueckenkopf v. 8. 7. - 29.8.44 National 
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Figure 175. Army Group North Ukraine, July 17, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 176. The Encirclement Of The XIII Army Corps On 
July 18, 1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei 
Hgr. Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 177. The 4th And 1st Panzer Armies, July 19, 
1944. Source: OKH, Per Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T -78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 178. The Encircled XIII Army Corps, July 19, 
1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 179. The 4th And 1st Panzer Armies, July 20, 
1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichse!-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 181. The 4th And 1st Panzer Armies, July 21, 
1944. Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
701 
" ,., , .. ' ' 't I . -~-..# ... 
,, ... 11• .•• lf;..-·,.,"-""''.! 
i;._root•~-ffGr. 
Figure 182. Army Group North Ukraine, July 22, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 183. The XIII Army Corps, July 22, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 136. 
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Figure 184. Army Group North Ukraine, July 24, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Der Grosse Durchbruch Bei Hgr. 
Nordukraine u. Kaempfe am grossen Weichsel-
Brueckenkopf v. 8.7. - 29.8.44 National Archives 
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CHAPTER XI 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
AND THE DEBACLE IN RUMANIA 
Stavka issued the formal order for an attack on Rumania on 
August 2, 1944. 1 Marshal Timoshenko was assigned by Stavka to 
coordinate the attack on Rumania by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 
Fronts.2 The 2nd Ukrainian Front was commanded by General 
Malinovskiy and covered a 330 km sector stretching from 
Chernovtsy to Orgeyev (see Figure 185). The 3rd Ukrainian Front 
under the command of General Tolbukhin extended 260 km along the 
Dniester River from Orgeyev to the Black Sea (see Figure 185).3 
Both fronts were to breakthrough on their respective sectors and by 
means of a double envelopment encircle the German 6th Army in the 
area of Kishinev by linking up together in the German rear.4 The 
2nd Ukrainian Front was to breakthrough the German defenses 
northwest of lasi (Jassy) and seize the Pruth river crossings on the 
west bank depriving the Germans of a retreat route. The Soviets 
would also seize Bacau, Vaslui and Husi in the encirclements The 
3rd Ukrainian Front was to breakthrough the German defenses south 
of Bendery taking Leovo and Tarutino while advancing toward 
Opachi and Husi where the encirclement would be completed from 
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the southwest in conjunction with the 2nd Ukrainian Front.6 Once 
the encirclement was completed the 3rd Ukrainian Front was to 
advance south crossing the Danube and the 2nd Ukrainain Front was 
to move southwest taking Ploesti, Bucharest and the passes in the 
Carpathians and Transylvanian alps.7 
The Soviets employed the same battle proven techniques that 
had been successful in White Russia. The Soviets established 
numerical superiority over Army Group South Ukraine and 
concentrated this superiority on narrow attack sectors to 
guarantee successful breakthroughs (see Table XXXXVll). The 
combined 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts contained 90 Infantry 
Divisions, 6 Tank and Mechanized Corps, 1 Cavalry Corps and 
numerous independent formations.a This amounted to 1,250,000 
troops, 16,000 artillery guns and mortars, 1870 tanks and self-
propelled guns and 2,200 aircraft (see Tables XXXXVlll & L).9 
Army Group South Ukraine contained the German 6th and 8th 
Armies along with the Rumanian 3rd and 4th Armies. This 
amounted to 43 infantry divisions, 3 Panzer divisions, 1 Panzer 
Grenadier division and 5 infantry brigades (see Table XXXXIX).10 The 
German and Rumanian forces amounted to approximately 900,000 
personnel (see Table L). The Rumanians accounted for 22 divisions 
and 5 brigades. 11 The Germans had 25 divisions with about 360,000 
troops stationed in Rumania.12 The Axis forces had 7600 artillery 
guns and mortars, 400 tanks and self-propelled guns and 81 O 
combat aircraft (see Table L).13 'Therefore, a comparison of Soviet 
to Axis forces reveals a substantial Soviet numerical superiority. 
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The Soviets enjoyed a superiority of 1.4 to 1 in troops, 2.1 to 1 in 
artillery, 4.6 to 1 in tanks and self-propelled guns and 2. 7 to 1 in 
aircraft (see Table L).14 
Army Group South Ukraine was deployed along a 671 . 7 km 
front with an average divisional sector of 17.223 km (see Table 
Ll).15 The 3rd Rumanian Army held a total of 121.5 km with an 
average divisional sector of 20.25 km (see Table LI). The German 
6th Army held a total of 220 .3 km with an average divisional sector 
of 13. 76 km. The German 8th Army held a total of 329.9 km of the 
front with an average divisional sector of 19.4 km (see Table LI). 
The weakest sectors of the front were held by the Rumanian troops 
on the flanks of German divisions. Rumanian divisions in Army 
Group Dumitrescu held 140 km out of 342 km of the front (see 
Table Lii). Rumanian divisions in Army Group Woehler held 128 km. 
out of 330 km of the front (see Table Lii). Therefore, the 
Rumanians held 268 km out of 672 km or 40°/o of the entire frontage 
held by the combined Army Groups Woehler and Dumitrescu (see 
Table Lii). 
Soviet strategy was to attack the Rumanian divisions on the 
flanks of the German divisions. The newly organized German 6th 
Army which replaced the 6th Army lost at Stalingrad was deployed 
along the front similiar to the old 6th Army at Stalingrad with 
Rumanian divisions holding its flanks and without adequate 
reserves. Soviet strategy was to concentrate its attack on the 
junction between neighboring German and Rumanian divisions.16 
The initial penetrations were to be made against Rumanian 
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divisions on the flanks of the German 6th Army with the objective 
of driving deep into the German rear area and encircling it. 
The Soviets concentrated their forces on narrow breakthrough 
sectors. The Soviets concentrated 73% of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's 
artillery to support the breakthrough sectors of the 57th, 37th and 
46th Armies on an 18 km wide breakthrough sector.11 This 
permitted the Soviets to achieve a density of 250 guns, mortars 
and rocket launchers for each kilometer of the breakthrough 
sector.1 a The 2nd Ukrainian Front's breakthrough sector was 16 km 
wide with 25 divisions assigned for the breakthrough (see Table 
XXXXVll). The 3rd Ukrainian Front had 24 divisions concentrated on 
its 18 km wide breakthrough sector (see Table XXXXVll). The Soviet 
formula of concentration of forces on narrow breakthrough sectors 
which had proven successful in Belorussia was once again employed 
in Rumania. 
Foreign Armies East 
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE 
FAILURE IN RUMANIA 
Colonel Gehlen's intelligence organization which had failed to 
accurately predict the main Soviet offensive in Belorussia in June 
1944 was also forecasting Soviet military activity opposite Army 
Group South Ukraine. Foreign Armies East (FHO) intelligence 
summary on July 30, 1944 stated: 
Altogether the impression emerged that the Soviet High 
Command for the immediate future had dropped the 
ideas about a major offensive against the Army Group. 19 
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However, FHO on August 7, 1944 noted an increase in Soviet 
reconnaisance efforts over the preceeding days which could serve 
as preparation for local attacks.20 On August 8, 1944, FHO noted 
that the date of the possible Soviet attack could not be forseen 
with certainty, however, the situation permitted the Soviets to 
attack after only brief preparations.21 FHO on August 11, 1944 
noted significant changes on the front. It recognized that for the 
last 10 days on Army Group South Ukraine's front from Tiraspol to 
the Carpathians that extensive Soviet regrouping was underway and 
the purpose was not yet definitely recognizable. Soviet forces 
were concentrating on both sides of the Pruth river, but the date of 
the attack had not yet been determined.22 The assessment by FHO 
on August 15, 1944 reiterated the view that a major offensive 
against Army Group South Ukraine was unlikely. Soviet operations 
into the Balkans were viewed as limited, local attacks designed to 
prevent the transfer of German divisions to the central front where 
the major Soviet efforts were expected to continue (see Figure 
186). Once again Foreign Armies East had predicted the wrong 
front for the next major Soviet operation. 
FHO on August 16, 1944 noted that regrouping and departures 
of Soviet units were occurring on Army Group South Ukraine's front. 
Aerial reconnaisance indicated reinforcements in the area south of 
Tiraspol and in the area of Jassy. Attacks on a local scale to 
secure territory were probable.23 The last three days preceeding 
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the Soviet offensive against Army Group South Ukraine were filled 
with observations by FHO of Soviet preparations for an offensive. 
The FHO assessment on August 17, 1944 indicated that the 
preparations by the Soviets in the area south of Tiraspol could be 
expected to only result in local attacks. The stronger Soviet forces 
were noted to be assembling on the northern front of the Army 
Group in the sector of Jassy-Targul Frumos. However, FHO 
calculated that the amount of Soviet forces available for the attack 
was insufficent for operations with far ranging objectives. 
Therefore, strong local attacks were to be expected in the Jassy-
Targul Frumos sector. Both attacks against Army Group South 
Ukraine were forecasted as local attacks and not a major offensive 
(see Figure 186).24 
FHO on August 18, 1944 continued to predict the main attack 
on the Dniester front in the area south of Tiraspol. Stronger Soviet 
attacks were expected soon to begin in the area of Jassy-Targul-
Frumos. Two Soviet tank corps were expected to participate in the 
attack in the Jassy area and the concentration of artillery was 
reaching levels of 150 guns per kilometer .2s Soviet activity on 
August 19, 1944 preceeding the major offensive was marked by 
numerous attacks against the entire front of Army Group South 
Ukraine which served to partly contain and distract German forces. 
In the area of Tiraspol and to the south and between the Pruth and 
Sereth rivers attacks were noted as preliminary before the 
anticipated stronger attacks. The Soviet 5th Air Army was noted 
to have regrouped in the area west of the Pruth river. The 
objective of the Soviets could only be estimated when a clearer 
picture of the employment of Soviet armored formations was 
available.26 In the area of Jassy-Targul Frumos and also on the 
east bank of the Pruth river attacks exceeding a local scope now 
had to be regarded as a greater possibility.21 Thus, on the day 
preceeding the major Soviet offensive FHO began to revise its 
forecast of Soviet intentions but this was already too late. 
RUMANIAN RELIABILITY 
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Hitler and the German High Command overestimated Rumanian 
resolve to continue the war against the Soviet Union. False 
intelligence reports were transmitted through OKW concerning 
Rumanian loyalty to the Axis cause.28 The German minister to 
Rumania, von Killinger and Erik Hansen, Chief of the German 
Military Mission sent reports affirming Marshal Antonescu's loyalty 
to Hitler and the German cause. However, Antonescu's personal 
loyalty was confused with the loyalty of the Rumanian country to 
the continuation of the war.29 Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, 
however, distrusted the reports he was receiving from Ambassador 
Killinger regarding the stability of the Antonescu regime and 
wanted a Panzer division stationed in Bucharest to guarantee the 
continued survival of the Antonescu government.30 However, 
Colonel General Guderian could not make a panzer division available 
because of the continual crisis on the Eastern Front.31 Guderian 
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instead wanted to send the 4th SS Polizei Division from Serbia to 
Rumania, but Jodi fobid it and Hitler did not act to overrule him.32 
Therefore, a German combat division was not stationed in a 
strategic location in Bucharest to ensure Rumanian loyalty. 
Colonel General Schoemer, Commander of Army Group South 
Ukraine, wrote Hitler on July 21, 1944 that the leadership in 
Rumania was wavering in its support of the continued war effort 
and Antonescu was loosing control.33 He recommended that Hitler 
personally interview Antonescu. Hitler apparently was displeased 
with Colonel General Schoerner's pessimistic attitude about 
Rumania and on July 23, 1944 he was transferred to the command 
of Army Group North. The High Command and in particular the new 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Guderian was displeased with 
Colonel General Friessner's pessimistic attitude about the position 
of Army Group North in the Baltic area.34 Therefore, The 
Commander of Army Group North, Colonel General Friessner was 
ordered to trade places with Schoemer and took over command of 
Army Group South Ukraine in a message received on July 23, 1944 
from Adolf Hitler which stated: 
Both Commanders of Army Group North and South 
Ukraine are to mutually change commands immediately. 
I promote General d. Inf. Friessner to Colonel General.35 
Colonel General Friessner made the following annnouncement on 
July 26, 1944 to the soldiers of Army Group South Ukraine: 
I have been appointed to the command of the Army Group 
with the confidence of the Fuehrer and I have assumed 
the command today. 
I expect from every soldier from the oldest General to 
the youngest Grenadier that as before he will do more 
than his duty at his post. 
The apparent quiet on our front shall not deceive us. 
The war has entered its decisive stage. Any day the 
assault of the Bolshevik masses could begin against us. 
The unshakable belief in the Fuehrer and the Volk will 
give us the power to break the enemy in a fanatical 
battle of determination side by side with the brave 
soldiers of King Michael and the Marshal of Rumania. 
In these decisive hours we look to the Fuehrer and 
promise him with immutable soldier's loyalty to follow 
him to the final victory. Long live the Fuehrer!36 
Colonel General Friessner on August 1, 1944 flew to 
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Bucharest and was briefed by the German Ambassador von Killinger, 
Chief of the German Military Mission in Rumania, General d. Kav. 
Hansen, the commander of the German Luftwaffe in Rumania and 
Luftwaffe General Gerstenberg. General Gerstenberg in his briefing 
expressed his opinion that in case of unrest one German Flak 
battery would be sufficient to smash any putsch in Bucharest. 37 
Ambassador von Killinger informed Friessner that "Marshal 
Antonescu has the people and the government behind him. "38 
However, Friessner was not convinced and he asked von Killinger if 
the German government had prepared any measures in case of a 
governmental crisis. Von Killinger replied that "up to now none." 
"There is no governmental crisis to fear. "39 
Colonel General Friessner dissatisfied with the situation in 
Rumania sent Colonel Trotha with his personal letter by airplane to 
Hitler at the Fuehrer's Headquarters which stated: 
According to my earlier personal orientation at the 
front and in the rear territory since assuming command 
of Army Group South Ukraine and especially after the 
August 1st informational visit to the German and 
Rumanian Headquarters in Bucharest that occurred 
which confirmed the impression that the political and 
military circumstances in Rumania are not sufficiently 
secure to be able to lead the fighting troops without 
apprehension. 
Subsequently, I am very disturbed on the basis of many 
rumors because of the uncertainty of the Rumanian 
troops and especially their higher commanders 
subordinate to my command, the German Ambassador 
and the German General with the Rumanian government 
in Bucharest claim to be informed about the political 
situation, but I have gained no reassuring impression. 
No one could give me a clear answer to my questions and 
minimized the insecure position of the Rumanian 
government. What happens when the many 
rumors already reported in the Army Group prove to be 
true and the Rumanian Government changes sides? The 
German Ambassador in Bucharest could not give me an 
answer to this question. It appears to me that to 
protect the troops under my command that it is an 
absolute necessity that the absolute security in the 
rear area be guaranteed. This can only be obtained by 
placing all German Headquarters, troops, and 
organizations under my command and allow me to 
operate our own intelligence service in the entire 
Rumanian area. 
Should symptoms of insecurity of the Rumanian troops 
at the front be further confirmed, then, there must be 
an immediate withdrawal of the front behind the Pruth 
and the line Galatz-Focsani-edge of the Carpathians 
will be established.40 
Colonel Trotha reported to Friessner on August 8, 1944 the 
outcome of his visit to Hitler's Headquarters. He indicated that 
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Colonel General Guderian instructions were that in event that 
further forces were withdrawn and particularily when the 
Rumanian troops became unreliable the present front was not to be 
held against Russian attacks; therefore when no reinforcements 
could be secured then a withdrawal to the First World War position 
of Danube-Sereth-Carpathians must occur and all preparations be in 
place. Guderian stated that he hoped, "when the situation developed 
in this direction that the Army Group could be given the necessary 
orders in time. "41 
The concerns of Marshal Antonescu were relayed by Major 
General Garbea, Inspector of Rumanian Armored Forces to Colonel 
General Guderian on August 3, 1944 at 1840 hrs.42 Major General 
Garbea expressed Antonescu's major concern about the withdrawal 
of numerous German formations from Rumania. However, Guderian 
attempted to alleviate Antonescu's concerns by reassuring Garbea 
that additional German formations would be sent to Rumania. The 
20th Panzer Division had been transferred to Army Group South 
Ukraine and 6-8 assault gun units were to arrive in August.43 Major 
General Garbea informed Guderian that the new commander of Army 
Group South Ukraine, Colonel General Friessner had made a good 
impression in Bucharest.44 Garbea also announced the visit of 
Marshal Antonescu for August 5, 1944.45 The meeting between 
Hitler and Antonescu was positive. Field Marshal Keitel of OKW 
informed Army Group South Ukraine that Rumania was with 
Germany "Through thick and thin."46 Keitel dismissed Colonel 
Trotha with the following message to Friessner concerning his 
- --- -------------------------------------------~ 
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request for complete authority in Rumania: "You hold the front 
will keep the rear area open."47 German Ambassador von Killinger 
on August 10, 1944 reported to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop that 
"the situation was completely secure, King Michael guarantees the 
alliance with Germany."48 According to Colonel General Friessner 
his efforts were in vain: 
Despite all reports and warnings from the Army Group 
to withdraw the front behind the Pruth or into the 
Carpathian border position permission was denied. My 
request for authority over the Wehrmacht in the rear 
area was also not imparted.49 
THE STATUS OF GERMAN AND RUMANIAN 
FORCES PRIOR TO THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE 
ON AUGUST 20, 1944 
Army Group South Ukraine during the summer of 1944 had 
served as a reserve from which OKH pulled divisions to replace the 
losses by other Eastern Front Army Groups. The last transfer of a 
division from Army Group South Ukraine ocurred on August 13, 
1944. Total transfers from Army Group South Ukraine since June 
amounted to 11 divisions or nearly one-third of the entire Army 
Group's strength.50 Army Group South Ukraine contained 25 German 
divisions and approximately 22 Rumanian divisions divided into two 
Army Groups: Army Group Woehler and Army Group Dumitrescu (see 
Figure 187).51 
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However, the quality of the German divisions had declined. 
The German divisions now contained only 15% combat seasoned 
troops while the other 85% had essentially no significant combat 
experience. 52 The infantry divisions also lacked motorization and 
depended on horses for movement (see Zustand der Divisionen der 
Heeresgruppe Suedukraine in Appendix C). The Rumanian divisions 
were also depleted and had serious morale problems. The combat 
readiness of Rumanian units was also low (see Zustand der 
Divisionen der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine in Appendix C). The 
Germans lacked armor on this front due to the withdrawal of panzer 
divisions to other Army Groups on the Eastern Front. The 
Rumanians had almost half of all the operational tanks in Army 
Group South Ukraine concentrated in the Rumanian Panzer Division 
"GrossRumaenien" (see Zustand der Divisionen der Heeresgruppe 
Suedukraine in Appendix C). The German Luftflotte 4 contained only 
232 combat operational aircraft: 60 reconnaissance aircraft, 43 
bombers, 57 ground attack and night ground attack aircraft, 41 
fighters and 31 night fighters.53 
The only additional support the German High Command had to 
offer was the traditional exhortations to the soldiers for discipline 
and sacrifice. Colonel General Friessner, Commander of Army Group 
South Ukraine, issued the following proclamation to all German and 
Rumanian Commanders on August 18, 1944: 
1. In the coming days our front can also expect the 
beginning of major attacks that in separate sectors will 
be accompanied by numerous deceptions and containing 
attacks. 
we can brace for these attacks with resolute confidence 
shoulder to shoulder with our proven Rumanian 
comrades in the confidence of our training, our weapons 
and our good, improving defensive works. 
The mission remains: Defense of the ordered main 
battle line with all available means. From responsible 
troop commanders to the last man, every penetration of 
his position must be defended to the last with grim 
determination. In the main battle line enemy 
breakthroughs are to be smashed in the counterstroke or 
counterattack. 
2. It will depend in the coming days on continuously 
increased observation of reconnaissance probes and 
raids to determine where the main effort of the enemy's 
attack objectives are. We must make this point strong 
by considering the weakening of forces in the sectors 
which are not attacked. 
I make in this context all commanders and troop leaders 
responsible for relevant, unvarnished and continuous 
reports. Invented reports will falsify the command's 
situation assessment. The forces will hereby be pulled 
from the true main points of attack, 
where every single man counts.54 
AUGUST 20, 1944 
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The Jassy-Kishinev operation commenced on the morning of 
August 20, 1944 in the area south of Tiraspol and in the area 
northwest of Jassy.55 The Soviets achieved deep breakthroughs on 
both frontal sectors against Rumanian units which put up 
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surprising little resistance. These breakthroughs were only 
partially sealed off by employing the available reserves en masse. 
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group South Ukraine prophetically 
noted that the "burden of the battles in the days ahead were placed 
almost solely on the shoulders of German troops. "56 
Army Group Dumitrescu 
The Soviets attacked after 90 minutes of artillery 
preparation on both sides of the boundary between the 3rd 
Rumanian Army and the German 6th Army with infantry and armor 
supported by strong tactical air support. The attack succeeded and 
the front of the 4th Rumanian Moutain Division was broken through 
on a wide front and the division was routed (see Figure 188).57 The 
21st Rumanian Infantry Division after the loss of Rascaeti was 
thrown out of its positions along the entire length of its front (see 
Figure 188).58 A weak defensive line was established by evening 
with employment of reserves from the 9th Infantry Division, 
remnants of the 21st Rumanian Infantry Division and the 4th 
Rumanian Moutain Division. The line extended from Rascaeti to 
northwest of Festelita. 
The main effort of the Soviet attack consisting of 4-5 rifle 
divisions and masses of armor was directed against the right wing 
of the XXX Army Corps where despite the employment of all 
reserves and tenacious defense the Soviets succeeded in the 
afternoon at Plopstiubei with a breakthrough by 50 tanks.59 This 
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forced a withdrawal of the front to the hills south of Popeasca and 
forced the abandonment of Carnateni. 
The 13th Panzer Division on the right wing of the XXX Army 
Corps was employed to restore the situation east of Causenil (see 
Figure 188). The Soviet attack against the center and left wing of 
the 15th Infantry Division lead to a 6 km wide and 3 km deep 
penetration which was in the process of being liquidated. The 
Grenadier Regiment 81 of the 15th Infantry Division was overrun 
and an assault gun battery from the Assault Gun Brigade 239 was 
deployed to restore the situation (see Figure 188).60 
A Soviet attack in regimental strength against the center of 
the Lii Army Corps west of Taslik was repulsed with heavy Soviet 
losses. A limited penetration in the 14th Infantry Division's sector 
was in the process of being mopped up. Soviet breakthroughs at 
Redeni on the 106th Infantry Division's sector were being 
liquidated. 
The situation of the German 6th Army was serious by 2005 
hrs in the evening. The 21st Rumanian Infantry Division and the 4th 
Rumanian Moutain Division had completely disintegrated and no 
longer existed.61 However, the main Soviet attack against the right 
wing of the XXX Army Corps in the sectors of the 306th Infantry 
Division and the right wing of the 1 5th Infantry Division was 
pushed back. The 13th Panzer Division was employed in a 
counterattack at Popeascu against Soviet armor and had knocked 
out 17 Soviet tanks. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious 
with the loss of two Rumanian divisions and the breakthrough on 
the 306th and 15th Infantry Divisions' sectors (see Figure 188). 
Army Group Woehler 
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The Soviets attacked with infantry and armor after 90-120 
minutes of continuous artillery barrage fire and strong tactical air 
support northwest of Jassy between Rediu Mitropoliei and Erbiceni 
achieving very rapid, deep penetrations on the 7th and 5th Rumanian 
Infantry Division sectors because the Rumanians partly deserted 
their positions (see Figure 188).62 The 7th Rumanian Infantry 
Division during the course of battle lost Vultur and Rediul lui 
Tataru.63 The failure of the 3rd Rumanian Infantry Division to 
enter the battle except with small units enabled the Soviets to 
advance around Rediul lui Tataru to the south. The 5th Rumanian 
Infantry Division completely disintegrated when it was swept back 
by the Soviet offensive and the two most forward battalions of the 
18th Rumanian Moutain Division were also swept away by the 
Soviet steamroller. The Commander of Army Group Woehler 
responded by forming an attack group from the 18th Rumanian 
Moutain Division, Artillery Brigade 959, Panzer Division 
"Grossrumaenien", formation Kessel and Assault Gun Brigade 286 to 
throw back the Soviets which had advanced south of Hoisesti. 
Meanwhile, the hole left on the 5th Rumanian Infantry Division's 
sector permitted the Soviets to enter the western part of Jassy 
where heavy street battles developed in which the population 
participated. The Commandant of Jassy encircled in the northern 
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part of town was extricated by a counterattack from the north by a 
battalion with Assault guns. s4 A counterattack succeeded 
northeast of Jassy and a new defensive front was built to the west 
to protect the 11th Rumanian Infantry Division and the 79th 
Infantry Division which were holding their positions. Directly west 
of Jassy the Soviets had crossed with their most forward elements 
to the south bank of the Bachluim sector and were met by the 10th 
Panzer Grenadier Division in a counterattack from the southwest of 
Jassy (see Figure 188). 
The breakthrough area in the VI Rumanian Army Corps was a 
result of the failure of the 5th Rumanian Infantry Division which 
permitted the Soviets to advance very rapidly through the Bachluim 
sector to the area southeast of Podul lloaci. The Soviet 
breakthrough area was constricted by a counteratttack of the 
Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" out of the area Popesti to the 
northeast. The 76th Infantry Division between the 7th Rumanian 
and 5th Rumanian Infantry Divisions was outflanked on both sides 
and had to withdraw to the hills south of Letcani and built a new 
defensive front on the line Cobiasca-Harpasesti (see Figure 188). 
The battle persisted between Jassy and the counterattacking Axis 
forces while the Soviets maintained strong frontal pressure to the 
south against the withdrawing 76th Infantry Division which was 
attempting to establish a defensive front along the rail line and 
southwest of it with elements of the 18th Rumanian Moutain 
Division. 
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There were only local penetrations on the right wing of the V 
Rumanian Army Corps. Nevertheless, a counterattack by the 1st 
Rumanian Infantry Division to liquidate yesterday's penetration 
southwest of Belcesti did not succeed. The 1st Rumanian Moutain 
Division was locked into a seesaw battle around a hill 8 km west of 
Stranya. 
The liquidation of the penetration in the I Rumanian Army 
Corps on the 6th Rumanian Infantry Division's sector was not 
successful. However, the Soviet penetration against the XVII Army 
Corps southwest of Solca was liquidated in a counterattack. 
The situation on Army Group Woehler's front had become more 
critical by the evening. Contact with the 76th Infantry Division had 
not been restored and its request to withdraw to Voinesti had been 
denied. It was ordered to hold its forward positions to prevent the 
Soviets from reaching the Trajan line (see Figure 189).65 The 
Commanding General of Gruppe Kirchner reported at 2230 hrs that 
the Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" had been attacked in the rear 
and routed. The Commander of Army Group South Ukraine stressed 
that the Soviets under all circumstances must be prevented from 
reaching the Trajan line (see Figure 189) and likewise the hole to 
the VI Rumanian Army Corps must be closed. 66 A withdrawal of the 
front to the Trajan line as proposed by the 4th Rumanian Army in 
Army Group Woehler was out of the question. 
German fighter and ground attack aircraft made 300 sorties 
against the Soviets in the area of Jassy. 67 Luftflotte 4 was 
advised that the main effort for tomorrow must again be directed 
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to the support of Army Group Woehler. An attack against Jassy 
tonight was recommended to destroy important military 
installations within the city. Air support for the counterattack of 
the 13th Panzer Division would also be important. 
AUGUST 21, 1944 
Army Group Dumitrescu 
The Soviets continued their attack around noon with new 
mobile forces and armor in the breakthrough area. Weak Soviet 
attacks were repulsed on the right wing of the XXIX Army Corps, but 
Soviet armored forces broke through the weakly occupied security 
line in the afternoon and after routing the 21st Rumanian Infantry 
Division and the 4th Rumanian Moutain Division advanced to the 
southwest and bypassed Grenadier Regiment 77 of the 153rd Field 
Training Division north of Volintiri (see Figure 190).68 Then the 
Soviets after defeating Panzer Grenadier Regiment 66 of the 13th 
Panzer Division at Festefita advanced to the fine Paufeni-Frumusica 
Veche-Nicofaeni. The 13th Panzer Division prevented one Soviet 
armored breakthrough onf y to be outflanked and forced back to the 
west in heavy fighting 
Further north the Soviets made little headway against 
tenacious resistance by the XXX Army Corps and the 13th Panzer 
Division. A Soviet armored thrust west of Popeasca resulted in a 
heavy armored engagement and a Soviet armored breakthrough was 
prevented at Causanii Noui. However, the 13th Panzer Division 
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suffered serious losses and was later pushed back to the hills west 
of Brezoaia by enveloping attacks. The Soviets later in the evening 
staged a breakthrough on the outermost right wing of the 15th 
Infantry Division and to the north broke through the remnants of the 
306th Infantry Division into the wooded terrain southeast of Zaim 
and reached the Botha sector by the evening.69 The southern part of 
Hadgimus was lost. 
The Chief of Staff of the 6th Army reported that the situation 
in the south of the breakthrough area was developing very 
unsatisfactorily. Chizil, Adjiler, Marianca and Festilta were lost 
and the 13th Panzer Division was pushed back to the hills of 
Simionesti (see Figure 190). There was a large hole from the left 
wing of the 9th Infantry Division to the west (see Figure 190).70 
The situation continued to worsen during the afternoon with the 
loss of Slobozla, Ganeasa, Siminnesti and Ursoaia. The 13th Panzer 
Division's losses were so heavy that it hardly had any tanks 
remaining. 50 Soviet tanks had reached Causanii Mari. The front of 
the 15th Rumanian Infantry Division was pushed back to Cara Hasan 
and from there to the west to connect with the 9th Infantry 
Division. The Soviet Air Force had achieved complete freedom of 
action on this front which caused numerous losses of vehicles and 
delayed all movement. 
Army Group Woehler 
The Soviets exploited yesterday's success in the breakthrough 
area at Jassy (lasi) during the early morning hours by breaking 
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through the Trajan line to the south with strong infantry and armor 
forces. Meanwhile, the rapidly concentrated Kampfgruppe on the 
left wing of the VI Rumanian Army Corps succeeded in repelling 
Soviet attacks that were supported by more than 60 Soviet tanks 
(see Figure 190). The attack against the 101 st Rumanian Moutain 
Brigade with 20 tanks resulted in 12 tanks being knocked out and 
the attack failed. However, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough 
into the Trajan line in the late afternoon with 30 tanks and 
mounted infantry south of Lungeni and penetrated the Trajan line 
east of Voinesti.71 The Soviets reacted rapidly by widening the 
breakthroughs to the south and southwest with 2nd echelon forces. 
Soviet armored spearheads advanced through Hadambul to the 
southeast, south and southwest on both sides of the Voinesti-
Garbesti road. Units from the Panzer Division "Grosssrumaenien" 
reinforced with one army engineer battalion moved to engage the 
oncoming Soviet armored spearheads. However, the attack of the 
Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" was brought to a halt by a Soviet 
flank attack out of the area of Podul lloaei-Cositeni and the 
division was routed. The 10th Panzer Grenadier Division launched 
an attack against the east flank of the Soviet breakthrough area and 
was brought to a halt by a Soviet counterattack supported by 100-
150 tanks. Nevertheless, the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division during 
the afternoon managed to hold the following line: the south edge of 
Galata-west edge of Balciu-the hill terrain west of Dancasa and 
knocked out 40-50 Soviet tanks before being pushed back to the 
east during the evening hours along the Jassy-Vaslui road (see 
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Figure 190). Similarly, the 11th Rumanian Infantry Division and 
79th Infantry Division northeast of Jassy were thrown back to the 
the southeast in the Bachlui sector after the Soviets broke through 
their positions during the night. The Soviets attacked Targul 
Frumos on a broad front during the morning from the west flank of 
the breakthrough area with approximately the strength of a tank 
corps. Targul Frumos was bombed by 70 Soviet aircraft around 
noon. The Axis forces improvised an anti-tank line with units from 
the Assault Gun Brigade 286 and Kampfgruppe von Kessel. The 
Soviets were successfully blocked on the general line Sinesti-
southwest of Crucea-Lugani-Baltati. 
The Soviets achieved penetrations on the right wing and 
center of the 1st Rumanian Infantry Division. The Soviets 
attempted to widen their breakthrough on the 1st Rumanian Guards. 
Division's sector but failed. There were only Soviet company 
strength attacks against the 3rd Moutain Division in the XVII Army 
Corps sector. 
Army Group South Ukraine 
A report issued by the commanding general of Gruppe Mieth 
and the VI Rumanian Army Corps stated that the following units 
could no longer be counted as combat effective because of losses of 
men and material in the battles of August 20th and 21st: the 3rd, 
5th and 7th Rumanian Infantry Divisions and most of the 5th 
Rumanian Cavalry Division. 72 
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The Chief of Staff of Army Group Woehler recommended 
replacing the Rumanian tank crews in the Panzer Division 
"Grossrumaenien" and the 2nd Rumanian Panzer Division with 
German crews to make the units more effective. 73 The Panzer 
Division "Grossrumaenien" reported only 20 tanks and 1 O assault 
guns available for action. A total of 5 Rumanian divisions had 
disintegrated in the last 24 hours.74 The Trajan line was ordered 
to be held under all circumstances. The situation had become more 
critical with Soviet armor attacking out of the breakthrough area 
on both sides of the Jassy-Targul Frumos road. The Soviets had 
even breached the Trajan line with 20 tanks south of Lungani.75 
The German and Rumanian air forces had staged 500 sorties for 
August 21, 1944. 
Marshal Antonescu met with Colonel General Friessner and 
conveyed to him that he was with the "Fuehrer and Germany to the 
end."76 Colonel General Friessner in his meeting with Marshal 
Antonescu on August 21-22, 1944 engaged him in the following 
discussion: 
The present could still be overcome when the Rumanian 
troops and the Rumanian people with unshakeable, 
strong conviction were willing to see through through 
the common struggle and bring together the Rumanians 
and the Germans against the great danger that a 
predominant Soviet Russia represents for Europe. 
We sit here together in a boat on a stormy sea. Whoever 
bails out brings not only himself and his nation into 
danger, but the entire European world. 77 
Marshal Antonescu responded to Friessner with an 
affirmation of loyalty: 
I declare anew that despite all the Rumanian people out 
of complete conviction and as the sincerest and loyalist 
ally march at Germany's side and also will continue to 
march.78 
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The parting words of Marshal Antonescu on August 21, 1944 
indicated a sense of inevitable defeat when he declared to 
Friessner: 
When the Russians cross over the line Galatz-Focsani, 
Rumania is lost for all time.79 
Marshal Antonescu aware of the disappointing performance of 
the Panzer Division "Grossrumaenien" ordered the division to be 
divided into two groups. One group was to be commanded by the 
Rumanian General Corne and deployed at Voinesti and the other 
group was to go to Sinesti to Kampfgruppe von Kessel to be 
replaced by German crews.BO 
AUGUST 22, 1944 
Army Group Dumitrescu 
The Soviets advanced from both sides of Volontiri to the 
southwest and west with motorized and armored forces and 
reached the area Paris-Tarutino-Leipzig-Taraclia-Cainari (see 
Figure 191 ). The 9th Infantry Division was pushed back 6 km to the 
southwest to lvanesti Vechi. Meanwhile, the 13th Panzer Division 
repulsed the Soviets southwest of Causanii. German and Rumanian 
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units held at Romanesti against the attacking Soviet armor. A 
defense line was under construction in the Cogalnicul sector 
southwest of Romanesti. The Soviets on the outermost left wing of 
the 6th Army broke through the 376th Infantry Division sector with 
infantry and armor forces and took Ungheni and the village 9 km 
northeast of Ungheni (see Figure 191 ). 
Army Group Woehler 
The Soviets continued their breakthrough of the Trajan line 
south of Lungani and east of Voinesti with infantry and armor.81 
The breakthrough developed rapidly to the south and southeast 
resulting in a further breakthrough at Vasluiui pushing the German 
forces back. 
Korpsgruppe Mieth continued to hold their positions southeast 
of Jassy against superior Soviet forces. 
Gruppe Kirchner was thrown out of their positions directly 
east and northeast of Roman by a Soviet attack supported by armor. 
But the Germans managed to repulse weaker attacks against the 
Trajan line south and southwest of Targul Frumos (see Figure 191 ). 
A total of 32 Soviet tanks were in Negresti 30 km south of the 
Trajan line at 0925 hrs and 50 Soviet tanks had reached the area of 
Garbesti-Titanesti (see Figure 191 ). German antitank positions at 
Dragesti were smashed by Soviet aircraft and the Panzer Division 
"Grossrumaenien" was attacked by 80 Soviet tanks. Army Group 
Woehler reported that it now only had 45 tanks, 78 assault guns and 
2 self-propelled howitzers available for action.82 
740 
Army Group South Ukraine 
The Chief of Staff of Army Group Woehler stressed that the 
Soviet thrust to the southeast must be prevented and the Pruth 
river crossings must be held open.83 The Soviet armor had to be 
channeled. The Trajan line must be held as much as possible and 
the hole must be closed by an attack from the east and west. 
Panzer Group Braun was dispatched from the Army Group in the 
direction of Vaslui to stop the Soviet armored thrust. Panzer Group 
Braun contained 30 tanks and 21 assault guns. 
The main effort of Luftflotte 4 was to be directed against the 
Soviet armored breakthrough of the Trajan line which was 
advancing south in the sector of Army Group Woehler toward Vaslui 
(see Figure 191).84 Presently, 20 Soviet tanks were reported in 
Vaslui. The remainder of the aircraft were to be used against the 
Soviet armored spearheads in Army Group Dumitrescu's sector. 
Luftflotte 4 aircraft destroyed 16 Soviet tanks and 140 vehicles in 
the 6th Army sector (see Figure 191 ). 
Soviet intentions were clear to the Germans by the end of the 
day. The Soviets continued their breakthrough operations in both 
breakthrough areas with the obvious objectives of capturing the 
Pruth river crossings and cutting off the German forces on both 
sides of Kischinew.85 Two Soviet assault groups were moving into 
the rear in the 6th Army sector. One assault group was moving 
west toward the Pruth river crossings and the other was advancing 
in the direction of Galatz. Two Soviet assault groups were also 
breaking through in the sector of Army Group Woehler (see Figure 
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191 ). One assault group was advancing toward Husi and the other 
to the south. The 6th Army was to be pulled back into the Trajan 
line tonight and then tommorrow into the Stefan line when possible 
(see Figure 189).86 The Soviets had also landed in the early 
morning hours in the area of Akkerman and pushed their way into 
the Axis defensive positions. 
The Chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine sent the order 
to withdraw to the 6th and 8th Army which had been approved by 
the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer had approved the withdrawal of the 6th 
Army to the Ferdinand-Carol-Trajan line.87 Army Group Woehler 
was ordered to· withdraw in conjunction with Army Group 
Dumitrescu. The withdrawal movement was to be conducted 
maintaining contact with the 376th Infantry Division and the west 
wing of the 6th Army to the Trajan line and the communication line 
southwest of Targul Frumos with contact at Harmaneasa to the old 
main battle line.88 This order further stated: 
It is of decisive importance that there is sufficiently 
strong mobile reserves available on the west wing to 
defend the general line Targul Frumos to Targul Neamt 
against a possible enemy breakthrough toward Roman. 
It must be clear to All troop leaders and every 
individual that the fate of their comrades east of the 
Pruth river is dependent upon their tenacity and 
resistance in holding this line.89 
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AUGUST 23, 1944 
3rd Rumanian Army. Soviet armored spearheads from the 
breakthrough area south of Tiraspol and east of the Pruth river 
reached the area around and west of Comrat. Soviet units had 
turned south and seized Tatar Bunar and Furmanca. Consequently, 
the bulk of the Ill Rumanian Army Corps including the German 9th 
Infantry Division was encircled.90 These units were ordered to 
attack to the west and southwest in order to fight their way out of 
the encirclement. Soviet armored spearheads advancing to the 
southwest were halted at Cubei northeast of Bolgrad from 
advancing further by elements of the 13th Panzer Division. 
6th Army. The withdrawal movement proceeded as ordered 
without notable Soviet pressure. Soviet armor was reported 
advancing southeast in the direction of Hancesti. Korpsgruppe 
General Mieth was placed under the command of the 6th Army as of 
noon on August 23, 1944 and was withdrawing in the line Grozesti-
Ciortesti (30 km northwest of Husi).91 The 10th Panzer Grenadier 
Division was currently engaged in battle with strong Soviet armor 
forces in the hills at Coadesti. The German defense line at Crassna 
repulsed attacking Soviet armor spearheads after the loss of 
Vaslui.92 A Soviet armored thrust against Barlad entered the town 
before it was repulsed with the loss of 9 tanks by Panzer Group 
Braun. Soviet attacks against Barlad were resumed in the evening 
with battalion strength infantry attacks. Soviet armor was 
reported west of Barlad moving south. Soviet armor reached the 
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airport northwest of Barlad and Panzer Group Braun deployed on the 
northwest edge of Barlad to meet the Soviet tanks. The Battle 
Commandant of Barlad was Colonel von Parsival. 
Army Group Woehler 
The Soviets launched an attack supported by armor against 
the newly built line at Roman and also to the north of the town. 
The Soviet attack had forced its way into Roman from the northeast 
and the east by the afternoon.93 The 46th Infantry Division 
defending the town was forced to withdraw to the west toward 
Trifesti. Similarly, the Soviets advanced north of Roman at 
Adjudeni over the Sereth river and pushed back the defending 
Rumanian troops to the west over the Moldau river. 94 Soviet 
cavalry also crossed the Sereth river north of Roman at Comesti 
and enveloped the command bunker of the 6th Rumanian Infantry 
Division from the rear. 95 
Colonel General Friessner informed Army Group Woehler of 
the following on August 23, 1944: 
1 . It is to be expected that large Soviet tank 
formations which broke through the Trajan line to the 
south have designated their main effort opposite and 
over the Vaslui-Husi line and through occupatioin of the 
Pruth river line down the river from Husi in 
coordination with Soviet armored fc. ces which broke 
through on the 6th Army sector the Dniester deployed 
divisions will be encircled for destruction. It must also 
be expected that elements of these Soviet tank 
formations will advance in a southern direction into the 
depth of the rear and further forces will advance to the 
south into the Sereth valley. 
2. The mission of Army Group Woehler is to construct a 
defensive front in close contact with the 6th Army in 
the general line north of Husi-Vaslui. Every action of 
these armored units against the Pruth river crossings 
and down the river from them is to be prevented. The 
west wing is to be retracted by pulling the front back 
behind the Moldau bridgehead position around Roman to 
the region of Bacesti to repulse the intended Soviet 
armored advance into the Sereth valley. 96 
Army Group South Ukraine 
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The bulk of the Ill Rumanian Army Corps in the 3rd Rumanian 
Army sector with the German 9th Infantry Division burst out of the 
encirclement to the west and southwest. The German line was now 
at Falciu (30 Km south of Leova) to Leova. The 13th Panzer Division 
was at Leova on the Pruth river and the Pruth river crossing was 
occupied by an engineer battalion. 
The German 6th Army withdrew in the general line: Cimislia-
Caracui-Zberoaia-Korpsgruppe Mieth. Army Group Woehler 
withdrew and halted on the west bank of the Sereth river and the 
Moldau river. Husi was reported under artillery fire as of 1105 hrs. 
20 Soviet tanks were reported 30 km southeast of Leova at 1305 
hrs. The Pruth river crossing at Cahul was occupied by the 153rd 
Field Training Division and the Pruth crossing at Reni was secured 
by the Army Weapons School of the 6th Army. The Pruth river 
bridge at Falciu was to be blown up. 
The 4th Luftflotte received a small reinforcement with the 
arrival of Major Rudel and his ground support air group.97 
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Rumanian Political Situation 
The situation in Rumania reached catastrophic proportions 
with the fall of Marshal Antonescu and the Rumanians dropping out 
of the war. Marshal Antonescu and the Deputy Minister President of 
Rumania during the afternoon were taken to meet King Michael.98 
The German Ambassador von Killinger was summoned by King 
Michael and informed that he wanted peace as soon as possible and 
he would not fight against the Germans.99 
The chief of Staff of Army Group South Ukraine was in direct 
contact with the German Ambassador by teletype. He was informed 
at 2225 hrs that during the course of the afternoon that Marshal 
Antonescu was arrested. The German Ambassador had driven over 
to meet King Michael who informed him that Marshal Antonescu had 
resigned and that he was establishing a new government. This 
government was to seek an armistice.1 oo However, a fight with the 
German Army was out of the question.101 King Michael announced 
on radio that evening that Rumania had accepted an armistice from 
the allies and Rumanian troops were to cease fighting.102 
Ambassador Killinger reported that the German Headquarters in 
Bucharest had been surrounded by Rumanian troops.103 
The change of the Rumanian political situation was relayed to 
the Commandant of Fortress Braila at 2300 hrs and the Chief of 
Staff for the Commander of Rear Operations in Rumania. All 
German units were put on complete alert but no active measures 
were ordered. 
The Commander of Army Group Woehler stated: 
Colonel General Dumitrescu reported that he did not 
believe that Marshal Antonescu voluntarily resigned and 
he did not think the entire Rumanian Officer Corps 
would break their loyalty to Germany.He would also 
determine if the Rumanian Generals and their soldiers 
in our would continue to fight.104 
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The Commander of Army Group Woehler expressed no great 
hope that the Rumanians would fight. A few officers may continue 
to fight but the troops would certainly not continue to fight. He 
expressed the view that there was no longer anything that could be 
done except get the German troops back to the Carpathians and 
block the Carpathian passes. 1 os 
AUGUST 24, 1944 
Army Group South Ukraine 
The 3rd and 4th Rumanian Armies and their subordinate units 
dropped out of the war because of the Rumanian betrayal on August 
23, 1944.1 os The Majority of Rumanian formations had abandoned 
their positions, some units departed in an orderly fashion while 
others disintegrated in the departure to the south and 
southwest.101 The German attack to take possession of Bucharest 
.ran into organized, strong resistance. The Soviets achieved great 
success today by occupying most of the Pruth river crossings as 
well as taking Barlad and Bacau.1oa 
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6th Army. The Ill Rumanian Army Corps was in retreat north 
of the mouth of the Danube river and crossed over at Ismail. The 
Soviets captured Kilia. The whereabouts of the German 9th 
Infantry Division was unknown. The weak German forces in the 
Ferdinand line were withdrawing into a compressed bridgehead in 
the sector Reni-Cahul. A bridgehead east of the Pruth river was 
built from Giurgiulesti to Cahul by the LXXll Army Corps Z.B.V. with 
the remnants of the 6th Army weapon School, alert units, remnants 
of Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 13 and the 153rd Field 
Training Division .109 Elements of the 13th Panzer Division secured 
the town of Bolgrad. The withdrawal movement of the 4 corps of 
the 6th Army proceeded according to present reports without 
substantial Soviet pressure. The Soviets shifted armored forces 
followed by infantry to both sides of the Pruth river and the Pruth 
river crossings blocking the retreat routes of the 6th Army.11 o 
Tomai was occupied by an armored Soviet task force. Another 
Soviet group occupied the Pruth river crossing at Raseti and 
destroyed the bridge. Korpsgruppe Mieth was ordered to withdraw 
in the line Obinjany-Baltati. 
Soviet armor and mechanized forces south of Korpsgruppe 
Mieth advanced from the northwest to the Pruth river crossings at 
Leova and Falciu. Soviet forces took Barlad and Soviet infantry 
reached a line 15 km southwest of Barlad.111 Soviets also occupied 
the crossing northeast of Husi. Korpsgruppe Mieth west of the 
Pruth river withdrew under strong Soviet pressure from the north 
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and envelopment from the south to the line 20 km north of Husi to 
1 O km west of Husi. 
8th Army. The Soviets advanced out of the area of Roman to 
the south with strong forces and took Bacau and threw the weak 
security forces back 6 km to the west in a bitter battle. The 
Soviets lost 21 tanks in this battle. The Soviets with part of their 
forces advanced from Bacau to the northwest and engaged the 
German forces at Roznov. Kampfgruppe von Kessel secured the area 
east and north of Piatra Neamt against Soviet forces advancing 
west from Roman. The Rumanian formations in the area along both 
sides of Targul Neamt abandoned their positions and withdrew to 
the southwest. Rumanian Border Regiment 3 commenced hostilities 
and attacked elements of the German 3rd Moutain Division on the 
Carpathian front. 
Army Group South Ukraine 
Hitler transmitted the order to Colonel General Friessner to 
crush the putsch in Rumania and arrest King Mlchael and his royal 
clique of advisors and reestablish a new government under a 
Rumanian general friendly to Germany in the event Marshal 
Antonescu was no longer available. 112 F riessner assigned the 
execution of the Fuehrer's order to General der Flieger Gerstenberg 
who along with the German Ambassador and General d. Kavalry 
Hansen were surrounded in the German embassy by Rumanian 
tanks. 113 General der Flieger Gerstenberg could not secure his 
freedom from the embassy so he directed SS Brigadefuehrer 
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Hofmeier to execute the action against Bucharest. Hofmeier 
reported at 0300 hrs from the assembly point outside Bucharest 
that the spearhead of the Kampfgruppe from Ploesti would arrive in 
approximately 90 minutes and then the attack would commence.114 
General Hansen called Colonel General Friessner and informed 
him that the new Rumanian government had informed him that if 
the German measures against Bucharest were not stopped within an 
hour the Rumanian Army would take up arms against the German 
Army.11s The Rumanian government made it clear that it wanted to 
be taken seriously and that this was no bluff by a small clique of 
traitors. It stressed that the Rumanian people and all the generals 
were behind the new government. General Hansen further stated 
that Ambassador von Killinger, General der Flieger Gerstenberg and 
Minister Clodium were unanimous in their opinion that the German 
forces assigned to occupy Bucharest and remove the new 
government were totally insufficient and that the German action 
was certainly expected to fai1.116 Therefore, it was urgent to 
refrain from carrying out the ordered action. Colonel General 
Friessner asked if he was free to move and Hansen replied no to the 
question since he was still surrounded in the German Embassy. 
Friessner requested further instructions from the Fuehrer based on 
this information concerning the execution of the order to seize 
Bucharest. The Fuehrer's answer arrived at 0500 hrs that the order 
was to be executed. The Fuehrer believed that General Hansen and 
the other people in Bucharest were unable to make free, 
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independent decisions after they have been isolated for days which 
would impair and distort their judgement of the situation. 111 
General der Flieger Gerstenberg was released by the 
Rumanians to stop the German measures against Bucharest. 11 s He 
arrived at the German assembly point outside Bucharest and 
informed the Chief of Staff of Luftflotte 4 at 0455 hrs that the 
new government consisted of only a small clique that were "filled 
with fear" and that Bucharest only had a thin screen of Rumanian 
troops.119 
The operation against Bucharest started at 0730 hrs with 
appproximately 6,000 troops.120 The 5th Flak Division was 
assigned to crush the putsch in Bucharest.121 General der Flieger 
Gerstenberg reported at 1130 hrs that the operation against 
Bucharest had run into stiff resistance and troops had failed to 
enter the city and had only occupied the radio station.122 The 
assistance of the Luftwaffe was requested en masse. A request 
was sent to OKW for immediate air transport of infantry from the 
Southeastern Theater to Bucharest. 
German instructions stated that the advance against the 
Rumanian King and the new government had nothing to do with the 
conduct of the Rumanian Army. No violent measures against the 
Rumanian Army were to be taken as long as it remained loyal. The 
Fuehrer ordered Colonel General Friessner, Commander of Army 
Group South Ukraine to assume command of all German military 
units thereby eliminating the Rumanian command of German 
units.123 German units that encountered hostile Rumanian units 
were to take the severest measures against the Rumanians. 124 
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There was no Rumanian General prepared to continue the war 
on the German side.125 Even General Corne, Commander of Panzer 
Division "Grossrumaenien" would not side with the Germans. 12s 
Colonel General Friessner communicated with Colonel General 
Dumitrescu, Commander of the 3rd Rumanian Army. Dumitrescu 
stated that he had heard the proceedings on radio but had not 
received any orders from Bucharest. He intended to carry out his 
old orders until he received new orders. He personally regreted the 
actions of the Rumanian government and would resign his command 
of the 3rd Rumanian Army.121 However, he would not fight against 
his king. Friessner queried Corps General Steflea, Commander of 
the 4th Rumanian Army, as to his position. He responded that he 
could not take any position since he had not received any orders 
from a higher Rumanian Headquarters. He indicated that he would 
relay any new orders so as not to surprise Army Group South 
Ukraine. 
German instructions concerning Rumanian units which 
engaged in hostilities or sabotage against the German Army 
required that the Rumanian units be destroyed or disarmed. 12a The 
order also stressed that the Wehrmacht was not to attack the 
Rumanian people or Rumanian troops but only the traiterous clique 
which had taken control of Marshal Antonescu's government. 129 
The Rumanians received an order from the Rumanian General 
Staff which raised the question of the armistice for the 3rd and 
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Bacau since 0700 hrs and the Germans after knocking out 12 Soviet 
tanks abandoned the town at 1045 hrs. 
The German Luftwaffe had been employed during the morning 
to support the 6th Army against Soviet columns and armored 
spearheads advancing in the areas of Comrat, Husi, Vaslui, Barlad 
and Bacau. However, Luftwaffe support was shifted in the 
afternoon against the government buildings and the king's palace in 
Bucharest.135 Colonel General Friessner noted in his memoirs that 
the effect of Hitler's order to bomb Bucharest was catastrophic 
because it gave King Michael the pretext to declare war on Germany 
and order the Rumanian troops to attack the German soldiers of 
Army Group South Ukraine.136 
AUGUST 25, 1944 
The Soviets landed at St. Gheorghe in the Danube delta and 
advanced from Kilia in the direction of Tulcea. There was no Soviet 
pressure against the German Pruth river bridgehead between Rani 
and Cahul. 
6th Army. The 6th Army report at noon reported that the XXX 
Army Corps had reached the area northeast of Sahaidac ( 40 km 
south of Kischinew), the Lii Army Corps reached the area of Hartop 
(12 km west of Sahaidac) and the XXXXIV Army Corps was in the 
area of Sarata Galbena (12 km southwest of Hancesti) (see Figure 
192).137 The attack of the 106th Infantry Division in the VII Army 
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Corps sector against the Pruth river crossing at Rasesti (12 km 
northeast of Husi) failed to breakthrough. However, the 370th and 
376th Infantry Divisions advanced to the north of Rasesti and 
crossed over the Pruth river and united with Gruppe Mieth which 
was last reported in the area 15 km north of H usi with its front 
deployed to the north and west (see Figure 192).138 Soviet armor 
attacking from the east and west captured the bridge at Leova. 
Panzer Gruppe Braun and elements of the 10th Panzer Grenadier 
Division were employed in a northwestern direction to cover the 
bridgehead at Falciu. Soviet pressure increased against the 
garrisons of Tecuci and Adjud. 
8th Army. The repeated enveloping attacks of strong Soviet 
armor and cavalry formations pushed Kampfgruppe Abraham which 
was under the Commander of the 76th Infantry Division out of the 
area west of Bacau approximately 18 km further to the west and 
southwest into the Trotus valley.139 Onesti was lost at 1600 hrs. 
Concentrated Soviet attacks launched against the 
Piatraneamt Bridgehead were repulsed by the L VII Panzer Corps. 
There were only local attacks on the XVI I Army Corps sector except 
for the defense of Paliligeni (20 km west of Targul-Neamt) against 
Soviet battalion strength attacks which were repulsed. Rumanian 
units now entered the battle against the Germans southeast of 
Gurahumorului140 There were no clear reports regarding the battle 
of Bucharest. The resistance there continued to be tenacious and 
bitter. However, in general there had still been no further combat 
engagements between German and Rumanian troops since the 
Rumanian declaration of war on Germany was reponed.141 
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The order to hold the Galatz-Focsani line was not possible to 
maintain. The Buzau-Kronstadt road instead had to be held open for 
the 6th Army. 
AUGUST 26, 1944 
6th Army. The Soviets occupied the bridgehead at Cahul (see 
Figure 193).142 The divisions of the 6th Army were now completely 
encircled and under attack all day. The eastern group consisted of 
the remnants of XXX Army Corps, Lit Army Corps and the XXXXIV 
Army Corps in the area of Mingir and the western group contained 
Gruppe Mieth and remnants of the VII Army Corps in the area south 
of Husi (see Figure 194).143 
The Soviets advanced against the Sereth river position with 
strong armored forces concentrating their main effon in the 
direction of Focsani.144 The Soviets penetrated the position east of 
Focsani and reached the region of Plainesti (see Figure 195). 
Kampfgruppe Philipp was employed from the area of Nanesti to 
meet these Soviet forces. 
Meanwhile, in the Rumanian interior the hostile position of 
Rumanian troops toward German troops increased sharply. There 
were already several incidents of fire fights between German and 
Rumanian troops including Rumanian flak which had shot down 
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German aircraft. There were no new reports on the situation 
around Bucharest. The 5th Flak Division in Ploesti was currently 
engaged in combat with Rumanian tanks (see Figure 195).145 
The situation of the 6th Army in the area of Focsani and the 
encircled divisions on both sides of Husi continued to get worse 
especially due to supply difficulties. The LXXll Army Corps 
continued to hold the Reni Bridgehead and a weak defensive line 
was under construction from Braila to the junction of the Buzaul 
river with the Sereth river. Once Cahul was lost to superior Soviet 
armored forces the XXIX Army Corps withdrew with the remnants of 
the 153rd Field Training Division, 13th Panzer Division and 10th 
Panzer Grenadier Division to the Sereth river in contact with the 
LXXll Army Corps z.b.V.146 The Soviets captured Tecuci. The 
commandant of Fortress Foscani repulsed numerous Soviet attacks 
supported by armor from the northwestern and northern direction 
(see Figure 195). Nevertheless, a Soviet thrust east of Foscani 
could not be prevented from bypassing the town and the most 
foreward Soviet armored spearheads advanced 20 km south of 
Foscani (see Figure 195). Kampfgruppe Philipp coming from the 
east was employed in a counterattack against the Soviet armored 
spearheads emerging from the area of Maicanesti. Kampfgruppe 
Braun fought through southeast of Barlad to the south (see Figure 
195). 
The remnants of the XXX, Lii and XXXXIV Army Corps were 
located on the east bank of the Pruth river 20 km east of Husi.147 
These corps were under attack from all sides by Soviet armor and 
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were pushed back together and compressed into a tighter area west 
of the Pruth river (see Figure 194). Gruppe Mieth was currently 
located in the woods southwest of Husi. It was also encircled 
tightly by the Soviets and it attempted to breakout to the south 
(see Figure 194). 
8th Army. The Soviets captured Adjud and advanced from 
here and Bacau toward Onesti where the Soviets had lost 18 tanks 
in the last two days as a result of defensive action by Gruppe 
Abraham (76th Infantry Division) which had been pushed back to the 
west edge of Ojtoz (see Figure 196). The Soviets advanced from 
Onesti toward the Ojtoz pass and Grozesti (see Figure 196). Soviet 
infantry and armor advanced from Darmanesti in the Uzul vally to 
the west over the Hungarian border to a point 12 km northeast of 
Feltiz (see Figure 196).148 The German defense line in the Trotus 
vally was pulled back to the west of Comanesti. The Soviets 
attacked Piatra Neamt in regimental strength in the L VI I Panzer 
Corps sector and were repulsed (see Figure 196). The Soviets also 
attempted to push back the German defense line in the XVII Army 
Corps sector by an enveloping attack at Paliligeni from the south. 
Army Group South Ukraine 
The hostile attitude of Rumanian troops was increasing in the 
interior of Rumania. However, there had not been any incidents in 
the front lines but the Rumanians ceased supplying the area north 
of the Braila-Bucau line. The Rumanians increased the pressure in 
the area around Kronstadt by attacks against German 
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administrative Headquarters. Rumanian moutain units had even 
occupied and blocked the Predeal pass. 149 German troops crossing 
the Rumanian-Bulgarian border were being disarmed and other 
unfriendly acts were being taken by the Bulgarians.150 Meanwhile, 
as the entire front was collapsing the Fuehrer ordered the Galatz-
Focsani line to be held with rear echelon and miscellaneous 
troops.151 
AUGUST 27, 1944 
6th Army. The remnants of the VII, XXXXIV, Lii and XXX Army 
Corps were placed under the command of Gruppe Mieth and after 
combining received the mission to breakout to the Carpathian 
moutain passes (see Figure 197).152 The most forward elements on 
the west bank of the Pruth river had reached Hocenii at 1630 hrs 
and the other elements were attacking Urlati while the rear guard 
troops were to hold the line Husi-Gragaseni-Gresteti. There were 
no further reports from the units east of the Pruth river. The 
Soviets had broken through the Galatz-Focsani line yesterday east 
of Focsani and today they seized Focsani by an enveloping attack of 
armored forces against bitter German resistance (see Figure 
198).153 The German garrison of Focsani managed to withdraw to 
the south after having destroyed numerous Soviet tanks. The 
Soviets then advanced toward Ramnicul Sarat (see Figure 198). 
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The XXIX Army Corps, units of the 153rd Field Training 
Division, remnants of the 13th Panzer Division, remnants of the 
10th Panzer Grenadier Division and Kampfgruppe Braun received the 
mission to withdraw to the southeast Carpathians and block the 
Carpathian border from the area of Ploesti.154 Two parachute 
battalions were flown into the area of Buzau (see Figure 198). 
8th Army. The Soviets moved against the southern wing of 
the army and increased the pressure against the Kampfgruppen 
blocking the Carpathian passes while the Soviets remained inactive 
on the XVII Army Corps front. Kampfgruppe Abraham consisting of 
units of the 76th Infantry Division had to withdraw from the 
continuously reinforced Soviet forces in the Ojtoz vally into the 
region 3 km southwest of Harja. The Soviets captured Poianna 
Sarata which was on the Hungarian side of the border. North of the 
Aklos pass the Soviets had advanced further to the southwest. 
Soviet cavalry formations advanced on the pass road Darmanesti-
Pojana-Uzul over the border to the region southwest of Pojana Uzul 
(see Figure 199). A counterattack by Hungarian forces in 
cooperation with German alert units was making good progress. 
Gruppe Fessner withdrew from a Soviet attack to the heights of the 
pass 1 O km southwest of Brusturoasa (see Figure 199). 
The Soviets in the L VII Panzer Corps sector probed the 
combat outposts at Piatraneamt from the southeast and north (see 
Figure 199). The bulk of Kampfgruppe von Kessel withdrew to a 
defense position 8 km west of Piatraneamt. Soviet battalion 
strength attacks on the southern wing of the XVII Army Corps 
against the defensive position south of Pipirig were smashed. 
Army Group South Ukraine 
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Kampfgruppe Stahel and the 5th Flak Division were engaged in 
heavy combat on all sides from attacking Rumanian infantry and 
armor forces north of Bucharest and in the area of Ploesti (see 
Figure 198).155 The 5th Flak Division located around Ploesti lost 
the city center and the oil refineries.156 The 5th Flak Division 
radioed that it could not spare any forces from Ploesti to reinforce 
Kampfgruppe Stahel at Bucharest (see Figure 198). The division 
stressed that it would hold to the last man. Lt. General Stahel 
radioed at 1640 hrs that the battle at Bucharest had reached a 
turning point and he requested reinforcements. He demanded a new 
decision concerning the continuation of the battle no later than 
tomorrow. Lt. General Stahel, however, quickly changed his mind 
and informed the Army Group High Command at 1715 hrs that the 
battle for Bucharest had to be abandoned and requested permission 
to breakout toward Mizil tonight.157 He explained that his 
Kampfgruppe had suffered high casualties and it was now down to 
only 1900 men and was being attacked by a Rumanian armored force 
consisting of 26 German Panther tanks which had arrived north of 
the airport Otopeni and in the woods northwest of Baneasa (see 
Figures 198 & 200).158 The Army Group instead ordered 
Kampfgruppe Stahel to withdraw to the area of Ploesti and 
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stressed that it must be held under all circumstances (see Figure 
200). 
The following reinforcements were arriving for Army Group 
South Ukraine: 4th Moutain Division, 75th Infantry Division and 4 
Panzer Jaeger Battalions. 
The Luftwaffe conducted only weak reconaissance and fighter 
activity because of the fuel shortage.159 Entire units of Luftflotte 
4 after using up their last supply of fuel transferred to the east 
Hungarian area.160 The air supply of Gruppe Mieth was no longer 
possible due to the shortage of fuel.161 
The war diary of Army Group South Ukraine noted on this day 
that the situation of the 6th Army was developing into a "complete 
catastrophe. "162 
AUGUST 28, 1944 
6th Army. Gruppe Mieth was still locked in battle in the area 
of Husi according to the last report. (see Figure 201 ). It was still 
attempting to fight its way out of the encirclement to the west.163 
The Soviets attacked with armor along the Focsani-Buzau road and 
advanced after the capture of Ramnicul Sarat to Buzau. Buzau was 
lost to superior Soviet forces after a bitter battle (see Figure 
202).164 The Germans managed to knock out 27 Soviet tanks during 
the course of the battle. No reports were received on the situation 
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of German forces on the southern bank of the Sereth river and from 
Kampfgruppe Stahel and the 5th Flak division. 
8th Army. The Soviets attacked the German forces blocking 
the roads in the moutain passes all day long in the sector of the 
L VII Panzer Corps. The Soviets attempted to penetrate the Ojtoz, 
Aklos and Gyimes Baekk passes and the Kronstadt area along the 
Kronstadt-Ditrau rail line (see Figure 202).165 Gruppe Abraham 
near the Ojtoz pass was pushed back 3 km to the southwest edge of 
Pojana Sarata by a strong enveloping attack. Soviet Paratroops 
were landed south of Harja (see Figure 202). German forces 
continued to engage increasingly reinforced Soviet forces west of 
Darmanesti. A counterattack by units of the 76th Infantry Division 
and the 3rd Hungarian battalion failed to have any effect (see 
Figure 202). Therefore, the Soviets renewed their attack during the 
evening with 2 battalions supported by armor which broke through 
the German positions and advanced further to the west in the 
direction of Szt. Marton. 
The battle in the area north of Feltiz near the Aklos pass 
continued with the Soviet infantry supported by armor. Gruppe 
Fessner at the Gyimes pass was attacked frontally and in the rear 
and after heavy casualties was withdrawn to the area west of 
Brusturoasa in the area of Palancu (see Figure 202). West of Piatra 
Neamt weak Soviet attacks were repulsed (see Figure 202). 
Meanwhile, the Soviets pressed foreward against the right wing of 
the XVII Army Corps in the area of Audia-Gura Largu and threatened 
from there the crossroads in the Bistrita valley. 
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The German Luftwaffe employed Stukas against the Soviet 
spearheads and assembly areas at the Gyimes Buekk and Aklos pass 
roads.166 The radio station in Kronstadt was damaged. 
Colonel General Friessner informed both the 6th and 8th 
Armies that the Balkan front would stand or fall depending on their 
holding of the Carpathian passes.167 The commanding generals 
were ordered to defend the most important passes by establishing 
strong points and defending them like fortresses.168 The Chief of 
Staff of the 6th Army stated, "that with the Soviets advancing on 
Ploesti that one could not have any illusions about holding the 
Carpathian passes because the available forces were far too 
weak."169 
AUGUST 29, 1944 
6th Army. There were no new reports on the encircled units 
of the 6th Army in the area of Husi because of the breakdown in 
radio communications (see Figure 203). The breakthrough of the 
XXIX Army Corps with the remnants of the 13th Panzer Division, 
10th Panzer Grenadier Division, 153rd Field Training Division, 
Panzer formation Braun and Gruppe Philipp along the Soviet 
occupied Buzau-Ploesti road toward the Carpathian Moutains to the 
northwest failed .170 The breakthrough attempt was renewed on the 
night of August 29th-30th with infantry units attempting to reach 
the Carpathian Moutains to the northwest while motorized units 
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moved west. The German forces that had been deployed in the 
western part of the Sereth line had retreated through Focsani and 
Ramnicul Sarat. These forces were now falling back along the 
Buzau-Kronstadt pass road and individual Kampfgruppen were 
located northwest of Buzau at Cislau, Nehoiuj and east of Teliul 
where the Rumanians west of the towns blocked the exits to the 
pass roads in the direction of Kronstadt (see Figure 204).111 The 
fuel shortage brought German motorized columns to a halt. A 50 km 
long German vehicle column was halted in the Buzau vally because 
of a lack of fuel. 112 Soviet regimental attacks northwest of Buzau 
were repulsed (see Figure 204). Soviet armor advanced from Buzau 
to Ploesti and reached the edge of the city in the evening where 
units of the 5th Flak Division were locked into a difficult struggle 
against numerically superior Rumanian and Soviet forces (see 
Figure 204). The 5th Flak Division reported that Ploesti was lost 
at 1430 hrs and only a strongpoint on the edge of the city was still 
holding.113 Kampfgruppe Stahel was 20 km south of Ploesti and 
was attempting to link up with the 5th Flak Division (see Figure 
204). Lt. General Stahel was to take over the combined command of 
his Kampfgruppe and the 5th Flak Division once the link up had 
occurred.1 74 
8th Army. The German forces of the L VII Panzer Corps in the 
Ojtoz vally at Pojana Sarata were under an enveloping attack from 
both sides and were forced back to the town of Ojtoz and the pass 
(see Figure 204). Soviet attacks from the east and northeast were 
repulsed. The German counterattack in the area of Szt. Marton 
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recaptured the wooded terrain 9 km northeast of the town. Further 
north the Soviets advancing from the Trotus vally through Soslelek 
had reached the hill terrain east of the Sepsiszentgoergy-Ditrau 
road at Csik Szt. Letek, Csomortan and Csik Szepiviz during the 
afternoon. A German counterattack pushed back the most forward 
units. The Soviets in the XVII Army Corps sector broke into the 
Bistrita vally northwest of Buhabuta and were pushed back again by 
a concentrated attack. Soviet air activity was weak on the 
southern wing of the 8th Army. The German Luftwaffe now 
directed its main effort against Soviet forces advancing over the 
Carpathian passes.115 
Units of Gruppe Abraham located northeast of the Ojtoz pass 
were enveloped on both sides by a Soviet attack and thrown back to 
the pass where a battle was in process with Soviet paratroops 
which had landed east of the pass (see Figure 204). The 1st 
Regiment of the 4th Moutain Division was advancing toward the 
pass to reinforce the German units there (see Figure 204). Soviet 
forces captured Scepviz and the hill terrain 6 km east of the rail 
line and the road south of this town. However, German 
counterattacks at Scepviz recaptured the town. But German aerial 
reconnaissance reported 1000 Soviet vehicles were approaching 
Palanca.176 There was no significant combat activity reported at 
the Gyimesbuekk pass and west of Piatraneamt. 
The Soviets on the right wing of the XVII Army Corps broke 
through on the Piatraneamt- Bistriz road at Hangul. However, the 
concentrated German counterattack repulsed the Soviets. The 
German 75th Infantry Division was being rushed to the area of 
Kronstadt and the Predeal pass. Kampfgruppe Stahel was to fall 
back to this pass when Ploesti could no longer be held. The 
Rumanian resistance in the Siebenbuergen was to be broken by 
arming the Volksdeutschen under the direction of the SS and the 
police.177 The arriving 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer" 
would also be employed to crush the Rumanian resistance.178 
AUGUST 30, 1944 
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6th Army. · There was no contact with Gruppe Mieth and aerial 
reconnaissance provided no new information. According to an 
intercepted Soviet radio message units of Gruppe Mieth consisting 
of the 370th Infantry Division, 282nd Infantry Division and the 
106th Infantry Division with a total strength of approximately 
20,000 men were located 48 km southeast of Husi.179 
There were also no further reports on the whereabouts of the 
XXIX Army Corps, Kampfgruppen Braun, Philipp and Stahel. The 5th 
Flak Division remained the entire day in the area of Ploesti in 
defensive battles with Rumanian infantry and Soviet tanks (see 
Figure 205).180 The 5th Flak Division was going to fight its way 
~ut through Valenii de Munte (see Figure 205). Kampfgruppe Stahel 
was apparently advancing from Berecszk to the north. 
Gruppe Winkler was pushed back to the sector of Gura 
Aninoasei by enveloping attacks on both sides of the Buzau vally. 
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Gruppe Winkler withdrew on the night of August 30-31, 1944 to a 
defensive position on both sides of Cislau (see Figure 205). A 
defensive line was under preparation with weak forces 1 O km 
northwest of Star Chiojd on both sides of Clabucetui in a line to 
Nehoiuj and Plostina (see Figure 205). A Rumanian battalion 
strength attack north of Tartlau was smashed by a police battalion. 
8th Army. The Kampfgruppe holding the Ojtoz pass repulsed 
several strong Soviet attacks (see Figure 206). 1s1 Units of the 4th 
Moutain Division after clearing Berecszk were deployed on both 
sides of the Ojtoz pass where they encountered Soviet forces 
advancing on the flanks of the Ojtoz pass (see Figure 206). The 
German Luftwaffe was attacking Soviet vehicle columns northeast 
of the Ojtoz pass. The counterattack by units of the 4th Moutain 
Division north of Kastonjakabfalvar developed into a costly battle 
in difficult, moutainous terrain and gained only little ground. 
The Soviets forced the north wing of the L VII Panzer Corps to 
withdraw to the region east of Bicaz by a series of enveloping 
attacks. Kampfgruppe von Kessel transferred units to Gruppe 
Fessner and now was no longer capable of countermeasures. 
The Soviets achieved local penetrations northwest of Hangul 
on the southern wing of the XVII Army Corps which lead to the loss 
of some hills northeast of Bistricioara and a breakthrough 
southeast of the Aurel passes. The front was withdrawn behind the 
Bistrita in the region northeast of Bistricioara. A Soviet 
penetration 15 km north of this region was sealed off. 
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AUGUST 31, 1944 
6th Army. Aerial reconnaissance placed units of Gruppe Mieth 
(600-700 men and 70 vehicles) west of the Sereth river and 
approximately 25 km southwest of Bacau.182 There were no further 
new reports about Kampfgruppe Stahel. According to aerial 
reconnaissance units of the 5th Flak Division north of Ploesti were 
observed retreating to the north (see Figure 207). Gruppe Winkler 
repulsed several Soviet battalion strength attacks during the 
morning and then withdrew during the night of August 31st and 
September 1st to the defensive position on both sides of Cisla (see 
Figure 207). Kampfgruppe Peters consisting of a police battalion, 
Flak Regiment 133 and 2 assault gun battalions had deployed on 
both sides of Sepsiszgyoergy on the Hungarian border and repulsed 
continuous attacks against the line Elopatak-llyefalya-Kokos-
Lisnyo by Rumanian troops since the early morning hours (see 
Figure 207). The Rumanians suffered heavy casualties. 
8th Army. The Soviets continued heavy attacks in the L VII 
Panzer Corps sector against Gruppe Abraham in the Ojtoz pass. 
German troops after bitter battles managed to repulse the 
numerically superior Soviet force attacking the actual pass 
position. However, the town of Ojtoz was lost in the course of the 
battle (see Figure 207).183 
Gruppe Breith in the area northeast of Szt. Marton began its 
attack at 1300 hrs and took both sides of the Aklos pass but failed 
to reach the controling heights north of Feltiz.184 This attack had 
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to be suspended and units of the 4th Moutain Division were ordered 
to regroup on the south wing of the L VII Panzer Corps. German 
forces advancing out of the area of Szepviz made good progress 
advancing along the pass road to the Gyimes pass but encountered 
in the hills of the pass a strong Soviet force moving to the 
southwest (see Figure 207). The German force attacked the Soviets 
and pushed them partially back to the northeast. Meanwhile, a 
Soviet assault group advanced against the Hungarian defensive line 
and pushed it back at Felsolok. German forces were employed from 
the north to cut into the flank of the Soviet force. 
The withdrawal movement of the 46th Infantry Division on 
the left wing of the L VII Panzer Corps went as planned into an 
intermediate position at Straja. The occupation of a bridgehead 
position at Bicaz was begun. 
Soviet battalion to regimental attacks against the south wing 
of the XVII Army Corps were repulsed at Gura Hangului and north of 
Largu. Soviet units that had broken through the German front lines 
in Ostra were thrown back in a counterstroke and the hill terrain 
southeast of Stulpicani was also cleansed of Soviet troops. The 
Soviets attempted during the afternoon a new thrust southeast of 
Gura Hangului and were advancing west of the Pluton pass road to 
encircle units of the 3rd Moutain Division. A Soviet battalion 
strength attack 7 km northwest of Straja was successful. 
The German Luftwaffe continued to support the defensive 
battles raging around the town of Ojtoz and the pass. 
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Meanwhile, the Soviets took Ploesti and marched into 
Bucharest (see Figure 208).185 The Soviets entered Bucharest in 
the morning with the 6th Tank Army and 53rd Army along with the 
1st Rumanian Volunteer Division "Tudor Vladimirescu."186 There 
was even more bad news with the Slovakian Army joining the 
Slovakian rebellion.187 
SEPTEMBER 1, 1944 
6th Army. There were no further reports concerning Gruppe 
Mieth, Gruppe Stahel and the 5th Flak Division. Intercepted Soviet 
radio messages indicated that a Kampfgruppe from Gruppe Mieth 
(approximately 5,000-6,000 men) were located on August 31, 1944 
in battle in the region 20 km northwest of Barlad.188 The main body 
of Gruppe Mieth remained close to Barlad (see Figure 209). The 
commanding general of the XXIX Army Corps with his Chief of Staff 
and a few soldiers broke through to the north and reached German 
lines on foot through the Carpathian moutains arriving at the 
Command Post of the 6th Army.189 Kampfgruppe Winkler during the 
course of the day repulsed Soviet forces in the Buzau vally south of 
Valea Lupului that had attempted to envelope the Kampfgruppe from 
the east. The end of the German vehicle column was located 5 km 
north of Nehoiuj during the afternoon. 
8th Army. The Soviets continued their attempt to envelope 
the Ojtoz pass position in the sector of the LVll Panzer Corps (see 
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Figure 210). The Soviets shifted their forces from the northeast to 
the line Esztelnek-Kurtopatak. The Soviets with the onset of 
darkness renewed their attack against the Ojtoz pass position from 
the south and launched an attack on Berecszk from the south and on 
Lemheny from the north (see Figure 210).190 The 3rd Moutain 
Division repulsed Soviet company to battalion strength attacks 
west of Gura Hangului. However, Soviets managed to infilitrate the 
lines northwest of Straja. 
The Soviets reinforced their position southwest of the 
Gyimes passes in the area east and west of the stretch of road 
between Santatelek-Felsolok. The Soviet attack enveloped the 
German Kampfgruppe Scholze from both sides at the Gyimes pass 
(see Figure 210) after the Hungarian battalion in the combined 
German Kampfgruppe had completely deserted their positions.191 
Soviet forces south of the bridgehead Bicaz advanced to the west 
into the vally southwest of Cazaci by enveloping the northern 
regimental group of the 46th Infantry Division and engaged the 
weak German defensive line. 
The Germans proceeded with the disarmament action against 
the 1st Slovakian Division. The Division Commander with his staff, 
36 officers and 360 men were arrested in Szt. Andras (6 km 
northwest of Szasz. Regen). 192 Disarmament of the other units of 
the division were in progress. 
The main effort of the Luftwaffe ground attack aircraft were 
directed against Soviet spearheads and columns advancing on the 
Ojtoz and Gyimes passes (see Figure 210).193 
SEPTEMBER 2, 1944 
6th Army. No further reports were available concerning 
Gruppe Mieth, XXIX Army Corps and Gruppe Stahel. Gruppe Von 
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Scotti withdrew with the subordinate Kampfgruppen Winkler, Ludig, 
Schmidt and Malmeister to construct a defensive front along the 
line west of Sepsiszentgoergy-lllyefalya-Zagon-Zabola (see Figure 
211 ). 
The Rumanian forces advancing on llyefalya and Koekes 
crossed over the border but were thrown back. Rumanian 
reconnaissance forces were located on the east edge of the Geister 
Forest north of Sepsiszentgyoergy. Countermeasures were taken 
against Rumanian regimental attacks over the border at Barot that 
reached Bibarczfalva (see Figure 211 ). 
8th Army. The Soviets advanced on the evening of September 
1, 1944 into the towns of Ozsdola, Berevszk and Lemheny in the 
sector of the LVll Panzer Corps, but the Soviets were repulsed by 
counterattacks of Kampfgruppe Abraham (see Figure 211 ). The 
Soviets continued to attempt the Ojtoz pass at Ozsdola and 
Lemheny. Both of these Soviet attempts were frustrated. The 
Soviets in the area north of Lemheny were attacked in the flank by 
units of the 4th Moutain Division. Both sides of the Gyimes pass 
were repeatedly attacked by the Soviets and Gruppe Fessner 
repulsed these repeated attacks in hard fought battles (see Figure 
211 ). Hungarian assault guns inflicted heavy losses on the Soviets 
during the evening along the pass road. The Soviets advancing on 
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the left wing of the 46th Infantry Division to the west reached the 
Hungarian border 1 O km south of Bicaz. 
Several Soviet attacks were launched against the 3rd Moutain 
Division in the XVII Army Corps sector. The Soviet attacks were 
primarily directed at the bridgehead of Bistricioara and isolated 
attacks were made north of the Kimpolung-Suceava road (see Figure 
212). 
Rumanian troops which had occupied towns on the Rumanian-
Hungarian border west of the line Neumarkt-Szasz. Regen were 
mopped up by alert units so that there were no longer Rumanian 
troops located on Hungarian territory.194 
SEPTEMBER 3, 1944 
6th Army. The Rumanian forces that had advanced through 
Barot to the east on September 2nd were pushed back in a 
westward direction to the border by Kampfgruppe Hoffmann. Barot 
was retaken and the Germans advanced west to the Hungarian-
Rumanian border (see Figure 213). Soviet reconnaissance probes in 
the area northwest of Sepsikoeroespatak and west of Malnasfuerdo 
were repulsed. There were still no reports concerning Gruppe 
Mieth, Kampfgruppe Stahel and the 5th Flak Division. 
8th Army. The Soviet main effort remained directed against 
the Ojtoz pass. The Soviets continued their attempt through an 
enveloping attack to take the Ojtoz pass without success (see 
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Figure 213). The Soviets had entered Gelence and Ozsdola last 
evening but were repulsed once again. Strong Soviet assaults 
against Kezdimartanos and Berecszk were still in progress during 
the evening. The Soviets infilitrated German lines southeast of 
Bistricioasa and northwest of Brosteni. A Soviet battalion 
strength attack was repulsed east of Stulpicani. The disarmament 
of the 1st Slovakian Division proceeded. Earlier 126 officers and 
3,525 troops had been disarmed.195 
Army Group South Ukraine 
The Army Group was suffering from a severe shortage of 
armored vehicles and reported that it had only 14 assault guns 
available. The 6th Army had 14 assault guns and 1 O assault 
howitzers and the 8th Army had 54 assault guns available for 
action.196 
SEPTEMBER 4, 1944 
Gruppe Siebenbuergen. The Soviets attacked during the 
evening after strong artillery preparation Mezoe Band (15 km west 
to northwest of Neumarkt) 
6th Army. Kampfgruppe Gerecke was withdrawn out of the 
area of Sita Buzaului (35 km east of Kronstadt) to the Hungarian 
border bunker line north of lntorsura Buzaului. The German attack 
against the Soviets in the Geisterwald pushed the Soviets out of 
Szaraz Ajta. Moreover, Rakos and Koepecz were captured. The fate 
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of Gruppe Mieth, Kampfgruppe Stahel and the 5th Flak Division 
remained unknown.197 A reconnaissance probe by a Soviet penal 
company southwest of Sepsiszentgyoergy was repulsed. 
Kampfgruppe Thams attacking from the area of Barot to the west, 
southwest and southeast pushed back the Rumanian troops (see 
Figure 213). The German defense line stood on the south edge of 
Vargyas. 
8th Army. The Soviets attacked the south wing of the L VII 
Panzer Corps the entire day. Oszdola was lost again to the Soviets 
only to be recaptured. The Soviets pushed their way into Berecszk 
but were pushed out again to the south edge of the town and the 
road from the Berecszk to the Ojtoz pass was cleared of Soviet 
troops. The town of Esztelnek was cleared of Soviets and the 
encircled German Kampfgruppe in Kurtapatak was relieved. Further 
north a Soviet penetration in the area of Feltiz 1 km east of the 
Kezdiszentlelek-Ujfalu road was repulsed. Strong Soviet pressure 
was exerted against Lemheny and the road east of the town during 
the afternoon. Several weak Soviet thrusts were repulsed in the 
sector of the 4th Moutain Division. 
The 2nd Hungarian Division launched local attacks to improve 
its position. Gruppe Fessner ran into a strong Soviet attack west 
of Felsoelok. The northern regimental group of the 46th Infantry 
Division in the Bicazul vally had its defensive position at Tikos 
Floaria enveloped by Soviet attacks of 1-2 regiments from the 
north and south. The Soviets advanced to the hills east of Domok (6 
km south-southwest of Almasmezoe) and the hills north of 
Almasmezoe despite German counterattacks. Units of the XVII 
Army Corps were employed to secure the Almasmezoe-
Gyergyotoelgyes road and other units staged a successful 
counterattack southeast of Stulpicani. 
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The Volksdeutschen from the disarmed 1st Slovakian Division 
who were still willing to fight for the German Wehrmacht were 
organized into a battalion under the 8th Army and transferred to 
the Gruppe Siebenbuergen .198 The remainder of the disarmed 
Slovakian troops were retained for the next two weeks for the 
construction of defensive positions in this region and roads.199 
Once this assignment was completed they were to be delivered to 
the rear. 
The situation of Army Group South Ukraine had become 
desperate and Colonel General Friessner issued a statement to the. 
soldiers of Army Group South Ukraine on September 4, 1944: 
... The danger that the loss of Rumania has brought to the 
Army Group can only be averted when everyone does his 
duty to the utmost. Whoever violates this command 
must and will be weeded out from our ranks! Everyone 
must know that fate has assigned us a hard trial which 
can only be endured by firm determination. This fate 
can only be mastered in Discipline, confidence and 
extreme readiness for action. It must be mastered for 
the sake of our people, our wives and children! It will 
be mastered when no one forgets this and everyone acts 
accordingly. 
Let the Fuehrer's word be an admonition to us all: "God 
has in all times only blessed those that were ready to 
defend themselves. "200 
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SEPTEMBER 5, 1944 
Army Group South Ukraine 
The 2nd Hungarian Army and Gruppe Siebenbuergen gained 
ground in an attack over the Hungarian/Rumanian border. 
Meanwhile, the Soviets attacked the 8th Army at several positions 
and achieved several deep penetrations. 
2nd Hungarian Army. The army began its attack at 0445 hrs 
to the south with the 7th Hungarian Reserve Division, 9th Hungarian 
Reserve Division and the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division reinforced 
with Assault Gun Battalion 1179 (see Figure 214).201 The attack 
was centered between Szasz Fenes and Szt. Gothard. The 
Rumanians were surprised by the attack. The assault group 
encountered only notable Rumanian resistance on both sides of the 
Klausenberg-Thorenburg road. The attacking spearhead of the 7th 
Hungarian Reserve Division reached Burul-Thorenburg; the 9th 
Hungarian Reserve Division reached the region north of Campia 
Turzu; and the 2nd Hungarian Reserve Division arrived at Ludus (see 
Figure 214). The spearheads of the assault group had by 1800 hrs 
reached the line of the river fork 9 km west of Cornesti-Cornesti-
south of Thorenburg-Viiscara-Ludus and established a bridgehead 
at Thorenburg and Cornesti where the light bridges were taken 
intact.202 The objectives of all assault groups were achieved. The 
Commander of the 20th Rumanian Infantry Division was taken 
prisoner and 6 batteries and two artillery tractors with equipment 
were captured on the route of Kolosz-Viisoara.203 
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Gruppe Siebenbuergen. Units of Gruppe Siebenbuergen joined 
the attack of the 2nd Hungarian Army out of the area southwest of 
Neumarkt (see Figure 214). The attack in the western direction 
made good progress without encountering significant Rumanian 
resistance and reached Lechinta and Ogra in the Mures vally. 
Reconnaissance units were deployed from Lechita toward Ludus to 
establish contact with the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division. The 
attack in the southern direction ran into stiff resistance and only 
reached the hill terrain north of Gerghid and the line 2 km 
northwest and 1 km north of Supiac. The Rumanians responded with 
a regimental counterattack in the afternoon. A Hungarian tank 
platoon was put into action on the rail line from Ogra to the west. 
Units of the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer" took the hill 
terrain northeast of Capalna in an attack against tenacious Soviet 
resistance. 
6th Army. German reconnaissance had determined on the 
right wing of Gruppe Gradel that the Soviets had occupied Bodogaja 
and Sakueni. The border town of Jimbor was captured by German 
forces and a Soviet force in the woods southwest of Vargyas was 
destroyed. Gruppe Thams along the road southwest of Barot took 
the towns of Koepecz and Miklosvar in an attack and continued 
advancing south during the evening. Weak Soviet infantry and 
cavalry forces probed lntorsura Buzaului in the sector of Gruppe 
General Scotti and pushed the German defense line back to the hills 
north of the town (see Figure 215). German reconnaissance forces 
east of lntorsura Buzaului advanced to the Hungarian-Rumanian 
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border without meeting any Soviet or Rumanian units (see Figure 
215). 
8th Army. The Soviets conducted repeated attacks against 
the LVll Panzer Corps. Soviet frontal attacks with infantry and 
armor against the Ojtoz pass position which began in the early 
afternoon lasted into the evening hours (see Figure 215). Gruppe 
Breith and the 2nd Hungarian Replacement Division repulsed several 
Soviet company and battalion strength attacks with the main effort 
located east of Szt. Marton and southwest of Felsoe. The situation 
at the Gyimes pass where there was no contact remained uncertain. 
The Soviets advanced on the sector of the 46th Infantry Division 
through Horomkut to the west up to 5 km east of 
Gyergyoeszentmiklos (see Figure 215). German countermeasures 
were taken and a defensive line was built on the east edge of town 
(see Figure 215). Units of the 46th Infantry Division and the 
Brandenburg battalion were employed in a counterthrust northeast 
of Bekas at 1200 hrs. 
The Soviets conducted numerous company and battalion 
strength attacks against the XVII Army Corps with the main effort 
northeast of Brosteni and south of Gurahomorului (see Figure 215). 
The Soviets achieved a deep penetration into the German 
strongpoint line northeast of Brosteni in battalion to regimental 
strength and by evening had advanced into the Bistrita valley 
southwest of Brosteni (see Figure 215). Ttie Soviets advanced 
further north into the region northwest of Riana Micului in 
battalion strength into the German strongpoint line. 
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Army Group South Ukraine 
Army Group South Ukraine reported that it had the following 
numbers of armored vehicles available: 
6th Army: 20 tanks, 30 assault guns and 14 antitank 
assault guns, type 38t. 
8th Army: 49 assault guns and 21 antitank assault 
guns, type 38t.204 
CONCLUSION 
The encircled corps and divisions of the 6th Army were 
designated as lost on September 5, 1944. There was no further 
hope that the encircled units would breakout. The war diary of 
Army Group South Ukraine noted that it was "the greatest 
catastrophe that had befallen the Army Group. "205 Army Group 
South Ukraine reported that the 6th Army had lost 5 Army Corps 
Headquarters: IV, VII, XXX, XXXXIV and Lii Army Corps in addition to 
18 divisions: 9th, 15th, 62nd, 79th, 106th, 161st, 257th, 258th, 
282nd, 294th, 302nd, 306th, 320th, 335th, 370th, 376th, 384th 
Infantry Divisions and the 153rd Field Training Division (see Table 
Llll).206 Moreover, there were now only remnants that remained of 
the 10th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 13th Panzer Division.207 
The 76th Infantry Division was also nearly destroyed in addition to 
the divisions listed above in the war diary of Army Group South 
Ukraine.2oa The following units were rebuilt immediately after the 
debacle in Rumania: 15th Infantry Division, 13th Panzer Division, 
10th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 153rd Field Training 
Division.209 
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The Soviet High Command estimated the German losses in a 
report on September 13, 1944. German losses were listed at 
256,000 with 150,000 killed and 106,000 taken prisoner.21 o 
German material losses were listed at 330 aircraft, 830 tanks, 
3500 artillery guns and 35,000 motor vehicles.211 There was not 
one formation of the German 6th Army that was able to breakout of 
the Soviet encirclement.212 
It was clear to all the leading commanders that 4n effective 
defense by the German 6th Army was only possible based on the 
withdrawal of Army Group South Ukraine to a more defensible and 
shorter line. Marshal Antonescu in his August 5, 1944 meeting 
with Hitler proposed that Moldavia be evacuated and that the Armv. 
Group be withdrawn to the Galatz-Focsani-Carpathian Moutain 
line.213 Colonel General Friessner agreed with the position of 
Marshal Antonescu and proposed to Hitler that the Front be 
withdrawn to the Galatz-Focsani-Carpathian Moutain line. Hitler, 
however, insisted that he must have positive proof of the Soviet's 
intention to attack before he would give his approval for a 
withdrawa1.214 
However, Guderian in his memoirs leaves the issue of blame 
for the loss of the German 6th Army on Colonel General Friessner. 
Guderian states in Panzer Leader the following: 
Although Hitler immediately authorized the withdrawal 
of the Army Group's front the troops attempted to hold 
out in places and to carry out a fighting retreat step by 
step. In order to avoid a complete collapse and 
consequent annihilation an immediate withdrawal and 
rapid seizure of the bridges over the Danube were 
essential. As this was not done the Rumanians reached 
that river before the Germans, closed the crossing 
places, and thus left their former allies at the mercy of 
the Russians. Sixteen German Divisions were 
completely destroyed, an irreplaceable loss in View of 
our already very difficult situation. These German 
soldiers fought valiantly to the bitter end; their 
military honor was unsullied. They were in no way 
responsible for their sad fate. The misfortune could 
only have been avoided if the decision to withdraw to 
the line Galatz-Focsani-the Carpathian Moutains had 
been implemented before the Russians launched their 
attack; the whole Russian plan would thus have been 
forstalled and we should have have been in possession 
of a line so shortened that we could have held it even 
without the assistance of the Rumanians.215 
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Colonel General Friessner sets the record straight with a 
direct response to the assertions in Guderian's memoirs. Friessner 
refutes the claims of Guderian in Verratene Schlachten: 
Army Group South Ukraine warned OKH repeatedly in 
written and verbal reports about the need for a timely 
withdrawal of the front. 
But only on August 22nd was the permission granted 
after the Russian offensive had already been in progress 
3 days. Furthermore, the troops east of the Pruth river 
had to face the complete collapse of the front as result 
of the loss of the Rumanians leaving 20 to 30 km wide 
holes in the front that caused the troops to have to 
fight their way back against Russian tanks which had 
flowed through the Rumanian holes in the front.216 
The Soviet History Of The Great Patriotic War supports the 
view of Colonel General Friessner: 
General Friessner only received the order to withdraw 
by the morning of August 22nd ... However, the 6th Army 
could begin its retreat only with the onset of darkness, 
13-14 hours after the order was received.211 
General Fretter-Pico, Commander of the German 6th Army 
supports the claims of Colonel General Friessner: 
The early demand of the Army Group for freedom of 
action for a timely withdrawal of the projecting arc of 
the standing 6th Army far to the east beginning on the 
Pruth, then the Sereth sector and Carpathians was 
denied. Thereby the Army Group by the middle of August 
had all its reserves to conduct a defensive battle 
removed ... The High Command retained for itself the 
order to withdraw with the consequence that it came 
too late like so often in the last world war.218 
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Therefore, Hitler alone bears the final responsibility for the 
failure to withdraw in time to save the German 6th Army. This 
failure was the result of his preoccupation with the "standing fast" 
doctrine and fighting for every foot of ground. 
TABLE XXXXVll 
OPERATIONAL DENSITY OF SOVIET FORCES 






Frontage (Km) Attack Sector (Km) 
2nd Ukrainian Front: 
51 Divisions: 
25 Divisions in Main 
Attack sector: 
3rd Ukrainian Front: 
37 Divisions: 













27 per Km 







240 per Km 
14-17 tanks/30-
55 Self-propelled 
guns per Km 
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy & Paul Martell, Great Battles on the 
Eastern Front: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945 (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1982), p. 189. 
Major Scott R. McMichael, "The Battle Of Jassy-
Kishinev" Military Review Vol. 64 July 1985, p. 57. 
TABLE XXXXVI II 
SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE OPPOSITE 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
Soviet Formations 
2nd Ukrainian Front: 
4th Guards Army 
5th Air Army 
6th Tank Army 
7th Guards Army 
18th Tank Corps 
27th Combined Arms Army 
40th Combined Arms Army 
52nd Combined Arms Army 
53rd Combined Arms Army 
Gorshkov Cavalry-Mechanized Group 
3rd Ukrainian Front: 
4th Guards Mechanized Corps 
5th Shock Army 
7th Mechanized Corps 
17th Air Army 
37th Combined Arms Army 
46th Combined Arms Army 
57th Combined Arms Army 
Black Sea Fleet 
Danube River Flotilla 
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Source: Major Scott A. McMichael, "The Battle Of Jassy-Kishinev" 
Military Review Vol. 64 July 1985, p. 57. 
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TABLE XXXXIX 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
ORDER OF BATILE 
AUGUST 15, 1944 
Formations 
Army Group South Ukraine: 
Army Group Reserves: 
10th Panzer Grenadier Division: 
153rd Field Training Division: 
Artillery Brigade 959 
Army Group Colonel General Dumitrescu: 
Army Group Reserves: 
1st Rumanian Cavalry Division 
9th Rumanian Infantry Division 
304th Infantry Division: 
3rd Rumanian Army: 
Ill Rumanian Corps: 
2nd Rumanian Infantry Division 
15th Rumanian Infantry Division 
110th Rumanian Infantry Brigade 
XXIX Army Corps: 
4th Rumanian Moutain Division 
9th Infantry Division: 
21st Rumanian Infantry Division 
Assault Gun Brigade 278 
6th Army: 
Reserves: 
13th Panzer Division: 
XXX Army Corps: 
15th Infantry Division: 
257th Infantry Division: 
Commanders 
Col. General Friessner 
Lt. General Schmidt 
Lt. General Bayer 
Col. Gen. Dumitrescu 
Lt. General Sieler 
Col. Gen. Dumitrescu 
Gen. d. Pz.Tr. 
Brandenberger 
Maj. Gen. Gebb 
General d. Artillerie 
Fretter-Pico 
Lt. General Troeger 
Lt. General Postel 
Major General Sperl 
Maj. Gen. Bluemke 
787 
TABLE XXXXIX 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
ORDER OF BATTLE 
AUGUST 15, 1944 
(continued) 
Formations 
302nd Infantry Division: 
306th Infantry Division: 
Assault Gun Brigade 239 
Lii Army Corps: 
161 st Infantry Division 
294th Infantry Division: 
320th Infantry Division: 
384th Infantry Division: 
Assault Gun Brigade 243 
XXXXIV Army Corps: 
62nd Infantry Division 
258th Infantry Division: 
282nd Infantry Division: 
335th Infantry Division: 
Assault Gun Brigade 911 
VI I Army Corps: 
14th Rumanian Infantry Division 
106th Infantry Division: 
370th Infantry Division: 
Assault Gun Brigade 236 
Commanders 
Maj. Gen. von Bogen 
Lt. Gen. Koehler 
General d. lnfanterie 
Buschenhagen 
Lt. Gen. Drekmann 
Maj. Gen. von 
Eichstedt 
Colonel Schell 
Lt. Gen. de Salengre-
Drabbe 
Lt. Gen Mueller 
Maj. Gen. Tronnier 
Lt. Gen. Bleyer 
Maj. Gen. Franking 
Colonel Dr. Brechtel 
Gen. d. Artillerie Hell 
Maj. Gen. v. Rakowski 
Maj. Gen. v. Huelsen 
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TABLE XXXXIX 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
ORDER OF BATILE 
AUGUST 15, 1944 
(continued) 
Formation~ 
Army Group General Woehler: 
Army Group And 8th Army Reserves: 
8th Rumanian Infantry Division 
18th Rumanian Moutain Division 
20th Panzer Division: 
Panzer Division "GrossRumaenien": 
Assault Gun Brigade 905 
8th Army: 
IV Army Corps (Gruppe Mieth): 
11th Rumanian Infantry Division 
79th Infantry Division: 
376th Infantry Division: 
IV Rumanian Army Corps: 
3rd Rumanian Infantry Division 
5th Rumanian Cavalry Division 
7th Rumanian Infantry Division 
102nd Rumanian Moutain Brigade 
4th Rumanian Army: 
VI Rumanian Army Corps: 
5th Rumanian Infantry Division 
76th Infantry Division: 
101st Rumanian Moutain Brigade 
Assault Gun Brigade 325 
Commanders 
Gen. d Inf. Woehler 
Lt. Gen. v. Kessel 
Rum. Gen. Corne 
Gen. d. Inf. Woehler 
Gen. d. Inf. Mieth 
Lt. Gen. Weinknecht 
Maj. Gen. Schwarz 
Gen. d. Kav. Racovitza 
Lt. Gen. Abraham 
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TABLE XXXXIX 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
ORDER OF BATILE 
AUGUST 15, 1944 
(continued) 
Formation~ 
LVll Panzer Corps: 
1st Rumanian Infantry Division 
13th Rumanian Infantry Division 
46th Infantry Division: 
V Rumanian Army Corps: 
1st Rumanian Guards Infantry Division 
4th Rumanian Infantry Division 
I Rumanian Army Corps: 
6th Rumanian Infantry Division 
20th Rumanian Infantry Division 
VII Rumanian Army Corps: 
103rd Rumanian Moutain Brigade 
104th Rumanian Moutain Brigade 
XVII Army Corps: 
3rd Moutain Division: 
8th Jaeger Division: 
Rumanian Borderguard Units 
Command~rs 
Gen. d. Pz Tr. Kirchner 
Colonel Ewringmann 
Gen. d. Geb Tr. 
Kreysing 
Maj. Gen. Klatt 
Lt. Gen. Volckamer v. 
Kirchensittenbach 
TABLE XXXXIX 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
ORDER OF BATTLE 




Luftflotten 4: Lt. Gen. Deichmann 
15th Flak Division with 4 Flak Regiments 
I Fliegerkorps: 
7 Reconnaissance squadrons 
1 Bomb group 
1 Ground Attack group 
1 Antitank Squadron 
2 Night Ground Attack Squadrons 
3 Fighter groups 
Total Aircraft: 318 Aircraft 
Aircraft combat ready 
on August 20, 1944: 
60 Reconnaissance Aircraft 
43 Bomber Aircraft 
57 Ground Attack Aircraft 
41 Fighter Aircraft 
31 Night Fighter Aircraft 
Total Combat Ready Aircraft: 232 Aircraft 
Source: Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 10, pp. 506-507; Alex Buchner, 
Ostfront (Friedburg: Podzun-Pallas Verlag GMBH, 1988), 
pp. 332-334; Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine, 
Zustand der Divisionen der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine Stand 
vom: 13.8.1944 NAMP T-311 Roll 266; Generaloberst Hans 
Friessner, Verratene Schlachten (Hamburg: Holsten-
Verlag, 1956), pp. 255-258. 
TABLE L 
SOVIET AND GERMAN COMPARISON 
OF FORCES 
Axis Forces 
25 German Divisions 
22 Rumanian Divisions 
5 Rumanian Brigades 
Combat Personnel: 
643,000 
Artillery Tubes & Guns: 
7,600 


















Source: Major Scott R. McMichael, "The Battle OF Jassy-Kishinev" 
Military Review Vol. 64 July 1985, p. 57. 
TABLE LI 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
DIVISIONAL FRONTAGE, 
JULY 23, 1944 
Formations Frontage in Kilometers 
Rumanian 3rd Army: 
110th Rumanian Infantry Brigade: 
2nd Rumanian Infantry Division: 
15th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
304th Infantry Division: 
21st Rumanian Infantry Division: 
4th Rumanian Moutain Division: 
Total Rumanian 3rd Army Frontage: 
6th Army: 
306th Infantry Division: 
15th Infantry Division: 
257th Infantry Division: 
302nd Infantry Division: 
384th Infantry Division: 
Corps Detachment A: 
320th Infantry Division: 
294th Infantry Division: 
4th Moutain Division: 
335th Infantry Division: 
282nd Infantry Division: 
258th Infantry Division: 
Corps Detachment F: 
14th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
106th Infantry Division: 
370th Infantry Division: 



























ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
DIVISIONAL FRONTAGE, 




376th Infantry Division: 
11th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
79th Infantry Division: 
3rd Rumanian Infantry Division: 
7th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
76th Infantry Division: 
5th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
1st Rumanian Infantry Division: 
46th Infantry Division: 
4th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
1st Rumanian Guards Division: 
6th Rumanian Cavalry Division: 
20th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
104th Rumanian Moutain Brigade: 
103rd Rumanian Moutain Brigade: 
3rd Moutain Division: 
8th Jaeger Division: 
Total 8th Army Frontage: 
Total Main Battle Line Frontage: 
Average Divisional 
Main Battle Line Frontage: 





















Source: Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine, 
Zusammenstellung der Frontkilometer 23.7.44 NAMP 
T-311 Roll 266. 
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TABLE Lii 
RUMANIAN DIVISION FRONTAGE 
IN ARMY GROUP DUMITRESCU 
AND ARMY GROUP WOEHLER 
ON JULY 23, 1944 
Formations Fronmge in Kilometers 
Army Group Dumitrescu: 
2nd Rumanian Infantry Division: 
4th Rumanian Moutain Division: 
14th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
15th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
21st Rumanian Infantry Division: 
110th Rumanian Infantry Brigade: 
Total Rumanian Frontage: 
Army Group Woehler: 
1st Rumanian Infantry Division: 
1st Rumanian Guards Division: 
3rd Rumanian Infantry Division: 
4th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
5th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
6th Rumanian Cavalry Division: 
7th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
11th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
20th Rumanian Infantry Division: 
103rd Rumanian Moutain Brigade: 
104th Rumanian Moutain Brigade: 
























RUMANIAN DIVISION FRONTAGE 
IN ARMY GROUP DUMITRESCU 
AND ARMY GROUP WOEHLER 
ON JULY 23, 1944 
(continued) 
FormatiQns 
Total Army Group Frontage: 
Total Rumanian Frontage: 
Rumanian Percent of Total Frontage: 
Rumanian Percent of Frontage in 
Army Group Dumitrescu: 
Rumanian Percent of Frontage in 
Army Group Woehler: 






Source: Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Suedukraine, 
Zusammenstellung der Frontkilometer 23.7.44 NAMP 




THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
Formations Reorganized Or Commanders 
DestrQ~eg Disbanded Units Killed Or Cagtured 
9th Infantry Division Reorganized Maj. Gen. Gebb 
Prisoner 
153rd Field Training Reorganized Lt. Gen. Bayer 
Division Prisoner 
IV Army Corps Gen. d. Inf. Mieth 
(Gruppe Mieth) Killed 
79th Infantry Divison Reorganized Lt. Gen. Weinknecht 
Prisoner 
376th Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. Schwarz 
Divison Prisoner 
VI I Army Corps Gen. d. Art. Hell 
Killed 
106th Infantry Reorganized 
Division 
370th Infantry Disbanded Lt. Gen. v. Huelson 
Division Prisoner 
XXX Army Corps Lt. Gen. Postel 
Prisoner 
15th Infantry Reorganized 
Division 
257th Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Bluemke 
Division Killed 
302nd Infantry Disbanded Maj. Gen. von Bogen 
Division Prisoner 
306th Infantry Disbanded 
Division 
XXXXIV Army Corps Lt. Gen. Mueller 
Missing In Action 
. 62nd Infantry Reorganized Maj. Gen. Tronnier 
Division Prisoner 












LI I Army Corps 























Killed Or CaQtured 
Maj. Gen. Franking 
Prisoner 
Gen. d. Inf. 
Buschenhagen 
Prisoner 
Maj. Gen. von 
Eichstedt Killed 
Lt. Gen. de Salengre-
Drabbe Killed 




Commandant Maj. Gen. 
Stingl Prisoner 
Commander Lt. Gen. 
Burckhardt Missing in 
Action 
Commandant Maj. Gen. 
Boie Prisoner 
Commandant Maj. Gen. 
von Dewitz Prisoner 
Commandant Maj. Gen. 
Seelig Missing in 
Action 
TABLE Liii 
THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
(continued) 
Formations Reorganized Or 
Destroyed Disbanded Units 
Total Corps Destroyed: 5 
Total Divisions Destroyed: 18 
Total Generals Killed, 
Captured or Missing: 
Commanders 
Killed Or Cgntured 
22 
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Source: Hauptmann Rabe, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 
Heeresgruppe Suedukraine 20.8. - 5.9.1944 Band 4 Teil 1, 
NAMP T-311 Roll 158, pp. 150-151; Generaloberst Hans 
Friessner, Verratene Schtachten (Hamburg: Holsten-
Verlag, 1956), pp. 255-258; Organisation der Wehrmacht, 
OKW/Org. Abt. und Heerespersonalabt., Zusammenstellung 
der in diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten. 
verstorbenen. vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen 
Generate stand 17.9.1944. Flensburg 5 June 1945 NAMP T-
77 Roll 785; Generalstab des Heeres, 
Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber aufgeloeste 
Division 1944 NAMP T-78 Roll 410. 
Situation from 15 June to 20 August 1944 
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Figure 185. The Soviet And Axis Deployment In Rumania 
From June 15th To August 20, 1944. Source: Major 
Scott R. McMichael, "The Battle Of Jassy-Kishinev" 
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Figure 186. Possible Soviet Operational Objectives On 
August 15, 1944. Source: Fremde Heer Ost, 
Vermutliche Sowj. russ. Operationsabsichten Stand: 
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Figure 189. The German Defensive Lines In Rumania, 
August 10, 1944. Source: A.O.K. 6, Pendelkarte la. 
A.0.K. 6/A.Pi.Fue. Stand v. 10.8.44 National Archives 
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Figure 192. Army Group South Ukraine, August 23-25, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 193. Army Group South Ukraine, August 26, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 194. The Surrounded 6th Army, August 26, 1944. 
Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 
20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm Publication 
T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 195. The Soviet Advance South Of Focsani And 
The Rumanian Armored Attack On Ploesti, August 26, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 196. The Soviet Advance On The Ojtoz Pass And 
Toward The Carpathians, August 26, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-
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Figure 197. The encircled Elements Of The German 6th 
Army, August 27, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 198. The Soviet Capture Of Focsani And The 
Drive South, August 27, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht 
um Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 



























































































































































































































































































































Rumanian Armored Reinforcements, 
Source: National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 202. Soviet Attacks Against The German 8th 
Army, August 28, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 203. The Encircled Elements Of The German 6th 
Army, August 29, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
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Figure 204. Army Group South Ukraine, August 29, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 205. The 5th Flak Division And Kampfgruppe 
Stahel In The Area Of Ploesti, August 30, 1944. Source: 
OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-
29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 
Roll 136. 
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Figure 206. Army Group South Ukraine, August 30, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
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Figure 207. Army Group South Ukraine, August 31, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
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Division, August 31, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
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Figure 209. Gruppe Mieth, August 31, 1944. Source: 
A.O.K. 6, Lagekarte 31.8.44 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-312 Roll 1470. 
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Figure 211. Army Group South Ukraine, September 2, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78 Roll 136. 
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Figure 212. Soviet Attacks Against The German 8th 
Army, September 2, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
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Figure 213. Army Group South Ukraine, September 4, 
1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um Rumaenien u. den 
Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T -78 Roll 136. 
Figure 214. The Counterattack Of The 2nd Hungarian 
Army, September 5, 1944. Source: OKH, Schlacht um 
Rumaenien u. den Beskiden v. 20.8.-29.9.44 National 
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CHAPTER XII 
THE SOVIET FRONT IN PERSPECTIVE: 
COMPARISON OF LOSSES BETWEEN 
EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS 
The significance of the collapse of the German Army in the 
East in the Summer of 1944 can be determined by an analysis of 
German losses in the East compared to German losses in the West. 
A review of German losses will reveal that the Eastern Front was 
the most decisive front during the Summer of 1944. German losses 
in the East were far greater than in the West and the shipments of 
armored and non-armored vehicles to the East was greater than to 
the West. The following categories will be examined to reveal the 
actual losses and supplies to the Eastern and Western fronts during 
the Summer of 1944: (1) troop losses; (2) armored vehicle losses; 
(3) armored vehicle deliveries; (4) non-armored vehicle losses; (5) 
non-armored vehicle deliveries; (6) aircraft losses; (7) German 
General losses; and (8) divisional losses. 
The loss of troops is perhaps the strongest indicator of 
combat activity in a war zone. The total losses of German troops 
killed, wounded or missing for the period June-August 1944 
amounted to 1,265,397 (see Table LIV). The Eastern Front 
842 
accounted for 908,806 and the Anglo-American Fronts for 356,591 
troop losses (see Table LIV). Therefore, the Eastern Front 
accounted for 72% and the Anglo-American Fronts for 28% of the 
total German troop losses during the summer of 1944 (see Table 
LIV). The fact remained that most of the German troop losses were 
occurring on the Eastern Front even after the allied forces had 
landed in France. 
The analysis of troop losses beyond the Summer of 1944 
continues to demonstrate the predominance of the Eastern Front in 
German troop losses. The period of June-November 1944 shows a 
large increase in troop losses for the Anglo-American fronts during 
the period September thru November. The German troop losses on 
the Anglo-American fronts increased from 356,591 in August to 
537,000 by November 1944 (see Table LV). Nevertheless, German 
troop losses for the June-November 1944 period remain 
predominately on the Eastern Front which accounted for 63% and 
the Anglo-American Fronts for 37% of all German troop losses (see 
Table LV). 
German armored vehicle losses during the Summer of 1944 
occurred mostly on the Eastern Front. The Anglo-American forces 
with the invasion of France on June 6, 1944 prior to the Soviet 
offensive against Army Group Center on June 22, 1944 inflicted 
greater armored vehicle losses on Germany in June of 1944 than the 
Soviet Union accounting for 83% of all German armored vehicle 
losses during the month of June (see Table LVI). However, once the 
Summer Soviet offensive had begun the armored losses shifted 
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decisively to the Eastern Front. German armored losses in both 
July and August on the Eastern Front accounted for 80°/o of all 
German armored losses for both months (see Tables LVll & LVlll). 
The overall German armored losses for the entire Summer of 1944 
on the Eastern Front were 680/o compared to 32% for the Anglo-
American Fronts (see Table LIX). 
The analysis of German armor vehicle deliveries to the 
various theaters of operations reveals that the preponderance of 
German armor vehicles were shipped to the Eastern Front during the 
Summer of 1944. The Eastern Front received 75010 and the Anglo-
American Fronts received only 25% of all armor shipments (see 
table LX). Thus, the Eastern Front received greater numbers of 
armored reinforcements during the Summer of 1944. 
German non-armored vehicle losses were greater on the 
Anglo-American Fronts after D-Day and prior to the start of the 
Soviet Summer offensive with the result that 810/o of all non-
armored vehicle losses in June 1944 occurred on the Anglo-
American Fronts (see Table LXI). However, in July 1944 the Eastern 
Front accounted for 91 % of all German non-armored vehicle losses 
(see Table LXll). A shift occurs again in August 1944 with the 
Anglo-American Fronts accounting for 59% of German non-armored 
vehicle losses (see Table LXlll). Nevertheless, by the end of August 
1944 the Eastern Front still accounted for more non-armored 
vehicle losses than the Anglo-American Fronts even though losses 
on the Anglo-American Fronts in June and August had been greater 
than the Eastern Front. The German non-armored vehicle losses for 
844 
the three month period reveal that 52% of all German non-armored 
vehicle losses occurred on the Eastern Front (see Table LXIV). 
The deliveries of non-armored vehicles to the German 
theaters of operations reveals that the Eastern Front received 
priority in the shipments of non-armored vehicles during the 
Summer of 1944. The Eastern Front received 53010 of all German 
non-armored vehicles delivered to the operational theaters (see 
Table LXV). 
Luftwaffe aircraft losses was the only area where losses on 
the Anglo-American Fronts completely surpassed all losses in the 
air on the Eastern Front. The Anglo-American air war over Germany 
and the rest of Western and Southern Europe inflicted tremendous 
losses on the German Luftwaffe. The Anglo-American Fronts 
accounted for 75% of all Luftwaffe losses and the Eastern Front 
only accounted for 25010 of German aircraft losses (see Table LXVI). 
Therefore, the Anglo-American "Second Front" was most successful 
in the air against the German Luftwaffe. 
The Summer of 1944 marked a turning point in the war for 
Germany which can be measured by the fact that Germany lost more 
generals during the Summer of 1944 than in the preceeding 12 
months of the war.1 The losses of generals during the Summer of 
1944 exceeded even the previous disaster periods of the Wehrmacht 
at Stalingrad and in Tunisia.2 The Anglo-American Fronts 
accounted for the loss of 26 German generals (see Table LXVll) 
compared to the Eastern Front where 64 German generals were lost 
(see Table LXVlll). Therefore, the Eastern Front was responsible 
for 71°10 of all German general losses compared to 2go1o for the 
Anglo-American Fronts during the Summer of 1944. 
845 
The Summer of 1944 also marked a turning point in the war 
because of the vast number of precious German divisions that were 
destroyed on both the Eastern Front and the Anglo-American Fronts 
during the Summer. German divisional losses on the Anglo-
American Fronts amounted to 32 divisions (see Table LXIX). The 
Eastern Front accounted for 52 destroyed German divisions or 62% 
of all German divisional losses for the Summer of 1944 (see Table 
LXX). 
The Eastern Front based upon the analysis of troop losses, 
armored vehicle losses, armored vehicle deliveries, non-armored 
vehicle losses, non-armored vehicle deliveries, German generals 
lost and the number of German divisions destroyed was the most 
decisive front and made the greatest contribution to the defeat of 
Nazi Germany during the Summer of 1944. The Anglo-American 
Fronts made significant contributions during this period but were 
in fact not the most decisive fronts causing the greatest 
destruction to the German Wehrmacht. The Anglo-American 
contribution in the air war against Germany was the most decisive 
operation of the Western powers inflicting severe damage on the 
infrastructure of Germany and more losses on the Luftwaffe than 
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's successful ground operations 
expelling the Germans from most of the Soviet Union and Rumania 
and the resulting destruction of German Armies were the most 
846 
significant contributions toward the defeat of Nazi Germany during 
the Summer of 1944. 
TABLE LIV 
COMPARISON OF TROOP LOSSES BETWEEN 
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS 
FROM JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
Dead June JUl:i August 
Eastern Front 10,853 31 ,351 30,880 
Western Front 4,973 10,839 7,205 
Italian Front 3,551 3,238 1,423 
Total Dead 191377 45A28 391508 
Wounded June JUl:i Aygust 
Eastern Front 42,700 135,469 153,567 
Western Front 14,631 38,824 13,605 
Italian Front 10,281 12,877 5,527 
Total WQunded 671612 1871170 1721699 
Missing June July August 
Eastern Front 73,931 238,474 191,581 
Western Front 15,848 55, 135 127,633 
Italian Front 16, 193 9,210 5,598 
Total Missing 1051972 3021819 3241812 
Total Losses June July August 
Eastern Front 127,484 405,294 376,028 
Western Front 35,452 104, 798 148,443 
Italian Front 30,025 25,325 12,548 
T Qtal Los~es 1921961 535A17 5371019 























COMPARISON OF TROOP LOSSES BETWEEN 
THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS 
FROM JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
Dead Eastern Front Anglo-American Front 
Comparison of Troop Losses on the Eastern and Anglo-American 














Source: Der Heeresarzt im Oberkommando des Heeres, Personelle 
blutige Verluste des Feldheeres. Berichtigte Meldung fuer 












GERMAN LOSSES BY FRONT 
FROM JUNE-NOVEMBER 1944 
Eastern Front Losses 













Source: Organisationsabteilung, Betrag: Aufschluesselung der 
unwiederbringlichen Verluste Juni - November 44 nach 




COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE 1944 
T~ge East West S.West 
PzKpfWg II 1 
PzKpfWg II Mun. 9 
PzKpfWg Ill L42 6 
PzKpfWg Ill L24 27 
PzKpfWg Ill L60 4 4 
PzKpfWg Ill Flamm 
PzKpfWg 38t 
PzKpfWg IV L24 1 7 
PzKpfWg IV L43 
PzKpfWg IV L48 10 124 109 
StuPz IV 15cm 
PzKpfWg V L71 17 76 40 
PzKpfWg VI L56 1 1 1 7 61 
PzBetwg Gross 3 
PzBefWg Ill L42 
PzBefWg Ill L60 1 7 
PzBefWg V L71 4 1 
PzBefWg VI L56 2 1 
StuGesch L24 
StuGesch L43 
StuGesch L48 70 27 80 
StuHaub 42 leFH 18 9 7 
PakSf 7.5cm pz II 2 5 1 
PakSf 7 .5cm pz 38t 1 1 15 30 
PakSf 7.Scm Lorraine 2 9 
PakSf 7.62cm pz II 1 
PakSf 7.62cm pz 38t 1 7 
PakSf 8.8cm pz IV 36 1 1 
PakSf 8.8cm pz VI (P) 4 
Beob. Pz Ill 1 1 1 




























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
T¥12e East West S.West 
ArtSf SFH 18 pz IV 7 
ArtSf SIG 33 pz 38t 1 8 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. M.G. 1 7 5 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 5 6 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 2 7 5 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 7.5cm 7 2 
S.Pz.Sp.Wg. Luchs 7.5 
le. Pz. Fu. Wg. 3 1 
S. Pz. Fu. Wg. 1 
le. Schtz Pz. Wg. 8 29 1 7 
le. SchtzPzWg 2cm 12 1 
le. SchtzPzWg 3.7cm 2 
m. SchtzPzWg 1 7 70 51 
m. SchtzPzWg 7.5cm 1 1 3 1 4 
m. SchtzPzWg 3.7cm 1 2 
Pion. PzWg 3 28 1 9 
Krk. PzWg 1 3 5 
Kde. PzWg 1 
Beob. PzWg 2 6 8 
Mun. PzWg 3 
Fla. PzWg 251 /16 1 2 2 
PzKpfWg Ill Mun. 1 
PzKpfWg IV Mun. 1 4 
PzKpfWg V Berge 1 1 2 




























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
TYQe East West S.We~t 
German Armor Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 17% 
Western Front: 35% 
Southwestern Front: 48% 
Totals 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (gepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LVll 
COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JULY 1944 
T~ge East We~t s.w~st 
PzKpfWg II 57 1 3 
PzKpfWg II Mun. 8 6 
PzKpfWg Ill L42 
PzKpfWg Ill L24 5 
PzKpfWg Ill L60 4 
PzKpfWg Ill Flamm 
PzKpfWg 38t 
PzKpfWg IV L24 1 7 
PzKpfWg IV L43 27 
PzKpfWg IV L48 256 149 28 
StuPz IV 15cm 5 52 
PzKpfWg V L 71 219 121 7 
PzKpfWg VI L56 164 13 14 
PzBefWg Gross 
PzBefWg Ill L42 15 
PzBefWg Ill L60 2 1 
PzBefWg V L71 22 4 
PzBefWg VI L56 2 1 1 
StuGesch L24 
StuGesch L43 
StuGesch L48 808 68 38 
StuHaub 42 leFH 18 79 1 
PakSf 7.5cm pz II 49 
PakSf 7.5cm pz 38t 264 10 
PakSf 7.5cm Lorraine 6 5 
PakSf 7.62cm pz II 
PakSf 7.62cm pz 38t 
PakSf 8.8cm pz IV 34 
PakSf 8.Scm pz VI (P) 2 3 
Beob. Pz tll 24 2 



























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JULY 1944 
(continued) 
Tyg~ Ea~t West s.west 
ArtSf SFH 18 pz IV 70 8 
ArtSf SIG 33 pz 38t 23 2 1 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. M.G. 22 2 1 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 33 1 4 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 39 1 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 7.5cm 6 
S.Pz.Sp.Wg. Luchs 7.5 
le. Pz. Fu. Wg. 9 
S. Pz. Fu. Wg. 3 1 
le. Schtz Pz. Wg. 173 14 23 
le. SchtzPzWg 2cm 24 3 
le. SchtzPzWg 3. 7cm 4 
m. SchtzPzWg 205 47 8 
m. SchtzPzWg 7.Scm 25 5 3 
m. SchtzPzWg 3. 7cm 7 1 
Pion. PzWg 60 21 
Krk. PzWg 12 1 1 
Kde. PzWg 4 1 
Beob. PzWg 32 1 2 
Mun. PzWg 29 
Fla. PzWg 251 /16 20 8 
PzKpfWg Ill Mun. 10 2 
PzKpfWg IV Mun. 15 4 
PzKpfWg V Berge 10 1 1 




























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JULY 1944 
(continued) 
T~ East w~ $.West 
German Armor Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 800/o 
Western Front: 14010 
Southwestern Front: 6% 
To~ 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (gepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LVlll 
COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
AUGUST 1944 
T~~e East West S.West 
PzKpfWg II 2 
PzKpfWg II Mun. 3 4 
PzKpfWg Ill L42 
PzKpfWg Ill L24 5 
PzKpfWg 111 L60 2 
PzKpfWg Ill Flamm 
PzKpfWg 38t 
PzKpfWg IV L24 3 
PzKpfWg IV L43 3 
PzKpfWg IV L48 309 49 4 
StuPz IV 15cm 14 2 
PzKpfWg V L71 239 36 3 
PzKpfWg VI L56 75 13 3 
PzBefWg Gross 
PzBefWg Ill L42 
PzBefWg Ill L60 5 1 
PzBefWg V L 71 7 5 
PzBefWg VI L56 1 2 
StuGesch L24 3 
StuGesch L43 
StuGesch L48 254 98 1 3 
StuHaub 42 leFH 18 39 5 
PakSf 7.5cm pz 11 7 
PakSf 7.5cm pz 38t 44 3 
PakSf 7.5cm Lorraine 
PakSf 7.62cm pz II 24 
PakSf 7.62cm pz 38t 
PakSf 8.8cm pz IV 7 1 3 
PakSf 8.8cm pz VI (P) 2 
Beob. Pz Ill 9 



























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
T~ge East West S.West 
ArtSf SFH 18 pz IV 9 
ArtSf SIG 33 pz 38t 12 12 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. M.G. 8 6 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 6 1 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 6 1 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 7.5cm 4 3 
S.Pz.Sp.Wg. Luchs 7.5 3 
le. Pz. Fu. Wg. 
S. Pz. Fu. Wg. 
le. Schtz Pz. Wg. 88 
le. SchtzPzWg 2cm 14 
le. SchtzPzWg 3.7cm 1 2 
m. SchtzPzWg 215 4 
m. SchtzPzWg 7.5cm 35 
m. SchtzPzWg 3. ?cm 5 5 
Pion. PzWg 28 34 
Krk. PzWg 6 2 
Kde. PzWg 1 
Beob. PzWg 7 4 
Mun. PzWg 1 
Fla. PzWg 251/16 13 4 
PzKpfWg Ill Mun. 
PzKpfWg IV Mun. 3 4 
PzKpfWg V Berge 6 


























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
Tme East Wf).St S.West 
German Armor Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 80°/o 
Western Front: 10010 
Southwestern Front: 2% 
Totals 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (gepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LIX 
COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
T¥Pe East West S.West 
PzKpfWg II 59 2 3 
PzKpfWg II Mun. 1 1 10 9 
PzKpfWg Ill L42 6 
PzKpfWg Ill L24 5 27 
PzKpfWg Ill L60 6 8 
PzKpfWg Ill Flamm 
PzKpfWg 38t 
PzKpfWg IV L24 3 1 7 
PzKpfWg IV L43 3 19 
PzKpfWg IV L48 575 322 141 
StuPz IV 15cm 5 1 4 54 
PzKpfWg V L71 475 233 50 
PzKpfWg VI L56 250 43 78 
PzBefWg Gross 3 
PzBefWg Ill L42 15 
PzBefWg Ill L60 5 4 8 
PzBefWg V L71 29 1 3 1 
PzBefWg VI L56 3 5 2 
StuGesch L24 3 
StuGesch L43 
StuGesch L48 1, 132 193 131 
StuHaub 42 leFH 18 127 1 3 
PakSf 7.5cm pz II 58 5 1 
PakSf 7 .5cm pz 38t 319 25 33 
PakSf 7.5cm Lorraine 8 14 
PakSf 7.62cm pz II 24 1 
PakSf 7.62cm pz 38t 1 7 
PakSf 8.8cm pz IV 77 24 
PakSf 8.8cm pz VI (P) 2 5 4 
Beob. Pz Ill 34 2 1 1 
































COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
T~(,2~ East West S.West 
ArtSf SFH 18 pz IV 79 8 7 
ArtSf SIG 33 pz 38t 35 15 9 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. M.G. 31 1 5 6 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 44 2 1 0 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 47 8 6 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 7.5cm 10 10 2 
S.Pz.Sp.Wg. Luchs 7.5 3 
le. Pz. Fu. Wg. 12 1 
S. Pz. Fu. Wg. 3 2 
le. Schtz Pz. Wg. 269 43 40 
le. SchtzPzWg 2cm 38 1 5 1 
le. SchtzPzWg 3.7cm 5 2 2 
m. SchtzPzWg 437 121 59 
m. SchtzPzWg 7.5cm 61 1 8 1 7 
m. SchtzPzWg 3. 7cm 13 6 2 
Pion. PzWg 91 83 19 
Krk. PzWg 19 6 6 
Kde. PzWg 6 1 
Beob. PzWg 41 1 1 10 
Mun. PzWg 33 
Fla. PzWg 251/16 34 1 4 2 
PzKpfWg Ill Mun. 1 0 3 
PzKpfWg IV Mun. 18 5 8 
PzKpfWg V Berge 1 7 2 3 






























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEENTHEEASTERNFRONTAND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
East West S.West 
German Armor Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 68% 
Western Front: 1go10 
Southwestern Front: 13% 
To~ 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (gepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LX 
COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE SHIPMENTS 
TO THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
T~ge East West S.West 
PzKpfWg II 1 1 
PzKpt'.Ng II Mun. 4 7 
PzKpfWg Ill L42 
PzKpfWg Ill L24 1 6 
PzKpfWg Ill L60 2 
PzKpfWg Ill Flamm 
PzKpfWg 38t 
PzKpfWg IV L24 
PzKpfWg IV L43 
PzKpfWg IV L48 524 163 107 
StuPz IV 15cm 45 31 
PzKpt'.Ng V L71 429 347 38 
PzKpfWg VI L56 173 104 43 
PzBefWg Gross 2 
PzBefWg Ill L42 
PzBefWg Ill L60 19 8 
PzBefWg V L71 31 21 
PzBefWg VI L56 7 6 2 
StuGesch L24 
StuGesch L43 
StuGesch L48 1,454 130 85 
StuHaub 42 leFH 18 221 9 21 
Pak Sf 7 .5cm pz II 20 
PakSf 7.Scm pz 38t 96 3 10 
PakSf 7.5cm Lorraine 1 
PakSf 7.62cm pz II 
PakSf 7 .62cm pz 38t 
PakSf 8.8cm pz IV 40 
PakSf 8.8cm pz VI (P) 4 18 
Beob. Pz Ill 7 9 

























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE SHIPMENTS 
TO THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
T~ge East West S.West 
ArtSf SFH 18 pz IV 42 27 
ArtSf SIG 33 pz 38t 74 1 2 2 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. M.G. 34 1 6 
le. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 43 1 1 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 2cm 9 1 1 
S. Pz. Sp. Wg. 7.5cm 3 
S.Pz.Sp.Wg. Luchs 7.5 
le. Pz. Fu. Wg. 3 
S. Pz. Fu. Wg. 1 
le. Schtz Pz. Wg. 334 59 8 
le. SchtzPzWg 2cm 50 1 6 1 
le. SchtzPzWg 3. ?cm 1 
m. SchtzPzWg 921 231 1 1 
m. SchtzPzWg 7.5cm 132 20 
m. SchtzPzWg 3. ?cm 1 
Pion. PzWg 240 66 2 
Krk. PzWg 50 6 
Kde. PzWg 5 1 
Beob. PzWg 38 10 
Mun. PzWg 
Fla. PzWg 251/16 89 1 7 
PzKpfWg Ill Mun. 
PzKpfWg IV Mun. 7 
PzKpfWg V Berge 40 25 2 



























COMPARISON OF ARMORED VEHICLE SHIPMENTS 
TO THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
East West S.West 
German Armor Vehicle Shipments To The Front: 
Eastern Front: 75% 
Western Front: 200/o 
Southwestern Front: 5% 
Totals 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (gepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LXI 
COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE 1944 
865 
T~ge East West S.West Totals 
Motorcycles 863 663 2,452 3,978 
Cars 962 919 2,648 4,529 
Trucks 1150 1649 3820 6,619 
Command Cars 24 27 79 130 
Ambulances 47 54 150 251 
Maultier 43 39 26 108 
Wheeled Tractors 27 29 148 204 
Tracked Tractors 22 2 69 93 
Ag) 68 88 205 361 
Half-Track Motorcycle 29 109 68 206 
Heavy Army Tractors -
Half-Track Mover 
1 ton 38 5 88 131 
Half-Track Mover 
3 ton 6 10 92 108 
Half-Track Mover 
5 ton 5 2 1 0 17 
Half-Track Mover 
8 ton 17 27 125 169 
Half-Track Mover 
12 ton 6 1 1 7 24 
Half-Track Mover 
18 ton 1 2 13 1 6 
Trailers 74 129 553 756 
Total Losses: 3,382 3,755 10,563 17, 700 
TABLE LXI 
COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Type East West S.West Totals 
German Non-Armored Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 19% 
Western Front: 21 % 
Southwestern Front: 600/o 
* The data has a margin of error due to a lack of reports from 
several Army units. 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 




COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JULY 1944 
T~ge East West S.West Totals 
Motorcycles 5001 13 569 5,583 
Cars 5,443 25 590 6,058 
Trucks 9,689 57 764 10,510 
Command Cars 211 3 77 291 
Ambulances 459 1 28 488 
Maultier 574 - 5 579 
Wheeled Tractors 119 20 30 169 
Tracked Tractors 120 - 10 130 
Aro 1566 - 36 1602 
Half-Track Motorcycle 200 - 9 209 
Heavy Army Tractors 5 - - 5 
Half-Track Mover 
1 ton 275 3 13 291 
Half-Track Mover 
3 ton 163 - 20 183 
Half-Track Mover 
5 ton 87 - - 87 
Half-Track Mover 
8 ton 122 - 8 130 
Half-Track Mover 
12 ton 60 - - 60 
Half-Track Mover 
18 ton 21 - - 21 
Trailers 1314 23 82 1419 
Total Losses: 25,429 145 2,241 27,815 
TABLE LXll 
COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JULY 1944 
(continued) 
German Non-Armored Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 91 % 
Western Front: 1% 
Southwestern Front: 9>/o 
*The data has a margin of error due to a lack of reports from 
several Army units. 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LXlll 
COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
AUGUST 1944 
T~ge East West S.West 
Motorcycles 4,373 7,515 252 
Cars 4,612 8,384 248 
Trucks 7,066 7,469 300 
Command Cars 168 226 4 
Ambulances 512 659 13 
Maultier 613 683 1 
Wheeled Tractors 65 272 27 
Tracked Tractors 40 231 14 
Ag) 809 310 1 7 
Half-Track Motorcycle 170 224 -
Heavy Army Tractors 
Half-Track Mover 
1 ton 281 369 7 
Half-Track Mover 
3 ton 138 155 3 
Half-Track Mover 
5 ton 60 35 -
Half-Track Mover 
8 ton 145 314 5 
Half-Track Mover 
12 ton 51 50 -
Half-Track Mover 
18 ton 16 57 -
Trailers 764 912 41 























COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
East We~t S.We~ Totals 
German Non-Armored Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 41% 
Western Front: 570/o 
Southwestern Front: 20/o 
*The data has a margin of error due to a lack of reports from 
several Army units. 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LXIV 
COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
T~g~ East Wefl.t S.West 
Motorcycles 10,237 8, 191 3,273 
Cars 11 ,017 9,328 3,486 
Trucks 17,905 9, 175 4,884 
Command Cars 403 256 160 
Ambulances 1,018 714 191 
Maultier 1,230 722 32 
Wheeled Tractors 211 321 205 
Tracked Tractors 182 233 93 
RS) 2,443 398 258 
Half-Track Motorcycle 399 333 77 
Heavy Army Tractors 5 - -
Half-Track Mover 
1 ton 594 377 108 
Half-Track Mover 
3 ton 307 165 115 
Half-Track Mover 
5 ton 152 37 1 0 
Half-Track Mover 
8 ton 284 341 138 
Half-Track Mover 
12 ton 117 51 1 7 
Half-Track Mover 
18 ton 38 59 1 3 
Trailers 2, 152 1,064 676 























COMPARISON OF NON-ARMORED VEHICLE LOSSES 
BETWEEN THE EASTERN FRONT AND 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
(continued) 
Tme East We~t s.west 
German Non-Armored Losses by Front: 
Eastern Front: 52% 
Western Front: 34010 
Southwestern Front: 14% 
Totals 
*The data has a margin of error due to a lack of reports from 
several Army units. 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LXV 
NON-ARMORED VEHICLE SHIPMENTS 
TO THE EASTERN FRONT AND THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-AUGUST 1944 
Type East West S.West 
Motorcycles 7,504 1,488 3,020 
Cars 11,033 3,775 4, 197 
Trucks 17,248 5,479 4,428 
Command Cars 361 220 110 
Ambulances 1, 159 417 371 
Maultier 1,277 123 87 
Wheeled Tractors 199 77 122 
Tracked Tractors 98 27 38 
Aro 1,487 107 310 
Half-Track Motorcycle 577 138 88 
Heavy Army Tractors 95 - -
Half-Track Mover 
1 ton 342 24 82 
Half-Track Mover 
3 ton 212 1 7 71 
Half-Track Mover 
5 ton 116 4 1 
Half-Track Mover 
8 ton 455 69 136 
Half-Track Mover 
12 ton 121 6 3 
Half-Track Mover 
18 ton 168 98 6 
Trailers 2,354 596 613 
























NON-ARMORED VEHICLE SHIPMENTS 




East West S.West 
German Non-Armored Shipments To The Front: 
Eastern Front: 630/o 
Western Front: 18% 
Southwestern Front: 19% 
Total~ 
Source: OKH, Kraftfahrzeuge (ungepanzert) Heer-Westen. Ob. 
Suedwest. Osten NAMP T-78 Roll 145. 
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TABLE LXVI 
LUFTWAFFE FRONTAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES 
(TOTAL LOSSES AND DISABLED AIRCRAFT) 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS, 
JUNE-OCTOBER 1944 
Aircraft Type Anglo-American Eastern 
FrQnts Front 
Close Recon Aircraft 191 341 
Long Range Recon Aircraft 249 133 
Single-Engine Fighters 6,099 1,058 
Night Fighters 1,271 73 
Twin-Engine Fighters 313 7 
Ground Attack Aircraft 224 1, 119 
Night Ground 
Attack Aircraft 125 191 
Bomber Aircraft 1,548 289 
Transport Aircraft 598 159 
Sea Planes 32 10 
Liaison, Communications, 
and other Aircraft 532 270 
Total Aircraft Losses 11'182 3,650 
Luftwaffe Aircraft Losses by Front: 
Anglo-American Fronts: 75% 














Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste der 
Deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer 
Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 333. 
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TABLE LXVll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
WESTERN FRONT GENERALS 
1. Gen. d. Art. Marcks, Commander LXXXIV Army Corps, 
Killed 6.12.44 
2. Lt. Gen. Falley, Commander 91st Jaeger Division, 
Killed 6.6.44 
3. Lt. Gen. Hellmich, Commander of 243rd Jaeger Division, 
Killed 7. 1 6 .44 
876 
4. Maj. Gen. Ritter und Edler v. Dawans, Chief Panzer Grenadier 
Command West, Killed 6.11.44 
5. Maj. Gen. Stegmann, Commander 77th Jaeger Division, 
Killed 6.17.44 
6. Lt. Gen. v. Schlieben, Commander of Cherbourg and Commander 
709th Jaeger Division, Prisoner June 1944 
7. Maj. Gen. Sattler, Deputy Commander of Cherbourg, 
Prisoner June 1944 
8. Lt. Gen. v. Drabich-Waechter, Commander 326th Infantry 
Division, Killed 8.1.44 
9. Lt. Gen. Kraiss, Commander 352nd Infantry Division, 
Killed 8.3.44 
10. Lt. Gen. Spang, Commander 266th Jaeger Division, 
Prisoner 8.14.1944 
TABLE LXVll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
WESTERN FRONT GENERALS 
11 . Gen. d. Inf. Neuling, Commander LXll Reserve Corps, 
Prisoner 8.20.44 
12. Lt. Gen. Manny, Commander 84th Infantry Division, 
Missing in Action 8.20.44 
877 
13. Gen. d. Inf. von Choltitz, Commanding General of Greater Paris, 
Prisoner 8.29.44 
.. 
14. Lt. Gen. Klfeldt, Commander LXXXIV Army Corps, 
Prisoner 8.29.44 
15. Lt. Gen. Schaefer, Commander 244th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 8.31.44 
16. Maj. Gen. Richter, Commander 198th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 8.31.44 
17. Maj. Gen. Schramm, Commandant F.K. 533, 
Missing in Action 9.5.44 
18. Gen. d. Inf. Vierow, Commander of District Northwest France, 
Prisoner 9.3.44 
19. Gen. d. Pz. Tr. Eberbach, Commander 5th Panzer Army, 
Prisoner 9.3.44 
20. Lt. Gen. Badinski, Commander 276th Infantry Division, 
Missing in Action 8.21.44 
TABLE LXVll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
WESTERN FRONT GENERALS 
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21. Maj. Gen. Suschnig, Commandant to the Military Command in 
France, Missing in Action August 1944 
22. Maj. Gen. Schuberth, Commandant F.K. 792, 
Missing in Action August 1944 
23. Maj. Gen. Bieringer, Commandant F.K. 800, 
Missing in Action 8.18.44 
24. Lt. Gen. Seyffardt, Commander 348th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 9.9.44 
25. Maj. Gen. von Felbert, Commandant F.K. 560, 
Prisoner 9.10.44 
26. Lt. Gen. Heinrichs, Commander 89th Infantry Division, 
Killed 9.10.44 
Total Generals Killed: 8 
Total Generals Missing: 1 O 
Total Generals Captured: 8 
Total Generals Lost To Enemy Action: 2 6 
Source: Organisation der Wehrmacht, OKW/Org. Abt. und 
Heerespersonalabt.; Zusammenstellung der in diesem 
Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten. verstorbenen. 
vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generate. 
Flensburg 5 June 1945 NAMP T-77 Roll 785. 
TABLE LXVlll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
879 
1. Lt. Gen. Richter, Former Commander, 263rd Infantry Division, 
Killed 6.3.44 
2. Gen. d. Art. Martinek, Commander XXXIX Panzer Corps, 
Killed 6.28.44 
3. Gen. d. Art. Pfeiffer, Commander VI Army Corps, 
Killed 7. 1 .44 
4. Lt. Gen. Philip, Commander 134th Infantry Division, 
Killed 6.27 .44 
5. Lt. Gen. Schuenemann, Commander 337th Infantry Division 
Killed 6.27.44 
6. Maj. Gen. Hamann, Commandant of Bobruisk, 
Prisoner 6.30.44 
7. Gen. d. Inf. Gollwitzer, Commander Lill Army Corps, 
Prisoner 
8. Lt. Gen. Bamler, Commander 12th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
9. Lt. Gen. Hitter, Commander 206th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
10. Maj. Gen. v. Erdmannsdorff, Commandant Mogilev, 
Prisoner 
11. Maj. Gen. Mueller-Buelow, Commander 246th Infantry 
Division, Prisoner 
TABLE LXVlll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
12. Lt. Gen. Mueller (Vincenz), Commander XII Army Corps, 
Prisoner 
13. Maj. Gen. Klammt, Commander 260th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
14. Maj. Gen. Schmidt (Aurel), Commander Army Engineers, 
Prisoner 
15. Maj. Gen. Trowitz, Commander 57th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
16. Lt. Gen. Traut, Commander 78th Sturm Division, 
Prisoner 
17. Lt. Gen. Hoffmeister, Commander 383rd Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
880 
18. Maj. Gen. v. Steinkeller, Commander Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle," Prisoner 
19. Maj. Gen. Gihr, Commander 707th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
20. Maj. Gen. Conrady, Commander 36th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
21. Lt. Gen. v. Luetzow, Commander XXXV Army Corps, 
Prisoner 
TABLE LXVlll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
22. Lt. Gen. Heyne, Commander 6th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
23. Maj. Gen. Michaelis, Commander 95th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
24. Gen. d. Inf. Voelckers, Commander XXVll Army Corps, 
Prisoner 
25. Lt. Gen. Peschel, Commander 6th Luftwaffe Field Division, 
Missing in Action 
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26. Lt. Gen. Pistorius, Commander 4th Luftwaffe Field Division, 
Killed 6.28.44 
27. Maj. Gen. Hahne, Commander 197th Infantry Division, 
Missing in Action 
28. Lt. Gen. Drescher, Commander 267th Infantry Division, 
Killed 8.13.44 
29. Maj. Gen. Engel, Commander 45th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 
30. Lt. Gen. Franek, Commander 73rd Infantry Division, 
Missing in Action 6.29.44 
31. Gen. d. Inf. Hauffe, Commander XIII Army Corps, 
Killed July 1944 
TABLE LXVll I 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
32. Lt. Gen. v. Kurowski, Commander 110th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner July 1944 
33. Lt. Gen. Moser, Commandant Lublin, 
Prisoner July 1944 
34. Lt. Gen. Ochsner, Commander 31st Infantry Division, 
Prisoner July 1944 
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35. Lt. Gen. Wuestenhagen, Commander 256th Infantry Division, 
Missing in Action July 1944 
36. Lt. Gen. Zutavern, Commander 18th Panzer Grenadier Division, 
Killed July 1944 
37. Maj. Gen. Beutler, Commander 340th Infantry Division, 
Killed July 1944 
38. Maj. Gen. Lindemann, Commander 361 st Infantry Division, 
Prisoner July 1944 
39. Maj. Gen. Nedtwig, Commander 454th Security Division, 
Prisoner July 1944 
40. Maj. Gen. Franking, Commander 282nd Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 8.29.44 
41 . Maj. Gen. Tronnier, Commander Corps Detachment F, 
Prisoner 8.28.44 
TABLE LXVlll 
GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
42. Lt. Gen. von Bogen, Commander 302nd Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 8.28.44 
43. Lt. Gen. Postel, Commander XXX Army Corps, 
Prisoner 8 .28 .44 
44. Maj. Gen. Eichstedt, Commander 294th Infantry Division, 
Killed 8.28.44 
45. Lt. Gen. Drubbe de Salengre, Commander 384th Infantry 
Division, Killed 8.28.44 
46. Maj. Gen. Gebb, Commander 9th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 8.29.44 
47. Gen. d. Inf. Leux, Commander 16th Army, 
Died from Wounds 9.2.44 
48. Gen. d. Inf. Mieth, Commander IV Army Corps, 
Killed 9.2.44 
49. Maj. Gen. Boie, Commandant F.K. 497, 
Prisoner 8.29.44 
50. Gen. d. Art. Hell, Commander VII Army Corps, 
Killed 9. 1 .44 




GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
52. Maj. Gen. Stingl, Commandant Jassy, 
Prisoner 8.30.44 
53. Lt. Gen. Burckhardt, Commander Rear Army territory 593, 
Missing in Action 9.11 .44 
54. Gen. d. Inf. Mueller, Commander XXXXIV Army Corps, 
Missing i~ Action 9.4.44 
55. Gen. d. Inf Buschenhagen, Commander Lii Army Corps, 
Prisoner 9.4.44 
56. Maj. Gen. von Dewitz, Commandant Kischinew 
Prisoner 9.4.44 
57. Maj. Gen. Seelig, Commandant Galatz, 
Missing in Action 9.4.44 
58. Lt. Gen. Troeger, Commander 13th Panzer Division, 
Prisoner 9.4.44 
59. Maj. Gen. Bluemke, Commander 257th Infantry Division, 
Killed 9.4.44 
60. Lt. Gen. von Hulsen, Commander 370th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 9.4.44 




GERMAN GENERALS KILLED, MISSING OR TAKEN PRISONER 
ON THE EASTERN FRONT DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
EASTERN FRONT GENERALS 
62. Lt. Gen. Schwarz, Commander 376th Infantry Division, 
Prisoner 9.4.44 
63. Gen. d. Kav. Hansen, Chief of the German Army Mission in 
Rumania, Prisoner, End of August 1944 
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64. Maj. Gen. Spalcke, Military Attache to the German Embassy in 
Bucharest, Prisoner, End of August 1944 
Total Generals Killed: 1 6 
Total Generals Missing: 7 
Total Generals Captured: 41 
Total Generals Lost To Enemy Action: 64 
Source: Organisation der Wehrmacht, OKW/Org. Abt. und 
Heerespersonalabt.; Zusammenstellung der in diesem 
Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten. verstorbenen. 
vermissten und im Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale. 
Flensburg 5 June 1945 NAMP T-77 Roll 785. 
TABLE LXIX 
GERMAN DIVISIONS DESTROYED ON 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTS 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
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German Divisions Destr~ed ReD_rganized or Disbanded 
Panzer Lehr Division 
5th Parachute Division 
16th Luftwaffe Field Division 
17th Luftwaffe Field Division 
17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Goetz von Berlichingen" 
18th Luftwaffe Field Division 
47th Infantry Division 
64th Infantry Division 
70th Infantry Division 
77th Infantry Division 
85th Infantry Division 
91 st Air Landing Division 
92nd Infantry Division 
242nd Infantry Division 
243rd Infantry Division 
244th Infantry Division 
266th Infantry Division 
271 st Infantry Division 
272nd Infantry Division 
275th Infantry Division 
276th Infantry Division 
277th Infantry Division 
326th Infantry Division 
331 st Infantry Division 
343rd Infantry Division 
344th Infantry Division 
348th Infantry Division 
352nd Infantry Division 
362nd Infantry Division 
363rd Infantry Division 
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German Divisions Destroyed Reorganized or Disbanded 
708th Infantry Division 
709th Infantry Division 




Source: Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht 
ueber aufgeloeste Division 1944 NAM P T-78 Roll 41 O; 
Abwicklungs und Betreuungstab/Rudolstadt/Prinz Eugen 
Kaserne, Uebersicht der abzuwickelnden Verbaende Stand 
per 15.1.1945 NAMP T-78 Roll 141; Mehner, GHTBDW Vol 
10, pp. 499-508; Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 11, pp. 337-339; 
Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German Army 
Order of Battle. World War II (New York: Stein and Day 
Publishers, 1985), pp. 75-459. 
TABLE LXX 
GERMAN DIVISIONS DESTROYED ON 
THE EASTERN FRONT 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
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German DivisiQns DestrQ¥ed Reorganized or Disbanded 
Corps Detachment C Disbanded 
Corps Detachment E Disbanded 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division Disbanded 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division Disbanded 
6th Infantry Division Reorganized 
9th Infantry Division Reorganized 
12th Infantry Division Reorganized 
13th Panzer Division Reorganized 
14th SS Division "Galizien" Reorganized 
15th Infantry Division Reorganized 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division Reorganized 
20th Panzer Division Reorganized 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division Reorganized 
31st Infantry Division Reorganized 
36th Infantry Division Reorganized 
45th Infantry Division Reorganized 
57th Infantry Division Disbanded 
60th Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" Reorganized 
62nd Infantry Division Reorganized 
78th "Sturm" Division Reorganized 
79th Infantry Division Reorganized 
95th Infantry Division Reorganized 
106th Infantry Division Reorganized 
11 0th Infantry Division Disbanded 
134th Infantry Division Disbanded 
153rd Field Training Division Reorganized 
161 st Infantry Division Disbanded 
197th Infantry Division Disbanded 
206th Infantry Division Disbanded 
246th Infantry Division Reorganized 
256th Infantry Division Reorganized 
TABLE LXX 
GERMAN DIVISIONS DESTROYED ON 
THE EASTERN FRONT 
DURING THE SUMMER OF 1944 
(continued) 
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German Divisions Destroyed Reorganized or Disbanded 
257th Infantry Division 
258th Infantry Division 
260th Infantry Division 
267th Infantry Division 
282nd Infantry Division 
294th Infantry Division 
296th Infantry Division 
299th Infantry Division 
302nd Infantry Division 
306th Infantry Division 
320th Infantry Division 
335th Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
340th Infantry Division 
361 st Infantry Division 
370th Infantry Division 
376th Infantry Division 
383rd Infantry Division 
384th Infantry Division 
454th Security Division 
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German Divisions Destroyed Reorganized or Disbanded 
Total Divisions Destroyed: 52 Divisions 
Source: Generalstab des Heeres, Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht 
ueber autgeloeste Division 1944 NAM P T-78 Roll 41 O; 
Hauptmann Rabe, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der 
Heeresgruppe Suedukraine 20.8. - 5.9.1944 Band 4 Teil 1, 
NAMP T-311Roll158, pp. 150-151; Generaloberst Hans 
Friessner, Verratene Schlachten (Hamburg: Holsten-
Verlag, 1956), pp. 255-258; Abwicklungs und 
Betreuungstab/Rudolstadt/Prinz Eugen Kaserne, Uebersicht 
der abzuwickelnden Verbaende Stand per 15.1.1945 NAMP 
T-78 Roll 141; Mitcham, Jr., Hitler's Legions: The German 
Army Order of Battle World War II, pp. 45-475; Mehner, 
GHTBDW Vol. 10, pp. 502-508; Mehner, GHTBDW Vol. 11, pp. 
337-342; Caren, pp. 508-509; Kriegstagebuch (KTB) 
Heeresgruppe Mitte, Fuehrungsabteilung, 
Kriegsgliederungen NAMP T-311 Roll 228; Hinze, Das 
Ostfront Drama 1944: Rueckzugskaempfe Heeresgruppe 
Mitte, p. 426; Teske, p. 216; Generalstab des Heeres, 
Organisationabteilung, Uebersicht ueber die grossen 
Verbaende des Heeres. der Waffen-SS und der Fallschirm-
Truppen. Stand 30.7.44 NAMP T-78 Roll 413; Burkhart 
Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 Vol. 3, p. 241; 
OKH Allgemeines Heeresamt, Abwicklungsstab, H 41/7-H 
41/12 NAMP T-78 Roll 139. 
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Zusammenstellung der in diesem Kriege gefallenen. toetlich verunglueckten, 
verstorbenen. vermissten und in Gefangenschaft geratenen Generale Flensburg 5 June 




The failure of Foreign Armies East to forecast the beginning 
of the Soviet main offensive against Army Group Center set the 
stage for the subsequent collapse of the German Army on the 
Eastern Front during the summer of 1944. The Wehrmacht in the 
East needed accurate intelligence about the direction of Soviet 
offensive operations for the summer of 1944. Foreign Armies East 
in April 1944 forcast two possible offensives. One possible 
offensive was directed toward Rumania and into the Balkans. The 
other offensive was predicted in the line Kovel-Warsaw. German 
intelligence leaned toward the Balkan scenario until May 10, 1944 
when serious offensive preparations were noted in the Kovel-
Ternopol area. Foreign Armies East in June 1944 predicted that 
attacks against Army Group Center were viewed as preliminary and 
secondary to the main attacks against Army Group North Ukraine. 
This failure to identify the main axis of Soviet offensive 
operations was disastrous for the Wehrmacht in the East. 
The deployment of the armored and mobile reserves in the 
East was primarily in Army Group North Ukraine and South Ukraine 
leaving Army Group Center stripped of armored and mobile 
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reserves. The armored "Fire Brigades" were not deployed where 
they were needed for the summer of 1944 and the failure of German 
intelligence was directly responsible for this situation. The 
failure to deploy the armor and mobile reserves behind Army Group 
Center resulted in the collapse of the Army Group and the 
destruction of 28 German divisions which unhinged the entire 
Eastern Front. 
Foreign Armies East was also responsible for the German 
intelligence failure in Rumania which as late as August 15, 1944 
noted that a major offensive against Army Group South Ukraine was 
unlikely. The assessment by Foreign Armies East on August 17, 
1944 indicated that only local attacks were to be expected on the 
Rumanian front. German intelligence also failed to accurately 
assess Rumanian reliability and the combination of both 
intelligence failures resulted in a catastrophe for Army Group 
South Ukraine and the destruction of the German 6th Army and 18 
German divisions. Therefore, the intelligence failures of Foreign 
Armies East were a central cause of the collapse of the German 
Army in the East during the summer of 1944. Accurate intelligence 
could have played a key role in preventing disasters on the scale of 
the collapse of Army Group Center and Army Group South Ukraine. 
Hitler's defensive doctrine of "standing fast" prevented local 
commanders from exercising initiative to prevent Soviet 
breakthroughs and executing withdrawals to save German units. 
Hitler's interference with local commander's decisions also 
prevented the implementation of an elastic defense which would 
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have absorbed the Soviet offensive much better than holding onto a 
rigid defensive line. However, Hitler was obsessed with the notion 
of "will" and the defensive recovery made by the Wehrmacht during 
the winter of 1941-42 by adhering to his "standfast" doctrine. 
Hitler clung to the belief of "standing fast" after the usefulness of 
this idea was negated by Soviet advances in mobility. The Red 
Army achieved a significant increase in motorization and 
mechanization since the winter of 1941 and this greater mobility 
rendered Hitler's "standfast" strategy obsolete. Fortresses served 
little purpose given the increased mobility and firepower of the 
Red Army. The medieval notion of establishing fortresses was an 
anachronistic idea that continued to appeal to Hitler. His 
establishment of cities as fortresses on the Eastern Front created 
further restrictions on local commanders in defending territory 
against Soviet advances. Precious reserves were as a result tied 
down holding stationary positions. Thus, Hitler was directly 
responsible for a defensive doctrine which may have been effective 
in 1941 but it was no longer an effective strategy in 1944. The 
opportunity to conduct an elastic defense based on rivers was 
available to Army Group Center and Army Group South Ukraine. 
Field Marshal Busch proposed two alternatives for conducting an 
elastic defense in Belorussia. The first proposal was adjusting 
defensive lines rearward behind the Dnieper river. The second 
proposal was for a more extensive withdrawal behind the Berezina 
river. A combination of both plans based on timely withdrawals 
could have absorbed the shock of the Soviet summer offensive more 
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effectively. However, Hitler forbid any plan establishing an elastic 
defense and instead promulgated "Fuehrerbefehl Nr. 11" which 
established fortresses at Bobruisk, Mogilev, Vitebsk and Minsk 
which had to be defended with no options for withdrawal. 
The situation on Army Group South Ukraine's Front offered the 
possibility of conducting an elastic defense. The defensive front 
was overextended running from the Carpathians to the Black Sea. 
Colonel General Friessner upon assuming command of Army Group 
South Ukraine was not satisfied with the Rumanian political 
situation and wanted authorization to withdraw the front behind 
the Pruth river and into the Carpathian moutains. This withdrawal 
would have permitted a more flexible and stronger defense against 
Soviet offensive operations. Hitler, however, was not convinced 
and did not authorize a withdrawal to the more defensible terrain. 
Therefore, Hitler was directly responsible for the Wehrmacht's 
failure to conduct an elastic defense in the East and this resulted 
in withdrawals which were too late resulting in the needless 
encirclement and destruction of German divisions. 
The loss of air superiority by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern 
Front was the direct result of fighting a two front war. The 
Luftwaffe's forces were fragmented by having to fight in several 
theaters of operation. The Italian/Balkan Front, Western Front and 
air defense of the Reich consumed the majority of the Luftwaffe's 
aircraft. The Luftwaffe maintained only 44°/o of its aircraft on the 
Eastern Front compared to 56% on the Anglo-American Fronts in 
June 1944. The Luftwaffe suffered 75.4% of its losses on the 
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Anglo-American Fronts and 24.6°/o on the Eastern Front between 
June and October 1944. The Anglo-American air campaign 
significantly altered the balance of power in the air making it 
impossible for the Luftwaffe to deploy greater numbers of aircraft 
in the East. This lack of aircraft in the East did not allow the 
Germans to engage in strategic warfare by bombing the sources of 
aircraft and armor production which would have significantly 
affected the strength of the Red Army and Soviet Air Force. Thus, 
the Soviet Air Force managed to develop numerical superiority 
being opposed by less than half the German Air Force. 
Consequently, the Soviet Air Force had achieved a superiority of at 
least 6:1 in operational aircraft over the Luftwaffe by the summer 
of 1944. Soviet air power played an increasing role in assisting 
the Red Army to achieve its objectives on the ground. Therefore, 
the loss of air superiority by the Luftwaffe in the East and the 
simultaneous rise of Soviet numerical air superiority created an 
untenable situation for the German Army on the defensive in the 
summer of 1944. The Luftwaffe had formerly served as a "fire 
brigade" for the Wehrmacht when it was in trouble and now it was 
no longer capable of meeting the numerous Soviet breakthroughs in 
the East during the summer of 1944. 
Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union provided significant 
supplies which enabled the Red Army to launch offensives with far 
greater endurance and mobility to exploit the initial breakthroughs. 
The first component of the Red Army was the infantryman and he 
was better prepared to fight as a result of Lend-Lease aid. The 
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U.S.S.R. had received 6 million pairs of boots by 1944 and over the 
course of the war Lend-Lease aid provided at least one pound of 
concentrated rations for 6 million soldiers each day for the length 
of the war. The combination of food and clothing undoubtedly 
increased the fighting potential of the Red Army. In fact, Lend-
Lease food aid prevented a civilian caloric drop by an estimated 
one-third. Lend-Lease food supplies, therefore, helped maintain the 
physical strength of the U.S.S.R.'s industrial workers that produced 
the armaments. 
The highly successful, widely separated and far-reaching 
breakthroughs achieved by the Red Army during the summer of 1944 
can be directly linked to the high degree of motorization and 
mechanization achieved by the Red Army by the summer of 1944. 
Lend-Lease aid played a crucial role in the Red Army achieving a 
superior mobility compared to the Wehrmacht in the East. The Red 
Army received approximately 430,000 vehicles by 1944 in Lend-
Lease aid. The vast number of trucks provided motorization for the 
Red Army on an unprecedented scale. The Soviet infantry could 
finally follow the Soviet armor in exploitation of the initial 
penetration and then into the extension of the breakthrough. The 
four and six wheeled trucks permitted supplies to be carried 
overland and therefore Soviet supply trains were not tied to the 
roads and rail lines when conducting offensives. The vast number 
of trucks gave the Red Army superior mobility compared to the 
Wehrmacht. Lend-Lease supplies also permitted the Soviets to 
concentrate their production on armor and aircraft which 
- -------- - -
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facilitated their armaments production. Therefore, the Soviets 
were able to produce approximately 112,952 tanks and assault guns 
compared to the 46,742 vehicles produced by Germany. Thus, Lend-
Lease aid facilitated the long range Soviet offensives conducted 
during the summer of 1944 and thereby played a critical role in the 
collapse of the German Army on the Eastern Front. 
The lack of German mobile reserves in the East during the 
summer of 1944 was a direct result of the Anglo-American second 
front. The German Army stationed 51% of its mobile formations in 
the West to counter Anglo-American offensive operations. The 
German mobile formations consisted of their most elite units and 
the fact that half of these formations were tied down in the West 
was of significant assistance to the Red Army during the summer 
of 1944. Additionally, the West tied down 42% of German non-
mobile divisions consisting primarily of infantry divisions. The 
total military deployment in the West amounted to 128 divisions. 
If the Anglo-American second front had not been a reality the 
number of divisions available to reinforce the East would have been 
substantially greater and the scope of Soviet breakthroughs would 
have been reduced. 
The defense of Belorussia by Army Group Center during the 
winter of 1943-44 was successful as the result of the use of a 
combination of tactics. Army Group Center employed concentrated 
artillery fire and the shifting of reserves along roads and rail lines. 
Mobile reserves consisting of armor units, assault gun battalions 
and motorized antitank units were shifted to the threatened 
sectors of the front to block any imminent Soviet breakthrough. 
This German strategy worked during the winter battles, but the 
Soviet High Command changed their tactics for the summer 
offensive. 
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The Soviets recognized a need to achieve a greater level of 
numerical superiority, more coordination of artillery in the 
breakthrough zones and the need to establish several breakthrough 
areas simultaneously to tie down German reserves preventing 
effective German counterattacks. The Soviet plan for the summer 
offensive incorporated all these changes. The number of divisions 
in the breakthrough areas was increased from 77 to 97 divisions. 
The number of aircraft and artillery was substantially increased. 
Ammunition supplies were increased to permit the Soviets to fire 
massive artillery barrages for days without stop while the 
Germans had to conserve their more limited supply of artillery 
ammunition and could not effectively engage in counter battery 
fire. Six breakthrough sectors were planned which effectively 
dismembered the German defensive front. The depth of the 
operation was also extended further to the west which was 
effective in disrupting German supplies, artillery support and the 
movement of reserves. This combination of Soviet tactics proved 
highly successful in destroying Army Group Center. Army Group 
South Ukraine and the XIII Army Corps in Army Group North Ukraine 
were destroyed by a similiar combination of tactics. 
The German Army at the operational and tactical level in 
Army Group Center made errors which facilitated the Soviet plan to 
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destroy the Army Group. Field Marshal Busch failed to seize the 
initiative and withdraw his divisions once the situation had become 
hopeless and encirclement was inevitable. Busch also failed to 
prepare the Berezina river as a secondary defense line. Field 
Marshal Busch would have had to exercise command in such a way 
as to circumvent Hitler's orders to have preserved his Army Group 
and the necessary actions would have been necessary prior to the 
beginning of the Soviet offensive on June 22, 1944. 
Field Marshal Busch failed to plan for the potential retreat of 
his Army Group and build sufficient bridges across the Berezina 
river to facilitate a rapid withdrawal. More ferrys were also 
necessary but not acquired to facilitate a rapid retreat across the 
river. Field Marshal Busch failed to act in the best interest of his 
troops and instead followed Hitler's orders without regard to the 
preservation of his Army Group. Busch would even support Hitler's 
demands to leave entire divisions in compliance with 
"Fuehrerbefehl Nr. 11" surrounded without attempting to 
circumvent his orders. 
The German High Command made errors by hesitating to move 
reserves in time and in sufficient numbers to reinforce Army Group 
Center before it was too late to prevent a disaster. Furthermore, 
the High Command failed to provide the infantry in Army Group 
Center with sufficient quantities of anti-tank weapons such as the 
Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. The troops instead were burdened 
with cumbersome anti-tank mines which were ineffective 
compared to the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck. Therefore, the 
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combination of Soviet strengths and German weakness and errors 
resulted in the destruction of 28 German divisions and the loss of 
31 generals in Army Group Center. These losses were replaced by 
the transfer of 29 divisions and 7 brigades to Army Group Center to 
fill in the huge hole in the Eastern Front. Consequently, this 
transfer of divisions weakened the other Army Groups on the 
Eastern Front and set the stage for the successive defeat and 
retreat of the remaining Army Groups. 
Army Group North Ukraine was weakened with the collapse of 
Army Group Center by having to transfer significant mobile 
reserves to Army Group Center consisting of the following 
divisions: 3rd Panzer Division, 23rd Panzer Division and 24th 
Panzer Division. This transfer of divisions occurred prior to the 
Soviet offensive against Army Group North Ukraine on July 13, 
1944. Therefore, when the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked Army 
Group North Ukraine and broke through in the three planned sectors 
there were insufficient mobile reserves to stop the main Soviet 
breakthroughs. The primary Soviet advances breaking through on 
the flanks of the XIII Army Corps were successful and the Corps 
was encircled and essentially destroyed. The Germans lost 5 
divisions at the Battle of Brody and the losses of Army Group North 
Ukraine were replaced mostly by transfers of divisions from Army 
Group South Ukraine which weakened this Army Group for the next 
round of Soviet offensive operations. 
Army Group South Ukraine had served as a reserve pool for 
Army Group Center and North Ukraine during the summer of 1944. A 
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total of 11 divisions or nearly one-third of the entire Army Group's 
strength had been transferred since June 1944. Consequently, this 
Army Group was also depleted of mobile reserves. Army Group 
South Ukraine's front extended from the Carpathians to the Black 
Sea which meant that it was overextended and lacked sufficient 
reserves to block Soviet breakthroughs in strength and depth. The 
average divisional sector was 17 kilometers, but the lack of mobile 
reserves made it impossible to contain any large scale 
breakthroughs once this divisional sector had been penetrated. 
Colonel General Friessner had wanted to conduct a defense 
from behind the Pruth river and at the edge of the Carpathian 
moutains which would have been much more defensible and 
permitted a more elastic defense but Hitler and the High Command 
would not allow this operational withdrawal until it was too late. 
Colonel General Guderian, Chief of OKH failed to place a 
Panzer Division in Bucharest to back up Marshal Antonescu's regime 
despite requests from the German Foreign Minister in Berlin. This 
proved critical because the Antonescu regime was to collapse on 
August 23, 1944, and within two days Rumania was to change sides 
in the war and declare war on Germany. The placing of Rumanian 
divisions on the flanks of German divisions was risky and once the 
Rumanians began dropping out of the war the flanks of German 
formations were wide open. Soviet motorized units drove deep into 
the German rear area. The German 6th Army reconstituted after 
Stalingrad now suffered the same fate a second time. The 
Rumanian units on the flanks of the German 6th Army melted away 
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and the Soviets encircled the 6th Army and compressed it until 
most of the 6th Army had been destroyed or capitulated. Army 
Group South Ukraine reported the loss of 18 divisions and 5 Army 
Corps Headquarters from the 6th Army. There were also three 
other divisions that were mostly destroyed in the collapse of Army 
Group South Ukraine. Essentially, 21 German divisions were 
destroyed in the Rumanian debacle. 
Finally, the significance of the collapse of the German Army 
in the East during the summer of 1944 can be determined by 
comparison of losses between the East and the Anglo-American 
Fronts. The number of German troops killed, wounded or missing on 
the Eastern Front from June-August 1944 was 908,806 compared to 
356,591 on the Anglo-American Fronts. Therefore, the Eastern 
Front accounted for 72% and the Anglo-American Fronts 28% of 
total German troop losses. German armored losses in the East 
during the summer of 1944 were 4,631 vehicles which amounted to 
68% compared to 2, 198 or 32% on the Anglo-American fronts. Non-
armored vehicle losses in the East were 48,694 or 52% compared to 
45,504 or 48% in the West. German armored shipments to the East 
consisted of 75% of all armored reinforcements while only 25% 
were sent to the Anglo-American Fronts. Non-armored vehicle 
shipments by contrast were almost equally split between the East 
and West with 52°/o to the East and 48°/o to the West. Therefore, the 
bulk of armored and non-armored vehicles were sent to the East to 
reinforce the crumbling front. A total of 64 German generals were 
lost in the East compared to 26 generals in the West during the 
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summer of 1944. German divisional losses in the East amounted to 
52 divisions or 62% compared to 32 divisions or 38% in the West 
during the summer of 1944. The Germans only suffered greater 
losses in the West from the Anglo-American air campaign. The 
Luftwaffe lost 75% of its aircraft in the West compared to 25% in 
the East. 
Therefore, the collapse of the German Army in the East was 
the most decisive military event during the Summer of 1944 based 
upon the military losses suffered by the German Army and was the 
result of the following factors: German Intelligence failures; 
German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-
Lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed 
in the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive 
doctrine and tactics. The lack of attention given to the Soviet 
contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany during the Summer of 
1944 in the history textbooks in the West has been an act of 
omission which has lead to a lack of understanding by people in the 
West of the significant contributions made by the Soviet Union 
during the period of the Allied invasion of France. However, Soviet 
historiography, likewise, has neglected an examination of the 
Anglo-American contributions which directly facilitated its defeat 
of the German Army in the East during the Summer of 1944. The 
end of the Cold War will hopefully produce an environment where 
more objective and balanced history can be written in the West and 
East about the contributions of both the Soviet and Anglo-American 
Allies in the defeat of Nazi Germany. 
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APPENDIX A 
GERMAN MILITARY FORMATIONS 
SOURCE: Staff of Strategy & Tactics Magazine, War In The East: 
The Russo-German Conflict. 1941-45.New York: 
Simulations Publications, Incorporated, 1977. 
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KEY TO SYMBOLOGY 
USED IN THE DIAGRAMS 
IN SECTIONS IV ANO V 
~ lnfanlry 
~ Mechanized lnfanlry IPanzergrenadierl 
lc:::>I AmKH Of tank IP1nzerl 
§ Annored Reconnaluance 
lZl C.Vafry 
[!] Altillery 
~ Self-propelled Artillery 
~ Anti· Tank 
~ Anti-Aircreft IFl1kl 
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••• Ptetoon 
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ITPICAL GERMAN ARMY 
THE GERMAN 17Tif ARMY 27 JUNE 1941 
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C8J11 
I (I U 
s@12s C8:J 97L ~ IOOL . 
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52 k:" k' • 101L 1 24 
257 HJ<... I 71 
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~T~., 
~r6·" 
1r .. 1f 1"J12 
Q 
262 
Til'ICAL GERMAN PANZER AR.Ml' 





12 l-4C'.)l 24 ~c::>I47 l-k::ll46 ~+0•15 .s 
MG 
3" u ..71'1 ~ ~ 17 SS'OR' '' + .. 
~ ~·J ~7 
~ 1.J 
45 Hc::>l4 d2'! 1a ~" ~1~1+!a::il12 
31 ttC>Jl ttESI 29 GO 
[6JtEJ 113 








1987 men 161 SMG 
334 SMG fB MG 
131 MG l3a105 H 
1:Z.81 Mir 9a1SO H 
81120 Mir 26 MT 
36 ATL 329 HO 





GERMAN INFANTRY DIVISIONS 
1939 '"" LW Men 17.734 12.n2 9.800 
lnf•ntry a.cm 5,500 4,100 
LMG 378 614 1200 
HMG 138 102 549 
ATL 90A 108 • 
SOMtr 93 • • 
81 Mtr 54 54 42 
120Mtr • 32 24 
20Gun 12 13 12 
7SATGun 7Sx37 22x75 20x7S 
75How 20 19 12 --- . 
105How 36 34 36L 
150How 18C 1SC 4M 
MT 1009 617 54J 
HD 918 1365 726 
Horses 4,842 3,979 2.734 
AFV 30 10 • 
FPF 6.2 7.0 4.8 
Raised 216 1~ 21 
ABBREVIATIONS: 
Men• total "papt1r'' ( fulfl strt1ngrh of unit: lnfan1rv • all 
~n in infantry, rt1conna11Sanct1. and t1flf}inttr bar· 
ta/ions: LW = Luftwafft! infantry; VG .. volksgrt1naCJ1tu: 
Min• mountain infantry; LI= light mfanrrv: FJ =fall· 
schirm1agt1r lparachutt! light infanrryl; PG= pan1t1r· 
grt1nad1t1r. Artv "'art11/t1ry; 50 m11 181. 1201 = Sl\-nm 
IBTmm. 120mml mortar: 20 gun= 20mm anr1·alfcr~ft 











2nd l!t 3rd 
1945 VG Mtn 1939 Lt Mtn 1939 
11.909 10.00J 24.956 14.500 17,188 
5,100 4.700 7,00J e.eoo 7 
462 2064 396 1100 275 
74 423 96 517 n 
222 216 54A 54A • 
• • 81 63 66 
54 42 54 42 36 
25 24 • 28 • 
lOH 9H 12 63 • 
3h75 9x75 1b37 60G 48x37 
29 561 18 14 12 
25 24 36 36R 16 
18C 12 12 12 8 
38S 426 1140 100) 871 
1273 1142 1007 700 659 
3.608 3.002 7,405 3,300 4,845 
14 14 • • • 
6.6 5.9 3.7 4.7 7 
• 13V 13W 16 2 
gun; 75 How 1105. 1501 • 75mm ( 105mm. 150mml 
how1Ut1r; FPF,. flff! powt1r factor;~ of Div I arty I= pt1r· 
ct!nt of d1v1s1on11I hit! powt1r gt1nt1r11rt1d by 11rrtllt1ry 
1PIJ•mt1nr. MG ILMG. HMGJ., m11chint1gun !light. ht111vvL· 
ATL = 11nt1·tanli roclit1r launcht1rs; SMG = submachint1· 
gun: FT = flamt! throwt1r: AFV = 11rmort1d f1ghrin9 
•t1/'11clt1: AG"' llSsaultgun; AC= armort1dc11r; Pz Ill !IV. V. 
VII= Panrt1r /II llV. V. VII rank: MT"' motor transport 
•t1h1dt1; HO= horst1·dr11wn vt1h1c/t1 
1944 GERMA~ INFANTRY REGIMENT 
INFANTRY REGIMENTS 
1933 1944 VG 1945 
Men 3060 1987 1854 1849 .. 
LMG 85 107 srn 79 
HMG 26 24 95 16 
ATL Tl 36 72 72 
50Mtr 27 • • • 
81 Mtr 18 12 12 12 
120Mtr • 8 8 8 . . 
20Gun • • • • 
75ATGun 12 3 • • 
751G How 6 8 12 8 
150 IG How2 2 • 2 
MT 73 45 9 9 
HO 210 242 219 220 






•a 12{) Mtr 
8 MT 
92 HO 










Pz Div Mot Div PzDiv PzDiv PGDiv 
IArmd !Mor IAtmd (Mot (Mot 
R~I R~gl R~I R~gl R~I 
L W '41 Pz '41 Mot ''4 PzA ''4 PzM ''4PG SSPG 
2645 2200 3250 2294 2258 3020 3242 
251 172 151 336 235 316 443 
202 150 130 250 170 z:J7 322 
• 18 Tl • • • • 
• 18 27 • • • • 
18 12 18 14 ,. 18 2D 
12 • • 8 8 12 12 
• 8 • 25 12 18 43 
3 6 12 • • 9 • 
8 8 8 • • • • 
2 2 2 • • • • 
51 420 486 ~ :m 502 5I1 
244 • • • • • • -• • • 18 8 6 18 
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Mtn Lt Ruu 
3650 3650 2474 
142 232 650 
174 174 207 
Tl• Z71 S4a 
Z7 27 18 
18 18 Tl 
12 12 7 
• 12 12b 
12 12 • 
8 8 4 
• • • 
88 103 21 
249 240 148 
• • • 
929 
19~ INFANTRY BATIALIO:"i 
C8Jr7o8-nl 
~ ~ a 
142-n 205 men 1651 
28 SMG :1951.,G 
15MG 9 ~1G 




GERMAN INFANTRY BATTALIONS " 41 "" "" 41 PGA PGM PGA PGM PGM 
1939 1944 VG LW 1945 Mtn Lr fPzl I Mori IPzl IMorJ IPzl Russ 
Men 850 780 6-12 668 644 rn an 910 850 867 868 955 619 
SMG 62 127 2SJ 107 256 71 71 B2 62 179 91 97 145 
MG 48 55 38 57 38 52 52 145 48 127 72 72 69 
SOMtr 9 • • • • 9 9 • 9 • • • 6 
81 Mtr 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 
120Mtr • 4 • 4 • 4 • • • 4 4 • • 
75How • • 4 • 4 2 2 4 • • • 4 • 
20Gun • • • • • • • • • 18 6 6 2 
75Gun 9 • • • • • • 21 • • • 12 • 
AFV • • • • • • • • • 12 • • • 
MT 11 8 2 6 2 • 16 130 125 158 14J 140 • 
HD 104 92 70 82 70 211 97 • • • • • 27 
Hors!'s 177 165 1:s 139 1:5 271 182 • • • • • '4J 
930 
1944 GER.MAN AR.MORED DIVISION 
.. 
(c::::>j 114.727 menl 
~ lc::::>J ~0 12223"71 !20061 (14511 "' 









I I I I I 1 @w .. CJ ~ [§ § 
GERMAN TANK REGIMENTS 
1942-43 1944 SS 1945 Russ 
Men 3000 2006 1n1 1361 1306 
SMG 182 Z79 245 m 1200 
MG 307 363 296 172 410 
20Gun 12 24 6 l3 • 
37Gun • 8 8 8 • 
Pzlll 54 • • • • 
PzlV 54 89 64 • • 
PzV • 79 82 54 66 
AG 31 • • • • 
AC 6 • • • • 
MT 537 654 313 250 156 
AFV • 12 • 49 • 
19~ MOTORIZED 
INFANTRY DIVISION <PG~> 
.. 
I§ 114.738 menl 
.. 
~ ~ 10 
131071 16021 11~1 
@) 
Acnl10051 




GERMAN MOTORIZED DIVISIONS 
FJ PG 1g,1PG1944 Pr 1g,1 Pr,,., Pr 19'5 SSP, 
Men 15971 16'00 14731 15600 14727 11•22 17200 
Infantry a.tOO 7100 7000 5600 S200 4700 7100 
LMG Xl2e 110 111 l50 1239 2100 20!iO 
HMG 1010 712 IOI 1oe7 n 150 15'5 
Afl ~ 1131 • •S.. . • • 
50Mrr • 57 • • • • • 
11 Mir 12S le M JO 52 JS 51 
120Mlr 93 • 21 • ,, 20 24 
20Gu" l9 12 71 74 102 109 152 
75 AT Gun 21 13 ,, 7!ig 13 JI 12 
75HowlG 20 14 • 18 • • . 
105H- • • 41 • 29! )I 42n 
105H- 12 11! 20 160 21 II lOk 
"'T 2141 2&10 1741 2900 2417 2171 l329 
HO • • • • . • • 
"°"" • • • • • . • AFV 14 112 105 165 50l 112 2JI ,,, 1.7 74 91 ,. 100 I.I 142 
~ .. d • 161 15 27 25 Of>I 7 
931 
....,.,. ,.,,,. T•nll 
10900 9'ICIO 11900 
l60 IJOO :slO 
1101 2200 2963 
113 147 517 
• 211-, 207y 
• IJ • 
I IJv 52y 
4 21 42 
Sol . 16y 
12 "' !Mr • • • 
5& 12y " IOI . .
2SZ2 1112 1110 
• 642 • 
l&IO 1 1 
93 . 240 
13 0 40 u 
1 790 21 
19-13-44 GERMAN ARTILLERY Dl\lSION 
cp 
r+; rt; [!:]• rn 
II II If It lo to 
lml [!] m [!] [!] [!] [!] [!] m 
1b105H 1b105H la150H 1b105H .. 150H !hl10G 12al05H 811SOH 9a.210H 
SalSOH •alOOG ••IOOG ••IOOG 
GERMA~ ARTILLERY REGIMENT 
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h 









GERMAN ARTlllERY REGIMENTS 
1m ,,.,, LW VG Mt1t Lt 
Men 3172 2013 1155 1741 2750 2550 
SMG • 161 109 Ill 103 125 
MG lO G 43 •S 2' lO 
IO!iH- JI lJ 33 2• 2• . 
105Gun . . • . 36 . 
lSOH- 12 ' • 12 12 • 75Gun • • • 11 11 • 
a Gun • • 12 • • • 
MT 155 21 • 99 •2 217 
HO 240 m IOI as - 201 HOf'MI 220I 17f7 - 1062 2100 121• FPF 317 3 .• 2.13 210 118 1..90 
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8cyll8371 277 MG 
2111 Mir 



















9MG I 4MG 
12 105H t 11 Mir 





























I 11 Mir 






t l . . 
C8I [5;2l 
1561 1451 
11 MG 2MG 9ATL 
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GERllllAN RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS 
/j)j '"' VG LW 
,,,,,,, LI """ ~" 6.23 7QI 200 120 150 m tcS 
SllllG • 127 " 27 SJ 112 2Dot llllG 22 '9 10 11 20 2J 133 
11M1r • • 2 2 l • 10 
120111111 . 4 . . . • . 
lOG"" . • . . . • 7 
75Gu" 2 . 2 . 2 2 • 
AG • • • • • • iJ 
AC 2 • . • . • 11 
MT ,, • . s • 41 1tc 
E:"tGL"iEER BAITAllOl'iS 
ENGINEER BA TT Al IONS 
ISJS 1944 VG LW 
Mt" 779 620 <M2 J97 
SMG 32 71 11 ZJ 
MG 27 37 2l 2' 
11M1r • ' 4 4 20Gun • . • • 
FT 20 20 12 14 
ltid9•• • • • • 
MT 11 17 12 3 
HO ,, 52 l5 35 























































ltuu .,,., SSPt 11141 
174 .. 164 
102 102 15 
102 IOS 
• • • 
l ' • 20 20 • 
• • 
174 212 4 
• • ' . • • 
GERJ\IA:" TA~K BATTALIO:"'S 
[§ 
~R 











I~~ ,,.1~ IM 1'44 SS SS AGI AQ nGtll 
950 MO 1S2 ... 119 716 .. az .. , ., ., ts ICU ICU 111 • 2111 '°' llS 135 Ill II• 133 1.)5 <IO .. IOI 
• • 12 t.2 12 12 • • 12 
10 . • • • • • • • 
• 10 • • • • • • • • • • 96 • 96 . • • 
• • • • • • • • 4S 
• • • • . • ll •5 • 
1•1 141 .. 117 " 127 IS ICU ll7 









1943 1944 VG 
M~n 551 <&84 460 
SMG 47 81 26 
MG 6 29 JO 
20Gun 12 48 9 
75Gun 36 12 9 
AG • 10 10 
PzVI • • • 






l. W '4Pl Tig~r 
350 475 915 
39 59 127 
17 37 60 
12 • 12 
14 12 • 
• 21 • 
• • 45 
88 102 192 
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SOVIET MILITARY FORMATIONS 
SOURCE: Staff of Strategy & Tactics Magazine, War In The East: 
The Russo-German Conflict. 1941-45.New York: 
Simulations Publications, Incorporated, 1977. 
KEY TO SYMBOLOGY 
USED IN THE DIAGRAMS 
IN SECTIONS IV AND V 
C8J lntentry 
§ Mechanized Infantry (P1nzergren1dierl 
[c::>J Armor Of 11nk IP1nzerl 
@ Armored Reconnaiuanc1 
0 C.V1lry 
[!] Artifl11y 
[ml Self-propelled Artillery 
~ Anti-Tank 
~ Anli-Aircraft IFl1kl 
~ Rocket Artillery 
lBJ Engineer 




ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE SYMBOLS 
••• Platoon 
Comc>1ny Of Battery 
II B111alion 




xx xx Anny 
937 
1942..tS SOVlET INFANTRY ARMY 
~ 120.000-40,000 men I 
@n ...... ~1 m 
Somet1me1 2 122/,1.~2H 132~LC21JI 













~ [81 ~ 




~ ~ BJ 118001 Rcnl2901 Cn191124001 Cnat n I 2501 .. .. .. .. 
[8J [8J 14001 [,.,.., J ,,.....,, 
Sc1vl6001 Ptn.il&OOJ RRMn1 TIJOOI 
0 
19·1~.0001 
l;;I 140.65,000 men) 
I 
~10 11900~,...,, ~ ·; ·;;·; 
14761 (170022001 













1941 SOVIET TANK BRJGADE 
I 
lo) I 1700 men I 
.. 




















Ren 12201 .76G 15461 
Rlct 12131 SU 8514401 " .. 
~ ~ 



































MOTORIZED RIFLE BRIGADE 
• 
~13247menl 
.. .. II 
~ 11991(!] [!] 821120 Mtr 76G 12241 
662 men 
I I 
241 SMG C8J C8J S4MG 
18ATA SMG 11001 Acn 11441 
6 82 Mir . I 
4 45 G §] ~ 
43MT 11211 MG 1481 
0 
12201 
120 M11 SU 1221152 Acn 12201 78Gl~I .. .. 
cg) IS?2I c!J-@ 













82M1r 1431 ~ 45G 1171 
~~~ ATA 1231 MG 1581' ... [8J 














@ "' . " C8l ~ [!] 998men Ren (741 
2474 tMft 
208SMG .. 
f50SMG 18MG ~ 107MG 38ATR 12331 SoC ATR 
24 76G .. 19 50Mu 
12 122 H [!SJ 1181 Mtr 48MT 
11641 1 120 Mtr 99HO . '2 45 G 















12/42 SOVIET RIFLE REGIME~I 
~12474 ...... 1 
~ M01GJf0 120 Ml,. 76 H • 741 
819mtft . . 
145 SMG 
~ ~ 69MG 
9 ATR ATR 1731 45 G '351 
6 50 Mlf . 
9 82 Mlf 











~ [!] m 115501 Ren (JOO 120Mtr(450I t32Rll2251 .. 5rntn 
tett!SMG " " ... " 
221MG [SJ [!5l @ ~ 
1t2 ATA f2150I 12901 su.-12111 45012431 
3882Mtr ... "' t2 t20Mtr ~ ~ 
837G 78Ci1'981 37Gl3971 
t245G 























~ 145010 [2j 
1144 men 120Mtr/7SG Ren I 1101 
485SMG ' . 
49MG ~ ~ 
32ATR 1531 37Gl801 
t2 82Mtr .. 
445G 1~1 





RECONNAISSANCE BA 1T ALJON 
~1220"*'1 
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l942-4S SOVIET ARTILLERY DMSION 1941--45 SOVIET ROCKET 
LAUNCHER (M.J3) "BRJGAD[ 
I I 
(!]Mrr (!]L1 
1705 rMn 2063tMn 
135SMG 256SMG 
67MG 39MG 
108 ATA 72ATA 












. ~ " (!]Mid. Gun QJ001 212111*t fw1 Con1rol 
lDISMG ,, 
27MG ~ 
36 A TR 12551 
t2122G 








24 132 Al 
llOMT 
1942-45 SOVIET SELF-PROPELLED 
ARTlllERY REGIMENT 
(ci>J 1440/06 menl 
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~+~ 














" . " 0 ~37G ~85G Ctoot 
397 """ 620rnen 
t02SMG 110SMG 
18MG teMG 
16 37G t685G 
57 MT ISMT 
1942-45 SOVIET 
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lt231 









~SMG 1403 nwnl 
·~· [!] ~ 
12 MTR 1811 46G 1371 
~-!-181 




MOTORIZED ANTI· TANK IU(GIMENT 
~ls.e&menl 
. 
~ ~;" Mmen 8SMG 2MG 1211 
4780 0 IMT 
11801 
1941-tS SOVIET RIFLE BRIGADE . 
C8:)14-5000 men) 
m ~ C8J '' .. ~ [!] ~ 76G(2001 
700750meit 
120Mtr 12001 SMG 13001 Rc;nl401 

















9 82 Mu 


























12/42 SOVIET RIFLE BATIALION 
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Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte 
An Armeen, Befh.i.Weissruthenien 
Fuehrer Order No. 11 
948 
H.Qu., den 11.3.1944 
(Commandants of Fortified Areas and Battle Commandants) 
1 . A distinction will be made between "Fortified Areas" 
[festen Plaetzen), each under a "Fortified Area Commandant", and 
"Local Strong-points"[Ortsstuetzpunkten], each under a "Battle 
Commandant". 
The "Fortified Areas" will fulfil the function of fortresses in 
former historical times. They will ensure that the enemy does not 
occupy these areas of decisive operational importance. They will 
allow themselves to be surrounded, thereby holding down the 
largest possible number of enemy forces, and establishing 
conditions favorable for successful counterattacks. 
"Local Strong-points" are strong-points deep in the battle 
area, which will be tenaciously defended in the event of enemy 
penetration. By being included in the main line of battle they will 
act as a reserve of defense and, should the enemy break through, as 
hinges and corner-stones for the front, forming positions from 
which counter-attacks can be launched. 
2. Each "Fortified Area Commandant" should be a specially 
selected, hardened soldier, preferably of General's rank. He will be 
appointed by the Army Group concerned. Fortified Area 
Commandants will be personally responsible to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army Group. 
Fortified Area Commandants will pledge their honor as 
soldiers to carry out their duties to the last. 
Only the Commander-in-Chief of .an Army Group in person 
may, with my approval, relieve the Fortified Area Commandant of 
his duties, and perhaps order the surrender 
of the fortified area. 
Fortified Area Commandants are subordinate to the 
Commander of the Army Group, or Army, in whose sector the 
fortified area is situated. Further delegation of command to 
General Officers commanding formations will not take 
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place. 
Apart from the garrison and its security forces, all persons 
within a fortified area, or who have been collected there, are under 
the orders of the Commandant, irrespective of whether they are 
soldiers.or civilians, and without regard to their rank or 
appointment. 
The Fortified Area Commandant has the military rights and 
disciplinary powers of a Commanding General. In the performance 
of his duties he will have at his disposal mobile courts martial and 
civilian courts. 
The staff of Fortified Area Commandants will be appointed by 
the Army Group concerned. The Chiefs of Staff will be appointed by 
High Command of the Army, in accordance with suggestions made by 
the Army Group. 
3. The garrison of a fortified area comprises: 
the security garrison, and 
the general garrison. 
The security garrison must be inside the fortified area at all 
times. Its strength will be laid down by Commander-in-chief Army 
Group, and will be determined by the size of the area and the tasks 
to be fulfilled (preparation and completion of defenses, holding the 
fortified area against raids or local attacks by the 
enemy). 
The general garrison must be made available to the 
Commandant of the fortified area in sufficient time for the men to 
have taken up defensive positions and be installed when a full-
scale enemy attack threatens. Its strength will be laid down by 
Commander-in-Chief Army Group, in accordance with the size of 
the fortified area and the task which is to be performed (total 
defense of the fortified area). 
4. The "Battle Commandant" comes under the orders of the 
local forces commander. He will be appointed by him, will be 
subordinate to him, and will receive operation orders from him. His 
rank will depend upon the importance of the position in the battle 
area and the strength of the garrison. His duties call for specially 
energetic officers whose qualities have been proved in crisis. 
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5. The strength of the garrisons of a "Local Strong-point" 
will be determined by the importance of the position and the forces 
available. It will receive its orders from authorities to which the 
Battle Commandant is subordinate. 
6. The duties of "Fortified Area Commanders" and "Battle 
Commandants" as well as a list of fortified areas, and of reports on 
them submitted by Army Groups, are contained in the appendices. 
7. All previous orders concerning Battle Commandants are hereby 
cancelled. 
signed: ADOLF HITLER 
Source: Adolf Hitler, Fuehrerbefehl Nr. 11. 8.3.44. NAMP T-311 
Roll 228. 
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